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
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THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, in conformity with the objectives of its publishers, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the JOURNAL or the Institute.

IN CONTINUANCE of its fifteen-year-old aim of helping to increase knowledge of the Middle East among Americans, the Institute has recently published a monograph on *Institutions of Higher Learning in the Middle East*. The publication reveals that approximately a quarter of a million Middle Easterners are now studying at the university level. Almost ten percent are in Western Europe and the United States and just over three percent (8,886) are in Western institutions in the region, but the great majority are at national institutions in sixteen Middle Eastern countries. Close to half of these students are in the United Arab Republic and roughly half of the institutions have been established since World War II. The monograph makes no judgments or recommendations but paints a picture of higher education for the Middle East today which is very different from what it was late in the nineteenth century when most of the area's university students other than those at "university mosques" or military academies were enrolled in French or American institutions situated in the Ottoman Empire.

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ZU'AMĀ' AND PARTIES IN THE
LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

Arnold Hottinger

POLITICS in Lebanon seems to evolve on two different planes: an onstage of official government and parliamentary political life and a backstage of personal, confessional, regional group, family and interest group politics. Such a statement could be made for any country. But what singles out Lebanon is the fact that the onstage has remarkably little connection with the backstage and, needless to say, that the backstage decisions, invisible as they are, are the ones that really count.

It seems many times as if the visible government were only performing for form's sake. Debates are held, but their issue does not, as a rule, influence the decisions of those who are really in charge of the country. Parliamentary debates may even be held after the decisions have already been made or a compromise has been reached and accepted by "everybody." Elections take place, but the real issue is usually not which candidate wins in the actual elections. It is rather who—and in what form—is allowed to organize the elections. Ministers resign, but the real issue is whether the President will accept their resignation (if not, they will be back at work the following day). There are political parties with programs and secretaries, but most of them are

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not parties; they are rather associations of "strong men," or simply a client group clustering around some dominant personality.

The following study does not attempt to explain how and why the specific Lebanese form of separation into onstage and backstage political life came into existence. In answering such questions one would have to dwell on the imposition of a political system, originally foreign to Lebanon, on the peculiar and still vigorous traditional system of politics in the Lebanese mountains. One would have to trace the unique process by which the alien concept and the traditional way of life were flexibly joined together in the course of the mandate, as well as during the development of independent Lebanon—loosely linked together, and not amalgamated up to the present day.

This is not our object here. What this study proposes is merely to describe the actual functioning of the system, backstage above all, since this appears to be the decisive plane. How can a foreigner penetrate this peculiar and essential sphere of Lebanese politics?

The Lebanese disturbances of 1958 afforded a unique insight into the inner workings of Lebanese politics. For six months there was practically no play onstage. The façade of official government had to a large extent broken down. But the country did not really fall into anarchy. The backstage took over. For five months it governed and fought without disguise. Each group was forced to come into the open and to reveal its structure, power, intentions, leadership, force of appeal to the in-group and to the country at large in its struggle with its opponents and in competition with its allies. They could all be observed in action until, eventually, a new compromise was worked out among them and the respectable cloak of parliamentary government was again draped over it all.

What groups did emerge? We shall try to give a short characterization of the principal ones: first, the interest groups functioning under the leadership of different *zu'amā'*; then, briefly, the army and its role; and, finally, the parties and their more modern development.

The za'im

Many of the political groups have one thing in common: they are led by chiefs, heads, leaders, strong men. Arabic has one precise word for it: *zu'amā'* (sg. *za'im*). What is a *za'im*? It appears that in peacetime a *za'im* is the recognized leader of a community who has the power to speak for his clients as a group or as individuals, who is expected to take action in their and in his interest whenever necessary. In peacetime he is the man to whom an individual, of a certain traditional outlook in life, will go if he has business to transact with somebody stronger than himself, and above all, with the government. The *za'im* may also have some business relationship with his clients, as

landlord, as employer, or as someone who obtains employment for a client through intercession with a third party with whom the *za'im* may be involved in some way. The *za'im* will protect "his" clients and will foster his own interests at the same time as theirs.

In times of war the *za'im* takes the field himself, or, if he is too old, deputizes a son. The group bound to him by the manifold ties of interest and loyalty serves as his armed following. This may or may not be reinforced by a hired bodyguard of *qabaḍayā*. As in times of peace, only more so, the *za'im* is responsible for the fate of his followers. If one of them falls in combat, the *za'im* will have to go to his family and offer some kind of compensation or help, on pain of being deserted by his remaining followers. His help and protection are accorded for a price. In times of war, the price is armed assistance and soldiering under his orders; in times of peace, it is less visible, moral, political and commercial allegiance to the *za'im* himself, to his family, and to the local group under their sway.

It is clear that the degree of interdependence of a *za'im* and his followers can vary. The closest ties exist normally between the *za'im* and his immediate household, family, servants, financial dependents and their relatives, etc. (the Latin *familia*). In the cities there is frequently a large group of people employed in the enterprises of the *za'im* and in companies in which the *za'im* or his family hold a controlling interest. In the country there are the peasants working the land owned by the *za'im*, and over them his agents, administrators and overseers in different capacities with their families. The more outlying circles are formed by more independent people to whom the *za'im* has once rendered a service or who hope that he may render them service when necessary.

Allegiance to the *za'im* is in peacetime exteriorized by visiting him. He is visited not only when help, intercession, protection, etc. are needed, but also at the "right" time intervals and in the "suitable" fashion (varying with the position of each client) to show that the client still belongs to his party and does want to be at his disposal, just as he expects the *za'im* to be at his disposal.

How does one become a *za'im*? It is usually an inherited position. Money, influence, power, the right touch with clients are prerequisites. The son of a family of *zu'amā'* who possesses most of the necessary qualities (or is at least believed to possess them) will become the *za'im* of his generation. He need not be the oldest son. On occasion new *zu'amā'* may possibly appear, but in today's Lebanon most of them are traditional. The *homines novi* come from a different background and tend towards new forms of power concentration. They are usually not recognized as *zu'amā'* by the people; of these we shall speak later.

Lebanese Zu'amā'

Having moved so far in the realm of abstractions we can now return to the reality of the Lebanese situation. It becomes obvious that not every *za'im* is the same as his colleague and competitor. The leader of a city group will employ different ways with "his" people than the leader in a rural community. A rural *za'im* will behave differently when he "leads" "his own" peasants or when he leads a community of more or less independent "freeholders" who own their land. There will be subtle as well as quite obvious differences among *zu'amā'* of a Maronite, a Druze, a Shi'i, a Sunni and an Orthodox community. There are also within the religious groups or regional communities "big" and "little," powerful and less powerful, upcoming *zu'amā'* and *zu'amā'* on their way out. Finally, quite important in an activity so much centered around the imponderabilia of personality, there will be individual differences in outlook, education, methods of leadership and accumulation of power, individual idiosyncrasies which in turn influence and are influenced by the special "collective personality" of the group that is led.

We can only hope to give a rough sketch of the principal groups and their leaders in action as they revealed themselves during the months of the crisis. One of the southern *zu'amā'*, Qāzim al-Khalil, from Tyre, (*Şūr*) was a minister of the government which he supported during the whole crisis of 1958. He was obliged to stay in Beirut under the protection of the government forces; and at the end of the emergency, when he tried to return to his native territory, he was attacked several times by gunmen. The South during the crisis was dominated solidly by the As'ad family, great proprietors and Shi'is, and by the Sunni leader of Sidon (*Saida*) Ma'ruf Sa'd. The role of the militant leaders fell to Sa'd and to Kāmil al-As'ad, the son of Ahmad, the great southern landlord and politician. They kept their territory free from government interference, collaborating with the *National Front* (the overall organization of the anti-government groups); but they did not prove to be aggressive, contending themselves with holding their territory and not attacking any of the major regions where they had no traditional influence over the inhabitants.

When the crisis lasted much longer than had been foreseen Kāmil al-As'ad let it be known several times that he would be at the disposal of both sides, "government" and "revolution," for mediation and for the elaboration of a compromise in order to end the crisis. (cf. *Orient*, Beirut, 29. 6. 58, partly reprinted in *Oriente Moderno* 1958 p. 609 f).

The reasons for the attitude of the As'ads are easy to find; they are Shi'is and landowners. They opposed Sham'un and the government in their quality of liberals, pro-westerners and of people who had, with some limited success, tried to oust them and their political dependents from the districts they were

used to head as deputies. The fact that the Sham'ūni forces had not, in the case of the As'ads, fully succeeded in driving them out, doubtlessly mitigated their opposition to the government.

The attacks of the Sham'ūni government had gone under the name of a campaign against "political feudalism" (*cf.* C. G. Hess and H. L. Bodman, Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics." *MEJ* 1954, pp. 10-26). The government tried to break the power of some of the big *zu'amā'* (especially when they were against Sham'ūn in the legislative elections of 1953 and more energetically in those of 1957, by reallocating the electoral districts in such a way that they cut across the boundaries of the traditional regional and religious territories of certain *zu'amā'*.

The Druze leader Junblāt, for instance, would find himself forced to campaign in a district only partly Druze and partly Christian, the Sunni *za'im* Ṣā'ib Salām in a section of Beirut which only partly belonged to his Muslim followers, partly to other, not his own client groups. This reallocation was at the time openly praised by the government as "destroying political feudalism." It was partly successful in-so-far as it kept certain *zu'amā'* out of parliament. But it did not destroy "feudalism;" it only closed the official eye of the state to the social fact of "feudalism," refusing its recognition (above all when the "feudalists" happened to be of the Druze, or pro-Arab and anti-Sham'ūn variety). It challenged in this way certain *zu'amā'* who had been excluded from what they (and their clients) felt as their due share in the affairs of the state.

Why is the position of a deputy so important for a *za'im*? This is one of the points where the onstage play hinges upon the backstage. To be a deputy gives the *za'im* the consecration of modernity. It adds to his real basis of power, the one back home as the head of his group, a modern façade exhibited in many cases with much complacency. It also gives many and manifold material advantages. It puts the *za'im* on the level of a privileged person in all negotiations with the state. By becoming a deputy his role as one of the leaders is recognized by the state and the administrative machine. This makes the position of a deputy for an important *za'im* a political "must." He cannot afford to lose it for an indefinite period.

For Kamāl Junblāt it was presumably especially bitter on personal grounds to be cast out of parliament. In the person of Junblāt many modern ideologies and modern political ambitions are blended strangely with the inherited position of a Druze tribal leader and the son of a great Druze *amirah* who had been endowed, so many believed, with prophetic gifts. Ideology and "philosophy" militate in Junblāt for "modernity." He is the founder and leader of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party. At the same time, he is, whether he wants it or not, the head of the Junblāti clan of the Druze in the *Shūf*. His

"feudal" position is the source of his political strength and even of the strength of "his" socialist party. It can not be quite easy for him to acknowledge the fact. His exclusion from the assembly must have meant for him that he was thrust back into "feudal society" which welcomed him loyally, enthusiastically, but which he himself did not welcome, at least not entirely.

The Shūf had already risen tentatively in April. There had also been disturbances in Tyre and Sidon. There is no doubt that the country was saturated with arms (smuggled over the frontier from Syria) and that pan-Arab propaganda had done its work. Connections between the Syrian Druze (of the Jabal Druze) and the Lebanese Druze of the Shūf have always been close. During the emergency the ancestral castle of the Junblāt was the seat of an enthusiastic amateur government. Junblāt himself worked hard at the task of keeping his retainers in order.

By no means all the Druze belong to the Junblāt faction. There is also that of Arslān. The Amir Majid Arslān was a minister of Sham'ün's government. He, being the head of the rival Druze faction, had his retainers fight for the government. His "troops," with the help of Na'im Mughabghab and his retainers, reinforced by some gendarmerie, took the brunt of the Junblāti attack on the airport (June 15th). During the whole of the emergency there were several more clashes between the two rival Druze clans. There had also been at least two different truces between the Druze factions, leaving Mughabghab, a Christian, alone to deal with the Junblāti forces. Druze religious men (*Shaykh 'Aql*) mediated these truces.

Na'im Mughabghab was the adventurous politican who had become a deputy in place of Junblāt. He was also an active combatant. (He was killed on a visit to the Shūf, July 27, 1959. His murderers escaped through Junblāti territory to Syria). His retainers, mostly his immediate family and friends from the Christian enclave in Druze territory: Dayr al-Qamar and Bayt al-din had headquarters in Beirut. Dayr al-Qamar and Bayt al-din themselves were successfully defended by gendarmerie against the Druze. After some initial fighting there was also a truce between Druze and gendarmerie allowing for Christian villages and their defenders to be provisioned from Beirut. In return wounded Druze were brought to Beirut to receive medical treatment.

In the rebellious part of the capital, Baṣṭā and adjoining quarters, Ṣā'ib Salām claimed "military leadership." This does not mean that he was the only *za'im* in the Muslim part of Beirut. There was even one small "Christian group" under Armenian Khantchak leadership amongst the rebels of Baṣṭā. There were also the clients of politicians such as 'Abdallāh Yāfi, Mashnūq, 'Uwayni. The *zu'amā'* would drive there undisturbed. Fighting usually took place in the afternoons and at night, also in several instances over the weekend. At those times Salām would be back in his own mansion in Baṣṭā. He would sit

there in one small room (the house had been shelled once during the troubles) near the telephone, receive visitors and subordinates, listen to reports and give orders over the city telephone or write little notes to his lieutenants.

The armed men all over Baṣṭā were paid at fixed rates. They received family allowances and free food and cigarettes while in service. I do not claim to know where the money for these payments came from, but there is little doubt that the *zu'amā'* themselves contributed, that rich Muslims who lived in Baṣṭā or owned property there were forced to contribute if they did not voluntarily do so. It seems most probable that some money came from certain embassies in Beirut.

In Tripoli fighting was most violent. The great mass of the people (Sunni) felt themselves clients of the Karāmī family. Its head at the time was Rashīd Karāmī. The founder of this powerful political nucleus in Tripoli had been his father 'Abd al-Hamīd. But the circumstances in Tripoli were complicated by the presence of a large number of party elements entrenched in the city and in the adjoining port: PPS on the one hand and Baathists (*ba'th*) and Communists on the other. There was evidence that these parties had started the insurrectional movement. It began characteristically with the plundering of the American Information Office (USIS), a favorite target for nationalist demonstration, and the burning of the local PPS headquarters, the mortal enemy of the Ba'th.

In the first days of the disorders in Tripoli (which sparked the Beirut insurrection), May 10th and 11th, the people in the sūqs, armed and unarmed, spoke openly of Tripoli joining the UAR; Arab unity and Nāṣir were the slogans most emphasized. This attitude broke down gradually under the pressure of the army stationed around the old town and under the influence of the traditional Muslim leadership: the Karāmīs.

In Zghorta (Zghartā), traditionally the Christian counterweight against Muslim Tripoli, the national crisis coincided with a very serious crisis of local leadership. Hamīd Faranjiyah, one of the founders of independent Lebanon and the one leader of the North who could compete in influence with father Karāmī, had been seriously ill for a long time. The Sham'un government had, in conformity with their "anti-feudal" policies, tried to bolster the anti-Faranjiyah faction of Zghorta, the Duwaihis. One of them, Father Sam'ān Duwaihi, had tried to run for deputy in the 1957 elections. The pre-electoral competition between the two clans—old rivals—had degenerated into a feud and had ended with what the Lebanese press called "*la tuerie de Miziara*" (June 16, 1957), a shooting match at a marriage party in a village church that was said to have injured thirty-eight victims.

The acting head of the Faranjiyah, René Mu'āwwad (the Mu'āwwads have intermarried with the Faranjiyah) had been present at the "*tuerie*" and

had taken refuge in Damascus. The government issued a warrant against him, but he won the elections. He did not come back to Lebanon until the time of the insurrection. After the troubles he was absolved by a Beirut tribunal. The blood feud raging at Zghorta was locally more important than the national emergency. The army, stationed all around the strife-torn town, was not able to prevent murder and revenge between the two sections. As a result, Zghorta was not able at this time to play its traditional role as a counterweight against Tripoli.

The situation in the Northern Biqā' and in the Anti-Lebanon was obscure. Several wild tribes, principally the Ja'fars, continued their private war with the army and the gendarmerie. The few Christian villages of the region made "contracts" with the Muslim armed bands, affirming their "neutrality" in the Lebanese struggle and obtaining in compensation an order keeping the bands out of their fields. The peasants tried to patrol their boundaries. The army was stationed in Riyāq with advanced elements in the temple of Ba'albak. The city of Ba'albak was at night penetrated by the rebels, in the daytime it was "neutral." Zahlah, at the foot of the Lebanon, was entirely pro-government. The town had its own armed patrols; no military protection but a strict "business as usual" attitude. The government had stationed a control post on the road to Damascus just beyond the village of Shtawra before the Biqā' proper begins. Travellers to and from Zahlah and beyond had to identify themselves at this check point which as far as the Beirut government was concerned was the beginning of "no man's land." The frontiers dividing the Biqā' from the foothills of the Lebanon followed largely the old borderlines of the Ottoman Sanjak of Lebanon.

The Army

The relatively static disposition of the Lebanese "revolution" would not have been possible without the help of the army. The army was doubtless militarily much stronger than the insurgents. It is also quite clear that it refused to use its superiority to crush the insurrection. Before the insurrection the commander of the army, General Fu'ad Shihāb, had warned President Sham'un against the political course his régime was taking, and had sent memoranda to him explaining that in the case of an insurrection his army would not be "able" to resist the double pressure from beyond the frontiers and from insurrectional centers inside the country.

Under Shihāb's instructions the army acted as a kind of arbitrator between the two factions. It took care to prevent onslaughts of "revolutionaries" upon zones inhabited by partisans of the government. It also gave some protection to the rebels (e.g. by prohibiting the PPS, as some of the leaders declared, to

start combat in Beirut) and it served, after the American landing, to isolate the American troops from contact with the insurgents.

Censorship of the press was imposed by army officers and in the interest of the army. An observer was free to speak of the government or of the rebels in any way he liked. But he was not to make any mention of the role of the army, and, above all, the name of the General was to be kept out of any political speculation. This is why the special role of the army has been appreciated only very gradually, even by the Lebanese themselves. The press discussed everything but the army.

Parties

The forces on the government side were structured differently from those of the insurrection. Amongst the members of the government and the deputies who were for Sham'un there were some who might well claim the title of *za'im*. But the only *za'im* on the government side who acted as such was the Druze Amīr, Majid Arslān. He assembled his clients, armed them, and sent them on the warpath. The two brothers Eddé (*Iddah*), Pierre and Raymond (one was minister during most of the troubles, the other became one in the compromise government afterwards), have strong roots in the Maronite villages of Mount Lebanon. Their father, ex-President Emile Eddé, had been the inflexible spokesman of the francophile Maronites who desired a lasting association with France. "Their" villages would doubtlessly have followed the Eddés if they had armed them and called them to war. But the Eddés were no longer of the type of leader who would or could do such a thing. They were modern businessmen (Pierre is a financier of great repute in the Lebanese banking world) and their politics tended to be "modern." They did not spend their life and their energy maintaining the web of complicated personal service-relationship with their clients, and they did not demand from their clients personal (armed) service in a time of emergency. For them the institutions of the state, the police, banking, business and government were more real than for the *zu'amā'*. They tended to obtain their share of power by participating in such institutions. This is the reason why Sham'un had little difficulty in convincing them and their Christian colleagues not to take to the warpath and to leave the defense of the state and the government to him, using "modern" diplomacy and international politics.

Those who took up the challenge of armed insurrection, armed "strike" and resistance were not the recognized "heads" of the Maronite, Orthodox, etc., communities, villages, regions, etc., but the parties. The time shortly before the American landing was the great period for the PPS, first known as: *Parti Populaire Syrien*, now *Parti Populaire Sociale* (Arabic: *al-hizb al-qawmī*

as-sūrī; now . . . al-ishtirākī). This strange *parti* merits more consideration than it is usually accorded. It is ideologically based upon a "Great Syrian Nationalism," the cult of *Blut und Boden*, a mystique of active combat. Proud of its alleged scientific philosophy, it is attempting to study "objectively" Near Eastern political social and economic life. It is anticlerical because it is based on its own mysticism and is deeply opposed to the Ba'th and to Nāṣir because "Greater Syria" does not include Egypt, and Nāṣir is not their man anyway. Conspiratory, activist, fervently dedicated to its questionable ideals, the PPS was ready to combat for Sham'ūn and against the insurrection. Their competition with the Ba'th and the Communists and the very similar mental attitude of the members of all three of those parties make their mutual hatred all the more bitter.

The PPS put up the most active, the best trained and the most courageous civilian combatants. They fought tough battles with submachine guns and grenades at Ḥalba, at 'Aināb, in the port of Tripoli. They staged massive funerals of their "martyrs" at Zahlah. Enrollment in the party increased during the troubles because of the natural attraction activists and extremists exert in troubled times.

Why do we classify the PPS as a party and not as a "client group"? Its members are not concentrated in one spot, but distributed all over the country, even in Syria and, to a lesser degree, in Iraq and Jordan, in spite of police persecutions. Their loyalty is not directly towards one man but rather towards an "ideal" and a "program." There is above all nothing of the typical interplay of service rendered to a *za'im* and expected from him. There is much hero worship, but the hero or leader is expected to work towards a political ideal ("Greater Syria"), not towards the fostering of the interest of each of his clients in all the ways of their socio-economico-political life. The PPS specializes in action within the political sphere while the traditional client group under a *za'im* does not really differentiate between political interest, social prestige, personal fortune, career and business, but is out to foster all this promiscuously.

The new president, General Shihāb, began his régime by nominating a government which, in the view of most of the Christians, inclined too far towards the side of the "insurrection." At that moment came the hour of the Kata'ib (*al-Kata'ib al-Lubnāniyah* or *Phalanges Libanaises*). It was this party which proclaimed a "counterstrike" more complete than the "strike" the "insurrection" had managed to impose and effected the closure of the roads leading to Beirut. They erected barricades around the Christian parts of the capital and refused cooperation for another fortnight until a "balanced" government of four ministers (two Christians and two Muslims) was formed (October 14, 1958).

The Kata'ib had grown out of a youth movement. Their leader was from the beginning Pierre Jumayyil, a Christian of French education, a pharmacist by profession. He occasionally uses the title of *Shaykh* which in his case means that he is descended from a small Maronite feudal lord. The movement of the Phalanges first became conspicuous in street battles against the gendarmes of the French mandate. The party calls itself Lebanese Nationalist. The leaders emphasize that they desire good relations with the West, but that their first loyalty is towards Lebanon, not towards "Arabism" or "Westernism." They like to state that their organization is open to Muslims as well as to Christians, but almost all their members are Christians. Women play a considerable role in the party. They even took an important part in the demonstrations and "strikes" which brought down the first Karāmī government. It is officially a secular party but in practice, and chiefly out in the country, there are many connections between the Phalange and the Catholic clergy (on a "personal" level). Their youth movement origins still linger on in many externals—uniforms for their young men, ceremonies and marches; but they have also grown into a full-fledged political party with local seats and chapters in nearly all Christian towns and villages, an Arabic and a French newspaper (the French one was not published during the troubles), qualified political leadership, including technicians in fields like urbanism, high finance, law, commerce, etc. Internally they advocate social services, such as state-run health service, unemployment insurance and subsidized housing.

It was the Kata'ib who took the lead in the protest movement against the first Karāmī government. To their surprise they found themselves followed by a great number of those Christians who normally voted for their traditional "heads of the community," "dignitaries," "ex-zu'amā'." Those leaders did not provide them the emergency leadership which they felt was necessary for redressing the balance of the two competing communities; the Kata'ib eventually did.

The Christians discovered that they (given the strategic position of their villages around the capital) were able to cut Beirut and the government off from the rest of the country. Roads in and out of Beirut were blocked for several days to all kinds of merchandise, even two of the newly appointed ministers were kept out of the city for two days. Only for the army and for the General-President were exceptions made. A long-drawn-out and increasingly bitter battle ensued over the domination of transport and roads in and around Beirut. Finally the bankers of the city (banks are preponderantly Christian-managed and directed) declared that they would be forced to close and to stop all financial activities if the troubles continued. This did the trick; the second Karāmī government was formed (Karāmī, Eddé, 'Uwayni, Jumayyil) and the Lebanese crisis was over.

There were parties also involved on the side of the "insurrection": the Ba'th, the Communists and the Najjādah. The Ba'th played an important role in sparking the "revolution" in Tripoli; the Communists in the country helped them and they were also of some service in organizing the "administration" of certain of the rebellious quarters of Beirut (notable Mseitbe, also, less dominantly, Tarīq Jdīde). But at the end of the troubles Communists and Ba'thists emerged mortal enemies, mostly a consequence of events in Syria (above all the persecution of the Syrian Communists by Sarrāj and his police). When, after the formation of his second government, Karāmī had difficulties with the Ba'th in Tripoli (in what seemed to be a competition for local leadership, the Ba'thists trying to outdo the Karāmīs in pan-Arab declarations), the Tripoli Communists gave Karāmī largely unwelcome support (*cf.* their newspapers *al-Nidā* and *al-Akhbār* of May and June, 1959).

There was also a quarrel, never quite patched up, between the Najjādah and Salām. The Najjādah form something like a Muslim counterpart to the Kata'ib. But, corresponding to the state of social evolution within the Muslim community, they are few and have never quite made the transition from a youth movement (of para-military nature) to a party. Their founder and leader, 'Adnān al-Hakīm, an optician, adheres to a policy of absolute "Arabism." He insists upon uniting Lebanon and the UAR even at times when the Muslim *zu'amā'* and Nāṣir himself ask only for cooperation and a certain coordination of the Lebanese foreign policy. His attitude can be explained by the fact that al-Hakīm competes with the *zu'amā'* for a very similar public: traditional Muslim youth, making a specialty of Muslim lower class workers, such as the harbor workers or the garbage collectors. He can only be successful if he offers an attractive ideology and the glamours of para-militarism against the more substantial favors offered by the *zu'amā'* (interviews in May, 1959).

The quarrel with Salām originated about broadcasts produced by the insurrection. Ṣā'ib Salām as "military commander of Bastā" demanded to control them. The Najjādah who had set up the station and were running it in their party headquarters refused to comply. Salām sent armed men; one of them was killed. The transmitter closed down for a time. Later al-Hakīm's shop in the center of Beirut was bombed and there have been intermittent quarrels ever since. In the by-elections of Jezzine, June 1959, the Najjādah endorsed the candidate of the Kata'ib, 'Abbūd, while Salām came out for the candidate of Sham'un, Kan'ān. It was a case of party against *zu'amā'*. In this, a Christian district, the Kata'ib won.

The parties participating in the National Front have all come into conflict with the *zu'amā'* of the regions in which they operate. They are no doubt weaker than those *zu'amā'*. But it is also felt that they are more "modern" than the traditional form of organization. Therein lies their attraction for the

younger people and their chance for future success as parties in the modern sense of the word.

There are many more political associations in Lebanon which go by the name of party. One should not be taken in by such designations. Any Lebanese can tell you that the *Parti D'estourien* "is" Bisharāh al-Khūrī (ex-president of Lebanon) and his clients, the *National Liberal Party* "is" ex-President Sham'un and "his" men, the PSP (*Parti Social Populaire*) "is" Junblāt and "his" Druze, the *Bloc National* "are" the Eddés, etc. Such parties are not organizations with political or ideological grass roots; they are leadership groups made and un-made by coalitions and quarrels of the *zu'amā'* or by the wish of one such *zā'im* to be "modern" and "up-to-date." Their grass roots are the personal ties of socio-economo-political interest between the *zā'im* and his client.

Conclusion

We have not by a long way given a complete picture of all the forces in play during the Lebanese crisis. We have deliberately omitted speaking of the tug and pull of all kinds of foreign policies and influences upon Lebanon, from Russian to American via English and French, from Hashimite to "Nasserite" to the decisive fact of the Iraqi revolution (of July 14th) which proved to be the major key to Middle East area politics in the period that followed. The Turkish policies and the Palestine problem, the League and the United Nations, all had a bearing upon the Lebanese crisis and its developments.

We have not even exhausted the enumeration of the major elements of internal politics. In this context mention ought to be made of the attitude of the Maronite Patriarch, Msg. Ma'ūshī, his very open partisanship for the pan-Arab insurgents and his accusations of the "Western-oriented" President.

To the complete picture would also belong a discussion of the manifold and complex quarrels arising between the different heads of the insurgents as soon as their aims had been (at least partially) attained: Salām against Karāmī, Salām against Junblāt, Salām against the Najjādah, the Ba'th against the Communists, the Ba'th against Karāmī, etc., together with the maneuvers inside the National Front for leadership and control of the position or of the person of the Prime Minister.

We have not mentioned the very violent battles within the Armenian community divided in Tashnak and Khantshak and adding their own violent feuds to the general antagonisms. Finally, we have not spoken of the Third Force (*la Troisième Force*), an association of influential politicians and civic leaders (mostly connected with the Beirut business world) like H. Far'awn, E. Bustānī, A. Naqqāsh, Gh. Tuwayni and—on the revolutionary side—Taqī-al-din Şulh, Ph. Taqlā. They took a stand somewhere between the two partisan

camps desiring the election of a new President after the end of Sham'ün's mandate but disapproving of open violence and dynamiting. They acted as intermediaries and hopeful peacemakers.

We have omitted discussing the role of these forces in order to avoid clouding what appears to us as the central socio-political constellation in the conflict. We have tried (avoiding the matter of the "massive interference") to reduce this to a conflict between dissatisfied leaders of specific client groups (*zu'amā'*) helped by certain parties with "ties" to the outer world, the Ba'th and the Communists, and perhaps sparked by those parties and their foreign friends; opposed by a government consisting of *zu'amā'*, ex-*zu'amā'* and the sons of one-time-*zu'amā'* turned businessmen, who were unwilling to fulfill their traditional role as leaders of "their" communities when it came to the use of armed bands. They were replaced in a last ditch stand by two "political parties," one sect-like, mystical and fanatically inclined, effective only in a position of deadlock between the two major contenders, the other about to evolve from a Catholic-patriotic youth movement to a Lebanese patriotic and moderately socialist party, strong enough to reestablish the old balance between the Lebanese communities. Internally the imbalance appears to have been brought about by strenuous action of the old-fashioned but well functioning insurgent *zu'amā'* and by the lack of decision and energy on the part of their opposite number, the governing "new-fashioned" and hesitant, ineffective ex-*zu'amā'*.

To state the same view briefly in terms of social development: In one part of the Lebanese population the old system of personal politics (*za'imism*), also misnamed "political feudalism," has proved to be sufficiently vigorous to react strongly under certain favorable international inter-Arab and military conditions against the more "modern" part of the population whose more advanced social development has apparently served to prejudice the effective functioning of the traditional form of politico-social association and affiliation. In a last minute stand an organism of still more advanced nature, a party, re-established the balance between the contestants—this with the accidental help of a new set of inter-Arab political facts brought about by the consolidation of the new régime in Baghdad.

OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY AND THE EUROPEAN STATE SYSTEM

J. C. Hurewitz

CONTINUOUS diplomacy, invented in Renaissance Italy to gratify the demands of the city-state system that had come into being in the peninsula, was diffused in the sixteenth century through central and western Europe, where the emerging nation-states were forging a continentwide state system. Originally the rules were framed in accord with ethical principles of a generalized Christianity. But in the course of time the techniques of permanent diplomacy became wholly de-Christianized and de-Europeanized, as has most of the apparatus of modern statecraft.¹ The rules of resident diplomacy became the rules of common sense and in this respect resembled the technology of the West in its exportability to the non-West. Continuous diplomacy, in fact, became part of the indispensable paraphernalia of government. The process in the earlier period was one of assimilation to the European system. But as the number of non-European lands adhering to that system and adopting its code and instruments for the conduct of interstate relations multiplied, they gradually modified the character of the system itself, so that it grew progressively less European and more global.

The Ottoman Empire was the first non-Christian country to participate in the European state system and the first unconditionally to accept its form of diplomacy. The Ottoman realization of full diplomatic reciprocity with Europe thus constituted a major step in the transformation of the European state system into a world system. It also constituted a major step in the Westernization of the Ottoman state. It is therefore surprising that the entire sweep of Ottoman

1. The classic and indispensable study of the origins of continuous diplomacy is Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955).

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diplomacy has not yet been systematically explored for its own sake. Many studies, it is true, have touched aspects of this broad subject. These by and large have been limited, however, to the consideration of substantive problems of diplomacy — international incidents, particular disputes, or special embassies. More commonly, diplomacy has received passing notice in general works on such themes as history, Westernization, law, government and the like. Instructively, there is no entry on "diplomacy" in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, while the article on "Tanzimat" dismisses foreign relations in two sentences. It makes no reference whatsoever to the Europeanization of Ottoman diplomacy, which undeniably was as much a product of the innovating zeal at Istanbul in that period as were the changes in military organization, education and law.

The tendency to relegate Ottoman diplomacy to episodic or incidental treatment is difficult to explain, in view of its importance. With mounting interest in the impact of Europe on the non-Western world, the study of the institutions, practices and theories of Ottoman diplomacy might have been expected to attract serious scholarly attention. The Ottoman Empire was, after all, a special case. The state, though Asian by birth, was naturalized as European by right of conquest. It thus represented a reversal of what was becoming in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the "normal" intercontinental projection of power. European influence was radiating in all directions around the globe; in this one instance Asian influence had penetrated deep into Europe and refused to be shoved back. It is relatively easy to understand how that penetration wounded the pride of Christian Europe and its sense of superiority. The tenacious Ottoman presence, moreover, served as a constant reminder of an "abnormality" that would not correct itself. Such a condition was bound to sharpen the mutual tensions and exaggerate the mutual fears and contempt that divided the Muslim state from Christian Europe. The study of Ottoman diplomacy should help clarify this general problem. It should assist us also to evaluate the rise and decline of one of the great states in history and its role among the family of nations.

In exploring this illcharted field, the investigator must seek answers to a number of basic questions. For the conclusions that he might reach would manifestly be conditioned by whether he argues that the Ottoman Empire did not participate in the European state system until 1856, as suggested by article 7 of the Treaty of Paris; or that the Ottoman Empire was already bound by the rules of the European state system at least from the time of the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699; or that the Ottoman Empire affected the balance of power on the continent from the very inception of the European state system and was to that extent at least a limited participant, through a one-way diplomatic linkage, from the birth of the system.

The investigator would wish to ascertain how Ottoman nonreciprocal diplomacy — not policy but institutions, practices and processes — actually worked. He would also seek to determine its techniques and its rationale and try to differentiate between those features that were primarily Muslim or Ottoman and those that were universal. He would try to learn why Sultan Selim III's experiment with continuous diplomacy at the turn of the nineteenth century failed, and why Sultan Mahmud II's comparable efforts in the mid-1830's succeeded. He would endeavor, besides, to find out what purposes the Sublime Porte's resident diplomacy hoped to serve, once the Ottoman Empire became subordinate to the European state system after the treaty of London in 1841. Finally, he might wish to learn about the recruitment and training of a professional diplomatic service, its financing, and the extent to which the Foreign Ministry, that took recognizable — and indeed solid — shape after the Crimean War, enjoyed discretionary powers or operated at the mercy of an absolute monarchy and its unpredictable whims.

The present article does not attempt to answer all these questions. Even if there were sufficient space, the primary research has not yet been done nor will it be by a single scholar, for the field has been too long neglected, and the materials too widely strewn. This is an exploratory inquiry that merely tries to determine major lines of development. Based in part on research launched in the Prime Ministry and Foreign Ministry archives at Istanbul, the present paper is only a fragment of a larger research project on international politics and diplomacy in the Middle East from 1798 to 1914. Findings at this stage remain tentative and malleable. In its still preliminary shape, the study raises many questions, suggests a few answers, and formulates a number of hypotheses.

Before the Ottoman record is examined, it might be helpful briefly to review the experiences of three other Asian lands—China, Japan and Persia—that in the conduct of diplomacy were also integrated into the European system in the nineteenth century. China formed the center of its own East Asian system. As a universal state resting on the Confucian concept of external relations, China claimed a Heavenly mandate to rule the world and viewed as barbarian all other countries. The smaller lands along China's periphery—from Korea to Burma, including Japan for a period—took part in the system as junior members. The subsidiary governments, through *ad hoc* diplomatic missions, conducted their relations with one another as equals. But toward China, whose leadership they acknowledged, they were in a tributary status, although the tribute was ceremonial, not material, and the tributary missions periodic, not continuous. When European nationals in the pursuit of commerce and religion sought to penetrate the system, starting in the sixteenth century, their governments acquiesced in China's refusal to receive resident diplomatic missions and in their diplomatic envoys' performing the kowtow. The European govern-

ments, thus, in effect, agreed to the same subordinate diplomatic rank as that accorded to China's immediate neighbors.

This relationship did not begin to alter until 1842, when the United Kingdom forcibly opened what came to be called the treaty ports and extracted from China for the benefit of British merchants extraterritorial privileges. China was then compelled to receive at Peking permanent diplomatic missions from the treaty powers: Britain, France, the United States, and Russia in 1860, Prussia in 1864 and even Japan a decade later. China's conversion to diplomatic reciprocity took less than two decades, for it established resident missions in Britain and the United States in 1875, Japan in 1876, Germany, France and Russia in 1877 and Italy in 1881. But characteristically this decision could be attributed less to Chinese initiative than to the prodding of friendly foreigners. What is more, the extraterritorial or unequal treaties continued in operation until 1943.²

A similar sequence occurred in Japan. But the Japanese response to the shock of having the country pried open to Western trade was swift and decisive. The unequal treaties and the West's unilateral diplomacy, which resulted from Commodore Perry's expedition in 1853-54 and the coercive ending of more than two centuries of isolation, gave way by the 1870's to reciprocal diplomacy and by 1899 to the elimination of the capitulations.³

Persia, on the other hand, was drawn into European policies only marginally throughout the period of the Safavi dynasty (1500-1722) by those powers most commonly at war with the Ottoman Empire (such as Venice, Austria and Poland). The maritime states of Western Europe for their part attempted to promote trade with Persia and received for their nationals from successive shahs extraterritorial privileges. But in these earlier centuries there were no European powers whose interest in Persia were both political and economic; and for the protection of limited interests *ad hoc* diplomacy, almost wholly of the one-sided European variety, seemed to suffice until the early nineteenth century. European unilateral resident diplomacy came to Persia in 1809, when the United Kingdom first opened its legation.⁴ Russia, the second European power to set up a

2. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase 1858-1880* (Cambridge, 1960); J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 6 (June 1941) 1935-246 [reprinted in Fairbank and Teng, *Ch'ing Administration, Three Studies* (Cambridge, 1960) 107-61]; and John K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast* (Cambridge, 1953), especially pp. 1-53 and 462-68.

3. G. B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan* (New York, 1950), p. 278; and Paul M. Linebarger, Djang Chu and Ardath W. Burks, *Far Eastern Government and Politics: China and Japan* (New York, 1954), chapter 14.

4. Technically, France was the first, under article 5 of the treaty of Finkenstein of 4 May 1807, but Napoleon's Minister, Brigadier General Antoine Gardane, left Iran early in 1809. France had no resident minister in Tehran again until 1855. See J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 77-81 and 159.

permanent mission in Tehran, did not follow suit until 1828 when the tsarist régime, as part of the peace settlement at Turkmanchay, also signed a commercial treaty providing in perpetuity broad extraterritorial rights to Russian subjects. This Russo-Persian instrument served as the basis for Persia's capitulatory régime under the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925). As the nineteenth century unfolded, a half dozen of the Western powers, including the United States, opened legations in the Persian capital and, under most-favored-nation clauses, their respective nationals came also to enjoy extraterritoriality. Persia did not begin to send reciprocal missions to Europe until 1862-63, when a legation was opened in London. In the quarter century that followed, others were set up in Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Washington and St. Petersburg.

To none of the three Asian lands, it is clear, did the European states send permanent diplomatic missions before the nineteenth century. By contrast, all the major European powers and a number of the lesser ones maintained resident diplomatic missions at Istanbul before the end of the eighteenth century. Some of these permanent missions traced back to the very inception of the general European practice of continuous diplomacy in the sixteenth century. The Sublime Porte apparently made no effort before 1793 to establish a resident mission in any European capital.

Ottoman diplomacy passed through at least four phases in the four centuries following the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. At the outset, by voluntary and deliberate act, the Ottoman Empire accepted resident missions from Europe but sent none to the Continent, thus largely cutting itself off from the European state system in that system's formative period. This unilateralism furnished the Padişahs of the day a means of expressing contempt for the emerging nation-states of Europe. What is more, unilateralism worked, as long as the empire was expanding, and even beyond, until Protestantism and Catholicism reached their accommodation in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). For nearly a century after the Peace of Carlowitz (1699), when Europe formalized its first decisive victory over the Turks, Ottoman diplomacy could best be characterized as the unilateralism of a contracting empire. In this second phase the sultans were compelled to negotiate; they did so generally from weakness and only at rare intervals from strength. It is significant that the Sublime Porte began to keep a record of its international commitments to Europe with the Treaty of Carlowitz. The *Namé-i Hümâyún* (Imperial Records), as this series was called, were launched in 1699 and continued until 1917, filling altogether sixteen volumes. The third phase embraced the period of the experiment of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) with reciprocal diplomacy, that lasted from 1793 to 1821. The fourth witnessed the progressive integration of Ottoman diplomacy into that of the European state system in the middle decades of the nineteenth century by the achievement of reciprocity and the

creation of the necessary supporting machinery at Istanbul.

The present paper focuses primarily on the last phase. But it might be useful at the start to dwell briefly on the other three. Why the European states began sending permanent embassies to Istanbul is not hard to explain. The very seizure by the Ottomans of European lands altered the balance of power on the Continent. The territorial aggrandizement of the Muslim state, whose military might in the sixteenth century surpassed that of any other country in Europe, evoked in some of the emerging nation-states an inclination to deal with the Asian intruder. Most successful in this were the countries at least once removed geographically, such as France, England and the Netherlands, for these lands frequently shared with the Padişah common European enemies contiguous to his realm. These three were also maritime states with commercial objectives in the Ottoman market.

But the essential question for the present analysis is not why the European monarchs sent missions to Istanbul, but rather why the Padişah did not reciprocate. After all, since the power of the Ottoman state at its zenith dwarfed that of any European rival, the sultan could have demanded and received full reciprocity in diplomacy as a condition for an alliance or the grant of extraterritoriality. Yet no sultan at the time ever made such a request; nor was there any compelling reason for him to do so. Through the reign of Süleyman (died 1566) the state steadily gained territory and rarely lost any, nor did it retreat substantially from its advanced European positions for more than a century afterward. The sultans were therefore under no pressure to abandon a system that produced results. European unilateralism, in fact, must have seemed to the Imperial Ottoman Government an acknowledgement of its superiority.

Besides, the commercial motive was absent. Whereas European traders desiring to sell their wares and to buy Ottoman goods established community outposts in the Padişah's provinces and required diplomatic safeguarding by their respective governments, Ottoman merchants made no effort to organize branches on the Continent, tending instead to move eastward into Asia. Islamic tradition further reinforced the unilateralism. As a universal religion which remained theoretically at war with the infidel world, classical İslâm did not frame more than the most elementary principles to guide Muslim governments in dealings with non-Muslim lands. Thus the Ottoman state had inherited only rudimentary practices for conducting external relations.

As long as the Ottoman state remained vigorous and its territorial integrity and sovereignty could not be, or simply were not, challenged by Europe, diplomatic nonreciprocity constituted a source not of weakness but of strength. European diplomats in this period were permitted to remain at Istanbul on sufferance, for the capitulations—the instruments that provided for the missions

—were temporary, lasting only for the duration of the sultan's reign. What is more, negotiations could be conducted only on Ottoman terms. The Padişah's plenipotentiaries could take immediate decisions, while the Europeans were forced at times to await instructions from their sovereigns. Ottoman diplomatic exchanges with European governments thus almost invariably took place on familiar ground, close to the throne, and in the Turkish language.

Nonreciprocal diplomacy retained its tactical advantages in negotiations and ceremony even in the period of declining Ottoman power. In the other functions that permanent missions performed—communication, information, liaison with an ally, the shaping and execution of policy and the promotion and safeguarding of national interests—the unilateralism of a contracting empire became in the eighteenth century a drag on the Sublime Porte, as it did also in a more limited way on the European governments.

Moreover, nonreciprocity became a distortion of its classical self, with the dragomans or interpreters, who by definition should have been agents, becoming in fact principals. The European diplomats did not normally know the Turkish language, and therefore had to rely on these interpreters who in turn usually conferred, not with the sultan's vezirs, but with the dragomans of the Sublime Porte. Recruited by the eighteenth century chiefly among the prominent Greek families of the Phanar district of Istanbul, the imperial interpreters became the vital link in the conduct of official diplomatic business. Besides, the dragomans of the European diplomatic missions were also subjects of the sultan and as such could not fully represent the interest of those European governments which employed them. Indeed, the lack of intergovernmental contact constituted the closest approximation to a perfect communications barrier in diplomacy. Yet even after unilateralism had become a source of weakness, the Sublime Porte could nevertheless, when fortune favored it in the field of battle, withdraw privileges of residence entirely. This was done in the Armistice of Pruth in 1711, when the Russians were deprived of their right of diplomatic representation at Istanbul. Significantly, nine years later the right was restored, after a Russian victory.

Sultan Selim's scheme for resident diplomacy in London, Vienna, Berlin and Paris in the 1790's is often assumed to mark the beginnings of the transformation from unilateralism to reciprocity. If judged by results, his project could hardly be described as more than a false start. The Padişah's instinct was sound. He recognized the need for permanent embassies in the major capitals of Europe as essential to the welfare of the state. He experimented, however, at a time when diplomacy in Europe was temporarily breaking down as one of the effects of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars which followed. At all events Selim had taken no more than half measures. His scheme made no provisions for a foreign ministry that might have coordinated

the diplomatic activities in Europe. Instead, the innovations were superimposed on existing practices, which had come to travesty the unilateral diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire at its height.

Often the sultan took decisions simply by consulting the vezir or court favorite who happened to be close at hand. The missions in the four capitals thus frequently received conflicting instructions, when they received any instructions at all. The correspondence reaching the Sublime Porte from the Continent was assiduously collected; but the archivists—unlike their predecessors of the sixteenth century—had forgotten how to file, so that it became impossible to keep track of commitments, negotiations and intelligence. Precisely because there was a good deal of communication where none existed before, the confusion was compounded. The experiment could hardly have been expected to strike root. Three of the four embassies passed into the hands of junior members in less than a decade, as did also by 1811 the embassy at Paris, the only one that even began to resemble the European models. The last traces of Selim's program for resident diplomacy vanished after the outbreak of the war for Greek independence in 1821, when the Sublime Porte finally decided to wind up its missions in Europe, all by then directed by chargés d'affaires who were Greek subjects of the sultan.

Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) renewed continuous diplomacy nearly a decade and a half later, this time on a durable basis. He appointed special ambassadors to Paris and London in the summer of 1834 and to Vienna the next year. The special embassy to Paris was converted in June 1835 into a resident one, and Mustafa Reşid Paşa, who had headed both missions, crossed the Channel to London in September 1836 as first chief of a permanent embassy in that metropolis. By then the Ottoman resident embassy in Vienna had already completed its first month. A fourth embassy was set up in Tehran in 1849, forming part of what was probably the first exchange of permanent diplomatic missions by two Muslim states. The six remaining resident missions organized at the time started out as legations: at Berlin in December 1837 (raised to embassy, March 1874); Athens in April 1840; Stockholm (also accredited to The Hague) in June 1854; St. Petersburg in March 1857 (embassy, July 1873); Turin, January 1857 (replaced by one in Rome in 1870, raised to embassy in the early 1880's); Brussels in October 1857 (in the custody of a chargé d'affaires until 1879, when a full-fledged minister took over); and Washington in April 1867.

Continuous diplomacy required a professional diplomatic service. Diplomats are not born career officers, unless they grow up in the tradition. But here there was no tradition to grow up in, for as was true of the Tanzimat movement as a whole, the paramount inspiration for the new Ottoman diplomacy was Muslim Turkish. In breaking with the past, the innovators seemed de-

terminated—to judge once again by results—substantially to replace Phanariot Greeks, who had figured prominently in Ottoman unilateral diplomacy after the mid-seventeenth century, by Muslim Turks. It has not yet been possible fully to tabulate—if it ever will be—the religious, educational, economic and social background of the Ottoman diplomatic corps that was assembled and trained in service in the last two thirds of the nineteenth century. But according to a provisional estimate the Phanariot Greeks and other non-Muslims who served as heads of mission represented altogether probably no more than a third of the total.

Deductively, once more, it might be observed that non-Muslims were almost wholly barred from the pinnacle of the service, while proved ability—and reliability—in the field were recognized and used, even at the most important post. The management of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry changed hands fifty-two times between 1835 and 1899, and the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs was held by twenty-three different men. The rate of change reflected the mercurial court politics at Istanbul; and the smaller number of men, an acknowledgement of the new expertise, for almost all Foreign Ministers in this period were drawn from the professional diplomatic service. Among these there was only one non-Muslim, Alexander Karatuduri, a Phanariot Greek who held office for less than eight months (December 1878 to July 1879).

The diplomatic posts at which Phanariot Greeks figured prominently in the nineteenth century were: London, where three incumbents of an over-all total of sixteen led the embassy for forty of the sixty-five years (Kostaki Muzurus established a record for longevity as chief of the same mission, serving without interruption from 1851 to 1885, thus doubling the achievement of his English counterpart at Istanbul, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, whose final assignment to the Sublime Porte stretched from 1842 to 1858); Washington, where two ministers among seven presided over legation affairs for nineteen of thirty-two years; Rome, where they numbered four (one serving twice) among ten mission heads in thirteen of thirty years; and Berlin, where two among fifteen held sway for eighteen of sixty-one years. For whatever meaning it may have, the sampling also establishes that Muslim Turks were rotated far more frequently than Phanariot Greeks.

Technically, the Foreign Ministry came into being on 11 March 1836 when Mehmed Akif Paşa, the last Reisülküttab, was designated by imperial act the first Minister of Foreign Affairs. Archival evidence suggests that this represented at the time little more than a change of title and that at least two decades passed before the Foreign Ministry established clearly identifiable procedures. Not until after the Crimean War did the Foreign Ministry create its own archives, separate from those of the Grand Vezir and—it should be noted—organized far more rationally. The advent of the telegraph, which

in September 1855 linked Istanbul to the Continent, accelerated overnight the pace of Ottoman diplomacy and toned up the service, as it had been doing in Europe, by tightening the controls of the Foreign Ministry over its missions abroad. The Foreign Ministry itself became a progressively bigger, busier establishment, as the communications traffic mounted, a trend that became further pronounced toward the century's close when the typewriter joined forces with the telegraph to multiply the paper work.

Also after the Crimean War, the Foreign Ministry adopted French as a—perhaps, the—principal language of communication within the Ottoman diplomatic service. The *Tercüme Odası* or Translation Department, created in 1823, became in effect by the sixties and seventies an adjunct of the Foreign Ministry. Clippings from the European press first began to reach the Foreign Ministry in large number during the Crimean War. It is instructive that the packets of such clippings that Muzurus sent from London at the time were seemingly left untouched by the Foreign Ministry staff. This contrasted sharply with the handling of the far bulkier load of such clippings from English, French, Austrian and even Russian journals during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78, when nearly all items were translated first into French, if they were not already in that language, and then into Turkish.

It is somewhat previous to attempt a detailed explanation of why reciprocal diplomacy was finally achieved in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. These comments are therefore limited to a bare outline of some of the major considerations.

Permanent diplomacy arose in the Ottoman Empire much in the way it had originated in the first place in Renaissance Italy and Reformation Europe, almost imperceptibly as a concrete response to a concrete need. The decade of Ottoman adoption of European diplomatic practices was at the Sublime Porte one of supreme crisis when the survival of the state hung by a hair. This was the period when the Eastern Question became murky, when the quarrel between Mahmud and Mehmed 'Ali interlocked with another over Ottoman affairs between Russia and Britain, with Austria supporting Russia and France, Mehmed 'Ali. In the face, from within and without, of this awesome menace, Sultan Mahmud turned not alone to the drawn-out program of military modernization but also in desperation to resident diplomacy. He and his vezirs probably did not fully appreciate it at the time, but this in fact was the kind of situation in which continuous diplomacy could yield more useful and immediate results than any other means at the Sublime Porte's disposal, for clearly the sultan required outside help of disinterested variety. Mustafa Resid Paşa, who in many ways was the real author of Ottoman reciprocity, returned to London as ambassador in 1838-39 expressly to negotiate a defensive alliance with the United Kingdom and a loan that might enable Mahmud to step up his military

preparations for restoring the integrity of his empire. Reşid's mission, narrowly viewed, proved an unmitigated flop. But the contacts and the experience in London later served the cause of his country's diplomacy immeasurably.

The quarrels were finally resolved, after Mahmud's death, by the intervention of the European Concert and its imposed settlement in 1841. Mehmed 'Ali was fitted into a provincial strait jacket that confined him and his heirs to Egypt and the Sudan. The sultan was made, once again, master in his own domain, but his empire became subordinate to the European state system, textually reflected in the designation of the Padişah as "His Highness," while diplomatic protocol demanded that the monarchs of Europe be addressed "Their Majesties." The inferior status that came with guarantees of sovereignty to the sultan accomplished two things: it relieved the Ottoman Government—although the Sublime Porte would doubtless have been the last to admit it—of anxiety over its survival, as distinct from the very real worry over its territorial integrity; and it provided the new diplomats with the positive challenge of devising ways to eliminate the elements of inequality in interstate relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe.

Of no less significance was the fact that after Mahmud came two passive sultans, Abdülmecid (1839-1861) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876), who left to their vezirs wide discretion in the handling of the affairs of state, external relations included. Almost without interruption for three full decades after the accession of Abdülmecid, the trio of paşas—Mustafa Reşid and his two disciples, 'Ali and Fuad—served as Ministers of Foreign Affairs. These three men were dedicated to the creation of a professional diplomatic service and the realization of full reciprocity. So well had they laid the foundations that even an autocrat of the stripe of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), who took an active personal interest in the management of diplomacy as of the remaining affairs of his realm, nevertheless allowed the Foreign Ministry some scope for discretionary action. More than that, the number of Ottoman missions abroad was augmented from ten at the time of his assuming power to fifteen by the end of the century.

The Concert's guarantees, in the early years of Ottoman reciprocity, were not empty ones. This was amply demonstrated by the Anglo-French intervention (1854-56) on the Ottoman side in the Crimean War and the Concert's intervention at the Congress of Berlin (1878) which softened the harsh terms of San Stefano. In the circumstances, the Sublime Porte was able in the pursuit of its defensive diplomacy to direct its efforts to the search for equal status. Thus, in the alliance with France and Britain in 1854, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries persuaded their European colleagues to drop "His Highness" as a mode of addressing the sultan, in favor of "His Majesty," a style that stuck until the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1922. The peace conferees, gathered

at Paris to draw up the formal instruments for terminating the Crimean War, accepted the Ottoman proposal—originally put forward by Foreign Minister 'Ali Paşa—in which the Concert declared (article 7) that "the Sublime Porte [is] admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (*Concert*) of Europe." This later confounded the international lawyers and historians because it could be persuasively argued that the Ottoman Government had participated in these "advantages" ever since it concluded treaties with European states, at least as early as 1699. At the bewilderment of later observers 'Ali Paşa would doubtless have chuckled, for the phraseology of the clause could have been used to suggest Ottoman membership not in the European state system alone but in that exclusive club of the Great Powers, the Concert of Europe.⁵

5. Since this paper covers developments over a period of four centuries, there is little point in trying to provide detailed annotation. On the changes in the nineteenth century the author has leaned heavily on what he learned from his research at the Prime Ministry and Foreign Ministry archives in Istanbul. For the lists of ambassadors and foreign ministers he is indebted to *Salname-i Nezareti-i Kharijiye* (Istanbul, 1318 A.H.), pp. 159-98.

ELECTIONS AND POLITICS IN IRAN

Andrew F. Westwood

THE CABINET of Manoucher Eqbal, the most stable and effective government Iran has known since 1941, fell last August on the charge that it had interfered in the Majlis elections. For Iran this event was extraordinary. The government indeed had interfered in the elections but this has been standard practice in Iran and essential to the survival of the régime. In the past it hardly has been a reason for the fall of a cabinet and Eqbal's resignation on this issue reflects the rapidly changing and tense political situation.

Equally interesting, Eqbal's resignation came as a direct consequence of failure in an ingenious attempt to use the elections to move the government off the dead center of authoritarian rule where Iran has stagnated since Mossadegh. The Shah and Dr. Eqbal sought to use the elections to build a more stable base for the government and failed. Their attempt and its failure promises to be of great importance for the future of the present régime.

Elections were scheduled for 1960 and as they approached the Shah and Eqbal faced a difficult dilemma. Opposition, notably among the middle class and focused on continued authoritarian rule, had been growing for a number of years and was of grave concern to the government, particularly after events in Iraq in 1958 and in Turkey more recently. Eqbal's government had been striving to mollify or undercut the opposition by cautious liberalization and economic progress. These steps had built some support for the government but they also had increased appetites for a real end to authoritarian rule. The elections would provide a test.

The preceding elections in 1956 had been controlled by the government. As a Tehran magazine recently summed them up with terse irony, "all the candidates were elected."¹ Then the elections scheduled for 1958 were bypassed by a constitutional amendment extending the Majlis terms from two to four years. The elections could not again be controlled, postponed or otherwise avoided without destroying much of the support the Eqbal government had built and possibly precipitating the issue with the opposition. At the very least the opposition would turn increasingly to radical solutions and radical leaders.

Neither, on the other hand, could the government accede to the demand

1. *Tehran Mossavar*, 17 Tir 1339/8 July 1960, p. 50.

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that free elections be permitted. In all probability free elections would have been won in roughly equal parts by ultra-conservatives opposed to even modest reform and by radicals of the Left. Eqbal's cabinet would fall and an ensuing chaotic situation imperiling the Shah and the régime would be most likely. In short, the government faced the awkward problem common to authoritarian régimes in a choice between standing firm and awaiting an explosion or making vital concessions likely to generate an explosion. And the scheduled elections permitted no delay in resolution of this dilemma.

In characteristic fashion, the Shah and Eqbal devised an election scheme which promised to allow the government to pass between the horns of the dilemma for the time being and to ease that for the future. The elections would be "free" with open opposition permitted in speech and in the press for the first time since Mossadegh. Candidates would compete for votes and results determined by votes cast. In repeated pledges the Shah placed his full prestige behind the "freedom" of the elections and there is reason to believe that they indeed were intended to be "free." For the "freedom" had a key qualification. Only two parties were to be in the field and the choice would be confined to the candidates of these two parties. Both were very loyal to the Shah and essentially controlled by him. *Melliun*, the government party, was formed by Dr. Eqbal while *Mardom*, the loyal "opposition," was formed by Assadollah Alam, long a close personal and political associate of the Shah. The candidates could be carefully selected and no real opponents would be elected to the new *Majlis*.

In the elections *Mardom* could oppose Eqbal's policies and in doing so baffle the real opposition. The opposition, disorganized and diffuse if widespread, would find no catalyst here to coalesce it upon a radical solution. Instead the "freedom" would provide some relief for tensions and the government would gain a valuable picture of who was opposing and why. Eqbal and *Melliun* might lose the elections and Alam and *Mardom* win, but if this was the popular verdict the change would strengthen rather than weaken the Shah and the régime. And a path through the immediate problem of the elections was not the only advantage.

The *Majlis* contained a number of wealthy and highly conservative deputies who opposed any reform and had been obstructing the vital efforts of the Shah and Eqbal to build public support through such means. These deputies had an independent basis of power and could not be removed without a dangerous struggle, as the régime rested in part upon their support. The two-party scheme offered to make the terms of this struggle favorable to the Shah. The conservatives could be denied candidacy in either party and thus excluded from the elections. Their exclusion would give the parties a much-needed appearance of liberalism and might bring the parties an important element of public

support. This support was valuable in and of itself and also could be turned against the conservatives. The harder and more openly the conservatives struggled, the more support the parties would gain and the more strength the government would have against the conservatives.

Furthermore, the new Majlis, unlike the old, would not contain numbers of deputies with power independent of the Shah and the government. For the first time all deputies would owe their seats to political parties and to only two parties—both eventually controlled by the Shah. For the Shah, the new Majlis would be immensely more malleable than the old. Reform would become possible.

The official justification for the two-party system stressed the need for "responsible" political parties, noting that the absence of such parties has been a central impediment to representative government in Iran. This cannot be entirely dismissed as window dressing. It is an accurate analysis of one of the many reasons for the failure of constitutional government in Iran and the Shah undoubtedly has been concerned to break out of the dangerous impasse of authoritarian rule. It appears probable that the Shah and Eqbal saw in the two-party system, in addition to other virtues discussed, a first step toward a more representative and hence more stable political system; a first step which would have immediate dividends in stability and control over the Majlis. That a viable system of political parties can be built in such a fashion is open to serious doubt but that a more attractive formula exists is even more dubious.

In the actual event this complex and ingenious scheme failed and in failing turned upon its originators. Eqbal fell, the Shah's position was undermined and new currents of opposition were set in motion. But an explanation of the failure and its consequences requires a broader exploration of Iranian politics.

Since the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh in 1953 the Shah has played a strong but less than dictatorial role. His power has depended upon his skill in manipulating support from three uncertain and diverse sources: 1) the general loyalty to the Crown; 2) the Army and 3) the political "élite." The requirements of this process have more typically limited the policies which the Shah might press than given him the power to dictate policy.

Loyalty to the Crown is difficult to transform into political power on concrete, specific issues. It is rather loyalty to the representative figure than to the person of the Shah and is based on the concept that the Shah is, or should be, above the political struggle. Every act of the Shah in the political arena undermines at least the loyalty of those who differ on the issue. Also, the régime in Iran rests upon the continued political quiescence of the mass. The Shah cannot bring public opinion to bear in the political arena and simultaneously keep the public apathetic and passive in the conditions of the modern world. Loyalty has one very definite value. It is an important latent check upon others

who might seek to act against the Shah. But it is difficult and uncertain as a source of support for actions by the Shah.

The Army appears to be loyal to the Shah and it is doubtful that it would move of its own volition against him. But the officers are not, as they were in the 1930's, creatures or protégés of the Shah. The officers who rose from humble origins to great wealth and power under Reza Shah are now largely retired. They exert considerable influence in the Army but only a few remain in active command. These older officers appear to be one of the more conservative groups in the country. The active officers in many of the higher and almost all of the lower commands are younger men, often university graduates and generally drawn from the middle class. They appear to share the discontent and attitudes of their civilian contemporaries in the middle class. Considerable care has been taken to give these younger officers economic privileges, but they have not had opportunities to become wealthy or powerful and they owe their positions not to the Shah alone, but to a variety of persons and factors.

In a violent clash with the middle class opposition the conservative Old Guard would probably support the Shah with alacrity, but the younger officers would face very difficult choices. Such a series of clashes split the Army under Mossadegh. On the other hand, the Old Guard cannot be counted upon to support the Shah's efforts at reform, which strike at their personal interests. A clash with wealthy and powerful conservatives would be likely to split the officer corps along opposite lines. Perhaps most important, as the Shah has moved under the pressure of middle class opposition to seek support through reform, he has undermined the support of that group in the officer corps which he could count upon against the middle class opposition.

The term "élite" is used here to describe a number of aristocratic landlords, Old Guard officers, large merchants, tribal and religious leaders who control concentrations of wealth and have major access to power. As a group it has many interests in common. Officers, merchants and tribal and religious leaders all control large estates. Landlords and officers are often found in business partnerships with the larger merchants. But as a group it is as much divided as united. It is united behind the maintenance of the *status quo*—of the wealth and power of its members—but divided on how to maintain the *status quo* and indeed divided on what the *status quo* should be.

First, the Old Guard officers were the active instruments of Reza Shah's brutal rule in the 1930's and the aristocrats, tribes and religious leaders suffered under this repression. Much of the wealth of officers was seized or otherwise gained from other elements of the present élite. The tribes and some of the aristocratic families suffered even more harsh treatment at the hands of the officers. Neither side trusts the other, fearing that once it gains power it will either restore the military dictatorship of the 1930's or take its revenge. Twice since 1941 a "strong-man" officer has led the government—Razmara in

1950 and Zahedi in 1953-54—and on both occasions much of the civilian segments of the élite moved against the government. Razmara ruled at the Shah's behest and the civilian politicians withdrew their support, contributing to the chaos which brought Mossadegh to office. Zahedi restored the Shah to office after Mossadegh but did not restore entirely the Shah's power. The civilian politicians appear to have entered an alliance with the Shah to check Zahedi and brought about his resignation in 1955.

Second, there are roughly three different points of view in the élite on the *status quo*. One held by some religious leaders and some Army officers is reactionary. They seek a return to a preferred religious or military domination of the past. Another, and perhaps the most widespread view, is that the régime is doomed sooner or later and that wealth should be amassed and gotten to a safe place as quickly as possible with no serious concern for the future. The third view, held by a not inconsiderable number of the élite and by the Shah, is that the only way to retain wealth and power is to give some of it up—to reform. Within this last group there appears to be a considerable variation in opinion on how far reform need go and what reforms need to be made, but any initiative by this group or the Shah alienates the first two groups.

In order to rule the Shah must manipulate the balance of these factions and elements—within the Army and the Army against the civilian politicians, within the élite, and finally the loyalty to the Crown in the Army and the élite and of the public against the Army and the élite. It is a task requiring skill. The Ala government accomplished it from 1955 to 1957, under the Shah's direction, only to find that the very balancing precluded reform and other steps to build public support, while it impelled the growth of opposition. Eqbal's task, beginning in 1957, was to find, at the Shah's direction, a way to build support and check the growth of opposition without so upsetting the balance as to endanger or weaken the Shah's power.

In this task the Majlis would have special importance. Without a firm, stable base of support and faced with growing opposition to authoritarian rule, the Shah and his governments have been most concerned to maintain legal and constitutional forms, and for this the sanction of the Majlis is essential. At the same time, the élite has been entrenched in the Majlis and able to deny this sanction to the Shah or embarrass him and his government by inopportune exposure or charges of illegal conduct. Equally, since the Shah needed the support of the élite among others, he could not move against its members in the Majlis without undermining his own power. The Majlis has been a source of negative power to the élite; a position from which they could defend their interests against the Shah and the government.

The elections, of course, are the formal means of access to the Majlis. In the past, election has hinged largely upon the interplay of two factors: the political strength of each candidate in his district and the attitude and actions

of the government towards his candidacy. Concentrated economic control, sometimes coupled with tribal or religious position, was usually decisive in rural districts. Some of the larger landlords own their districts virtually outright—land, water, trees, houses and a considerable part of the towns. The vote of illiterate and insecure peasants in such situations can be manipulated. In the major urban centers, personal prominence and following has been more important than wealth. Dissidents, such as Dr. Mossadegh, or opponents of the régime have usually chosen to run in urban centers. But in both rural and urban districts the government controlled the election machinery and could manipulate it to the great advantage or disadvantage of an individual candidate. Only candidates of great strength ever survived the determined antagonism of the government.

The government, however, has not been strong enough to control all of the districts. It has had to concentrate upon defeating particularly repugnant candidates and has had to seek the support of the élite in order to accomplish this limited end. By and large, the government has had to accept the election of most of the members of the élite in order to defeat a few of these men and the more dangerous opposition candidates.

This was true even in the relatively controlled 1956 elections. The Shah, it is said, "hand-picked" the candidates in this election and all won. A more accurate description would appear to be that the Shah arrived at a full slate of approved candidates after long and careful consultations among the élite. This slate was smoothly elected because it represented the careful balancing of factions which was the hall-mark of the Ala government that conducted the elections. But the deputies, who held office until the 1960 elections, did not owe their election solely to the Shah but to their own power exerted in compromise with each other and with the Shah. They retained an independence in the Majlis and opposed the government when Eqbal sought reforms.

Perhaps the clearest example of this interplay between the government and the élite in the elections occurred in 1954 when General Zahedi and the Army dominated the government. Zahedi overstepped the power of the government in attempting to eliminate the candidates of the Zolfaghari family in Zenjan.

The Zolfaghari are among the largest landlords and virtually own the district of Zenjan. They are not absentee landlords and have carefully tended a local base of power. During the war years they were able to maintain an effective private army against the Soviet-sponsored régime in neighboring Azerbaijan. The Zolfaghari brothers supported Mossadegh and a Zolfaghari introduced Mossadegh's qualified land reform bill in the Majlis. This added to their support in Zenjan but marked them for defeat in Zahedi's 1954 elections.

Zahedi set out to defeat the Zolfaghari—he even entered his brother-in-law

as a candidate in their district—only to have the Zolfaghari again sweep the poll. Thereupon Zahedi arrested the Zolfaghari brothers resident in Tehran and ordered the Army into the district to conduct new and more satisfactory elections. But the government could ill afford a clash with the Zolfaghari partisans at a time so soon after Mossadegh, and the Zolfaghari had a web of contacts with powerful persons in the capital. Many of the élite spoke out against the action; the Shah publicly interceded and the Zolfaghari were seated in the Majlis. The Zolfaghari appeared to be among the civilian politicians who helped precipitate Zahedi's resignation in 1955.

One effect of this election system has been to impede the growth of political parties. Iran has had a multiplicity of factional parties, most quite ephemeral, but no real election parties of any strength. The élite has not needed party support in order to gain election and no opposing party could hope to win, or even enter, their districts. In urban districts parties have been active in the less controlled elections, but only rarely have had significant success. The urban districts are multiple-seat and the characteristic urban election party consisted of a very prominent man at the head of the slate with lesser men further down the list. The prominent men of several of the parties often won election with the lesser men failing. Mossadegh consistently ran and won in Tehran without any party support or affiliation and generally against the government. In the Majlis parliamentary factions formed and re-formed with shifting issues, but few deputies were willing to submit to party discipline when they did not need a party for election.

Eqbal's two-party election scheme, then, was potentially a radical innovation. Carried out with full vigor, it could alter the basis of access to the Majlis and destroy the balanced relationship between the Shah and the élite, giving the Shah a workable Majlis but possibly at the cost of denying him the support of the élite. However, it need not introduce so radical a change, for the choice of candidates for the two parties could be conducted in a fashion hardly distinguishable from the compromise between the Shah and the élite in the 1956 elections. Candidates who were to win would be assigned weak opposition in the other party. The actual intent of the Shah and Eqbal appears to have been to follow a middle course: to use the scheme to eliminate as many of the obstructing conservatives as possible but to stop short of turning the élite to opposition. But they appear to have underestimated the tenacity with which the élite would resist any compromise in the independence of its base of power in the Majlis.

When the two parties were formed in 1957 and 1958 about 80 of the 136 deputies joined one or another. But when the candidates of the parties were announced, shortly before the elections in 1960, only a few of the existing deputies appeared on the lists. Of the 64 deputies who had adhered to the

government party, *Melliun*, prior to the elections only 25 were included on its list of candidates.² Most of the candidates were political unknowns: younger men in government employ, the professions and other middle class occupations. *Keyhan*, an important Tehran daily, labeled 68 of the *Melliun* candidates "undistinguished persons" whose occupation was unknown to it.³ Whatever the original intent, a sweeping purge of the Majlis was under way.

In the months before the lists were announced negotiations went on almost continuously between prominent deputies, the Premier, Assadollah Alam and the Shah. Few hard details are available, but the position of Sardar Fekhr Hekmat may have been a key factor and in any case provides some clues. Hekmat is one of Iran's most respected elder statesmen and by no means an ultra-conservative. He has based his position on public support as well as property and since 1953 has been a pillar of the government.

Hekmat may have been the Shah's first choice to head the "opposition" or may have considered that he should head the "opposition." Before *Mardom* was announced Hekmat formed a Socialist Party only to allow it to fade from sight with the advent of the *Mardom*. Hekmat, however, joined neither *Mardom* nor *Melliun* in the Majlis. Instead, as the elections approached he announced his independent candidacy in his usual district, Shiraz. Thus the hope of confining the choice to candidates of the two parties was dashed from the beginning by one who was perhaps the most powerful man in the Majlis and a staunch, important supporter of the Shah.

Hekmat's announcement was followed by a number of prominent deputies and, as more and more "Independents" announced, a dispute arose over their legal rights, if any, in the elections. At this point Hekmat made a sweeping public statement stressing that the two parties did not have a majority of the country behind them and that the elections were supposed to be free.⁴

On another level, Eqbal appears to have made strenuous last minute efforts to avoid so complete a clash with so many powerful deputies. The *Melliun* list for Tehran was delayed for days after the announcement of its list for the provinces while furious negotiations appear to have taken place between Eqbal and a number of deputies. No radical reversal of course resulted, but when the Tehran list was finally announced *Melliun* was backing some prominent deputies who would normally have run in the capital city. A most useful example is Mohammed Ali Massoudi.

The Massoudi family own the important and conservative Tehran daily, *Ettela'at*. They have had a representative in the Majlis for decades, normally

2. *Keyhan*, 27 Tir 1339/18 July 1960, p. 1.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 1 and 13. Known occupations were: 37 physicians, five engineers, three merchants, 45 landowners, four lawyers, one Governor-General, eight journalists, three retired Army officers and one former policeman. *Melliun* later ran two "workers," one in Abadan and one in Isfahan.

4. *Keyhan*, 6 Tir 1339/27 June 1960, p. 1.

elected from the district of Demavand where the Massoudi are important land-owners. Mohammed Ali was elected from Demavand in 1954 but in 1960 he was neither the *Melliun* nor the *Mardom* candidate in that district. Later, Mohammed Ali headed *Melliun's* Tehran list and before the elections were suspended he was reported to be leading the ballot count there. Rather clearly, Eqbal decided at the last moment, with Hekmat in opposition and freedom of the press being permitted, that he needed Massoudi support at almost any price.

Elections were conducted first in the provinces (Iranian elections are not conducted simultaneously) and there the two-party scheme appeared to be working successfully. Of the 150-odd candidates declared elected, all but three belonged to *Melliun* or *Mardom*. Hekmat and two other "Independents" secured election. Balloting in Tehran was held off until later in the campaign and when it began *Melliun* was already virtually assured of an absolute majority in the new Majlis. But campaigning in Tehran, the political nerve center of the country, had begun immediately and here matters went badly awry.

As campaigning opened in Tehran a group of prominent men, led by Ali Amini, a former Ambassador to the United States and a member of Zahedi's Cabinet, and Jafar Behbehani, a deputy and religious leader, announced the formation of an *Independent* party or group. They proceeded to denounce the conduct of the elections and both parties in the strongest terms and received great attention in the press. Their charges received as much if not more publicity than the campaigning of the official parties. Then numerous other individuals and factions announced "Independent" candidates of their own, including a slate backed by a group of senior retired Army officers.

The Shah and the government might well have won the struggle against the various independent candidates except that two additional elements were interjected which radically upset the situation. First, the agreement, if any, between Eqbal and Alam of *Mardom* broke down and as the campaign proceeded in the country Alam turned to violent attacks on Eqbal's conduct of the elections. Second, leaders of the Mossedegh era re-emerged on the political scene and began to organize popular movements against the elections.

Details of the break between Eqbal and Alam which converted *Mardom* into a real opposition party are not available but much of the situation can be deduced. When the elections opened *Mardom* was critical of the policies of the Eqbal government but followed the Shah's position that the elections were and would be free. Then the failure to prevent independent candidates from running apparently altered the problem. Once the independents were in the field, the government necessarily had to abandon plans to permit a "free" choice, lest the voters chose the independents. It had to manipulate the election machinery in favor of one candidate or another. It is perhaps inescapable in the nature of politics that Eqbal at this juncture chose to manipulate the

machinery to ensure his continuance as Premier rather than to ensure his own defeat. But he apparently failed to get Alam's consent to this arrangement.

Here the Shah's role was crucial, for only he was in a position to arrange or force a settlement between Eqbal and Alam and this was not done. Perhaps Eqbal failed to keep the Shah informed of what he proposed to do until too late. Or perhaps the Shah simply lacked control and skill to keep the situation under control. In any case, as the elections proceeded, Alam began to express more and more irritation at *Melliun* successes until finally, in the Azerbaijan balloting, he exploded and threatened to withdraw *Mardom* candidates unless the government cease its interference. Thus, in mid-stream Alam, long a close associate of the Shah and the official "opposition," joined the powerful independents and the real opposition in charging that the elections were not free as the Shah repeatedly pledged that they would be.

Concurrently, a number of leaders of the Mossadegh era appeared on the scene and began to give organization and public expression to the real opposition. A student rally was organized in Tehran under the National Front label which has strong emotive quality for most Iranians. Hossein Maki, the "Firebrand of Abadan" long considered a dangerous demagogue by the government, announced his candidacy in Tehran. And perhaps more important, Dr. Mozaffer Bagha'i, once a close associate of Mossadegh and founder of the Toiler's Party, again entered the arena.

The sudden appearance of these men in politics is inexplicable on the surface. Had any of them stirred a few months before they would have been quickly transferred from their virtual house-arrest to a proper jail. Only if they had powerful protection—precisely of the powerful independents struggling against the government—is their renewed activity explicable. There is considerable evidence that this was precisely the case of Dr. Bagha'i.

Bagha'i is a socialist who broke with the Communists on the issue of Soviet domination and has long been a highly effective anti-Communist. His Toiler's Party was founded to challenge the *Tudeh* on its own grounds, and Bagha'i broke with Dr. Mossadegh when he felt that the latter had become too dependent on the *Tudeh*. Because of this Bagha'i was not jailed after the overthrow of Mossadegh. But when Bagha'i attempted to enter the 1954 elections in Kerman he was quickly jailed and in recent years has been in administrative exile in remote Zahedan.

Some months before the 1960 elections began Bagha'i was permitted to return to Tehran and resume his post at the University. Then with the elections under way he announced his candidacy in Kerman and formed an organization in Tehran to provide poll watchers throughout the country.⁵ Iran, lacking political parties, has never had nor permitted anything resembling poll

5. *Keyban*, 22 Tir 1339/13 July 1960, p. 15.

watchers. The officials charged with conducting the elections also supervised their own conduct and the government was quick to deny any legal foundation for poll watchers provided by Bagha'i. But the government did not move against Bagha'i and other leaders of the Mossadegh era, who were permitted to campaign and hold mass meetings.

Press reports of meetings of Bagha'i's organization stress the presence of a number of prominent men who never before had reason to show public sympathy for Bagha'i. Leaders of the *Independent* group in Tehran and other individual "Independents" were among these, and toward the end of the campaign Alam's *Mardom* associated itself with Bagha'i and his efforts. It seems clear that powerful members of the élite who were being squeezed out in the elections decided to back Bagha'i and protect other leaders of the Mossadegh era as a trump card in the struggle with the government. It was a potent trump and appears to have carried the day, but it was also a very dangerous act.

The trump threatened to bring on the crisis with the opposition which the Shah and Eqbal had been at such pains to avoid, and bring it on under the worst possible conditions.

The popular leaders of the Mossadegh era had the power to crystalize the opposition into action and along violent paths. If they did so at this juncture, the Shah and Eqbal could not count on support from any quarter. The élite was disaffected. The Army, rather than being split, might be united on a program of inaction. The Old Guard officers would share the view of the élite while the younger officers would be only too likely to sympathize with the opposition. It is notable that the Army was never called upon during the election crisis. Finally, loyalty to the Crown had proven before to be a weak reed before the emotive power of the popular leaders.

As the Tehran ballots were counted in the last days of August the situation became more and more tense. Then Ayatollah Behbehani, religious leader of Tehran and one of the two most revered '*ulama'* in the country, broke his usual silence on politics and added his prestige to the demand that the elections be cancelled and run over again.⁶ This probably was done in concert with the Shah, who later in the day in a press conference admitted that his pledge of free elections had not been fulfilled by the government. The following day Eqbal resigned.

Eqbal's successor, Sherif-Imami, was brought into the Cabinet earlier for his skills as an economic technician and had had relatively little political experience. Yet his choice in a situation demanding political skill and experience was apparently necessary. For he alone in Eqbal's Cabinet had remained apart from the election struggle and his very lack of political engagement, and political enemies, appears to have commended him. In a nation so riven by the

6. *Keyhan*, 7 Shahrivar 1339/29 August 1960, p. 1.

election struggle no prominent politician was acceptable as Premier to other politicians.

The results of the Tehran elections were never announced and at the Shah's request all of the new deputies from the provinces tendered their resignations. A commission was appointed to consider the defects of the election law, upon which official blame was placed. The law has served the government's manipulations well since 1911 and the commission decided that it could not be legally changed in the absence of the Majlis. The "freedoms" prevailing during the elections were abruptly halted but only Dr. Bagha'i appears to have been arrested. He was soon released, albeit with charges still pending against him.

In December 1960 new elections were begun, this time without any significant campaigning or discussion. The results, incomplete when this is written, indicated that *Melliun* will gain the largest number of seats but will lack an absolute majority and "Independents" of various kinds will hold a balance of about 25 seats. The slates of both *Melliun* and *Mardom*, however, were revised, apparently to the end of securing a more feasible balance with the conservative members of the élite and avoiding another near-explosion.

It is doubtful, however, that the old balance upon which the régime rested can ever be restored. The willingness of the Shah to move against them must remain in the minds of many of the élite as a constant reason for hedging their support. The Shah, in turn, cannot but be impressed with the willingness of part of the élite to walk so near the brink of disaster in protecting and sponsoring Dr. Bagha'i and others of the Mossadegh era. He must now be more cautious of the élite and more determined to check their power. It may be that the Shah could have exercised more skill in finding a compromise with the conservative members of the élite prior to the first elections, or that the élite, which has as much at stake as the Shah, might have been more willing to compromise with him. But since this failed to occur the course of events in the election will make it much more difficult for the élite and the Shah to work together to maintain the régime in the future.

The opposition, on the other hand, appears to have received much impetus from the election events. The second and most recent elections, unlike the first, were marked by student violence in Tehran. Dr. Bagha'i, ever persevering, again announced his candidacy in Kerman, only to be quickly re-arrested. Rather than baffling and undermining the opposition, the election scheme in its failure allowed the opposition a catalyst and an open, public forum. It is impossible to know what this will mean for the future of the opposition, but the Shah and Eqbal accomplished none of the things they set out to do in the elections and probably intensified and widened the opposition at the same time they undermined the existing basis of support for the régime.

THE PATHAN BORDERLANDS

James W. Spain

FRONTIER areas are by their nature tumultuous places and many of them have long and colorful histories. Few, however, can equal, either in history or tumult, the borderlands inhabited by the Pathans (Pukhtuns or Pushtuns) along the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

This boundary, known more familiarly as the Durand line, had already been a source of conflict between the Afghans and the British for a half-century when Rudyard Kipling turned his literary attention to it some sixty years ago. The chronicles of the Pathan borderlands today must be read in the outpourings of Radio Kabul and Radio Pakistan and in an occasional terse official statement. These lack Kipling's talent for words but they still recount turmoil and intrigue—which indeed show promise of being perennial.

The Ingredients of Conflict

Small wonder that it is so. All the classic ingredients for strife are there. Some ten million Pathans live in a rugged and remote rectangle of perhaps 100,000 square miles which straddles the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They are warrior tribesmen bound together by a common language and literature, an ancient and well-defined code of honor, and a superb contempt for all peoples outside their own highly developed clan system. To a man, they are orthodox and militant followers of Islām.

The more sophisticated of the Pathans have risen high in the governments of the two states in which they dwell. The royal family of Afghanistan is of the Muhammadzai branch of the Durrani Pathans. The great grandfather of the present King and Prime Minister of Afghanistan ruled in Peshawar, now one of Pakistan's richest and proudest cities. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan is a Pathan of the Tarin tribe whose home is along the River Indus in the Hazara District of Pakistan. The Pathans have more than their share of representation among the top generals, diplomats and civilian officials of both

◇ JAMES W. SPAIN has been a student of the Pathans for a decade. His book, *The Pathan Borderland*, from which the material in this article is drawn, will be published later this year by Mouton and Company, The Hague, for the Institute of Near and Middle East Studies of Columbia University.

governments. All are constantly seeking to utilize the strength and talents of their brothers in the borderlands to promote their usually conflicting national ends.

The main target of both sides are the great "independent" tribes, the Mohmands, the Afridis, the Wazirs and the Mahsuds, to name only the largest, who constitute the inner core of the Pathan borderlands. These and similar clans, whose tribal structure is still intact and vigorous, dwell in a strip of relatively inaccessible hills from fifty to a hundred miles wide and perhaps three hundred miles long. There are four to five million Pathans in the inner core, something more than half of them dwelling on the Pakistan side of the border; the remainder on the Afghan side. Some tribes, such as the Mohmands and the Wazirs, have part of their membership in one country and the rest in the other.

The border hills are almost completely lacking in economic resources. The pressure of population is intense. The hill Pathans have traditionally lived by raiding the fertile lowlands and by taking toll of the commerce which moves through their famous passes: the Khyber, the Malakand, the Kurram, the Tochi, and the Gomal. They have been forced to desist from these practices only by strong governments and then only when subsidies were paid in return for their good behavior in "guarding" rather than preying on the lowlands and the passes. These subsidies were paid by the great Mogul Emperor Akbar in the last part of the sixteenth century; the use of them became almost a fine art under the British; supplemented by an occasional hospital or school, they are paid today by the governments of both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Except for their control of the passes and the roads that lead to them, the neighboring governments have never been able fully to extend effective administration in their territories up to the Durand line. In British India and Pakistan, Tribal Territory has had a special political status since 1901. No attempt is made to tax its inhabitants and many of the national laws do not apply there. In constitutional terms, much of the special status of Tribal Territory has been eliminated in the past few years, but with certain recent exceptions, the legal changes have had little practical effect in the border hills. In Afghanistan, the border tribes have never had any special legal position but administration there has generally been as tentative as in Pakistan's Tribal Territory.

The hill tribesmen themselves, on both sides of the Durand Line, have never displayed any great affinity for their respective national sovereigns. Many on both sides are probably content with their present countries and some are actually devoted to them. Others, however, prefer to profit by playing one country against the other while concentrating on their own inter-clan feuds, and are stung to genuine resentment only when Kabul or Karachi seeks to

extend governmental authority further into the hills. When this happens, there is likely to be trouble. There are about 500,000 rifles (mostly British Enfield 303's) in the hands of the hill tribes, and unfortunately, when unrest begins more are apt to be forthcoming from outside.

Adding to this volatile situation is the fact—well recognized by the tribesmen—that their border hills are highly important strategically. In Pakistan, the main north-south road through Peshawar skirts Tribal Territory for most of its length and in places runs through it. The material essential to north-western Pakistan's commerce and defense must move along this road. In Afghanistan, the Kabul-Kandahar road follows a similar pattern. The cities of Jelalabad, Kandahar and Peshawar are all within a few dozen miles of the homes of the hill tribes. The passes and roads connecting the two countries, again vital for both trade and defense, run right through the Pathan heartland.

The international importance of the area is still much the same as in Kipling's day. Pakistan is a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and has bilateral security ties with the US. Afghanistan is a devoted neutralist, geographically closely associated with the Soviet Union and heavily dependent on the USSR for economic and military aid.

Origins of the Problems of the Borderlands

It is easier to understand many of the principal problems which agitate the Pathan borderlands today if one has in mind an outline of the history of the area for the past century-and-a-half.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, practically all of the territory inhabited by the Pathans was a part of the Afghan empire founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani some fifty years before. While more than a score of Ahmad Shah's grandsons struggled for primacy, another clan of Durranis, the Muhammadzai, seized control of the empire. One brother, the Amir Dhost Mohammad, mounted the throne in Kabul. Four others became viceroys in Peshawar.

Meanwhile, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh had taken over the Punjab and were rapidly pushing out to the north and west to pick up other parts of the original Durrani empire. The Sikhs first marched into Peshawar in 1818 and formally took possession of the city in 1823. They left the Muhammadzai *sardars* (noblemen) as their viceroys until 1834 when they expelled them and assumed direct rule. This brought the Amir Dhost Mohammad down from Kabul with an army in May 1835. The Sikhs sent 40,000 men out to meet him at the eastern end of the Khyber. The battle was never fought. As a result

of a clever piece of bribery and intrigue carried out by one Josiah Harlan, a gentleman adventurer from Pennsylvania in the service of the Sikhs, Dhost Mohammad found himself outwitted, betrayed, and surrounded. He retreated quickly back to Kabul.

During the years that followed, the Sikhs stationed garrisons in other parts of the Pathan homeland east of the border hills. In 1839-40, they allied themselves with the British power spreading out from Bombay to depose briefly Dhost Mohammad in the First Afghan War. Ten years later, in the Lahore Durbar of March 30, 1849, the British took over sovereignty from the disintegrating Sikh empire and most of the Pathans living on the plain between the Indus River and the border hills became subjects of Queen Victoria.

At first, the British neither claimed nor wanted any authority or responsibility for the hill tribes, who were left free to maintain their independence or give allegiance to Kabul as they chose. It did not take the new rulers long, however, to realize that their domains would never be secure as long as the hill tribesmen, frequently supported by Kabul, were free to continue their raiding and harassing of the plains and the lines of communication.

Over the next forty years, the British sought to extend their control into the hills. Most of the tribes resisted, some of them claiming they were subjects of the Amir of Kabul, and scarcely a year went by without a punitive military expedition against them. A few, such as the Shi'a Turis in the Kurram Valley who had long been under attack from their Sunni neighbors, welcomed British occupation.

British policy toward the Pathan borderlands fluctuated frequently, but there were two main schools of thought. Advocates of the "Close Border" system held that the Government of India should not assume responsibility for areas it was unwilling or unable to administer as an integral part of its domains. Viceroy Lord Lawrence (1863-68) was even prepared to pull back all the way to the Indus as a natural geographic and ethnic border.

Supporters of the "Forward Policy" favored pushing the international boundary as far westward and northward as physically possible, and by dint of changing conditions in the extended area through both force and education, exercising full sovereignty over the whole. Obviously, this procedure would sooner or later bring Britain and Russia (which was constantly expanding eastward during the same period) face to face in Central Asia.

There were vastly differing opinions as to just where the boundary should be. Extremists said that India's frontier lay on the Oxus; others would be satisfied with Herat and the Hindu Kush. During and immediately after the Second Afghan War (1878-80), the proposal for a "scientific frontier" along a line from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar was popular. (The British were in actual occupation of the three cities in 1879-80). None of the advo-

cates of the "Forward Policy" were content with merely including the plains between the Indus and the hills which had been inherited from the Sikhs.

In the early 1890's, the British finally settled on a line running almost directly along the spine of the border hills inhabited by the "independent Pathan tribes." After long negotiations presided over by Sir Mortimer Durand, an agreement with the Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan was signed in 1893. The "Durand Line" was demarcated in 1894-95 and remains the international boundary today. The area between the Durand Line and the territory actually being administered by the British remained something of a "no man's land" until 1901, when Viceroy Lord Curzon designated it as Tribal Territory to be dealt with directly by the central Government of India. At the same time, he separated the administered districts adjacent to the Indus from the Punjab and set them up as the North-West Frontier Province of India. In his well-known Romanes Lecture of 1907 at Oxford, Curzon made it clear that he saw Tribal Territory primarily as a "marchland" in which the northwest frontier of empire could be protected against any hostile interests which might seep through the "buffer state" of Afghanistan from beyond the Oxus.

All of this was not accomplished easily. The Amir Abdur Rahman, claiming he was being forced to act against his will, pleaded with the British repeatedly not to include the hill tribes within their boundaries: "If you should cut them out of my dominions, they will never be of any use to you nor to me," he wrote Lord Lansdowne. "You will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering."¹ Yet, in the end, both he and the British promised not to "exercise interference" in each others' territory as divided by the boundary and both professed to accept the Durand agreement as "a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier."² Abdur Rahman's son and successor, the Amir Habibullah, signed another treaty with the British in 1905 undertaking to fulfill the commitments made by his father in 1893.

The border tribes, who were not consulted on these arrangements, resisted the new order forcibly. The Mahsuds destroyed the British Boundary Commission camp at Wana when the Durand Line was being demarcated. Almost all of the major tribes participated in the great rising of 1897-98 which was suppressed only after the British had been forced to commit more than 60,000 troops in Tribal Territory.

1. Abdur Rahman, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, ed. by Mir Munshi Sultan Mohammad Khan, 2 vols; (London: John Murray, 1960) II, p. 158.

2. Aitcheson, C. U., ed., *Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, 14 vols., 5th ed. (Calcutta: Central Publications Branch, 1929-33), XIII, No. 12.

The regularizing of the political structure which Durand and Curzon had accomplished fell far short of solving the problems of the borderlands. Tribal risings and trans-border intrigue continued. In 1919, Amanullah, the new young Amir of Afghanistan, launched the brief and unspectacular Third Afghan War for the purpose of recovering some of the lost territory or at least making it untenable for the British. The Mahsuds and Wazirs joined the fight against the British belatedly but continued it long after the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 8 August 1919 ended the formal war between Afghanistan and Great Britain. In this treaty, Amanullah accepted the Durand Line but won from the British recognition of his right to the title of King and of Afghanistan's independence in foreign affairs.

Two years later, in the Treaty of Kabul of 22 November 1921, Amanullah managed to extract further concessions. Article Two of the Treaty provides that the two parties:

Having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding their benevolent intentions toward the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in the future of any military operations of major importance which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective sphere before the commencement of such operations.

A note from the British Minister in Kabul addended to the Treaty also states:

As the condition of the frontier tribes of the two Governments are of interest to the Government of Afghanistan, I inform you that the British Government entertains feelings of good will toward all the frontier tribes and has every intention of treating them generously, provided they abstain from outrages against the inhabitants of India.³

Legally, there the matter stood until the British departed. However, on at least two subsequent occasions there were graphic demonstrations of the practical connection between the Pathan borderlands and the political situation in Afghanistan. In 1928, a general rising of the tribes on the Afghan side of the border overthrew King Amanullah. After more than a year of virtual chaos, Amanullah was succeeded by a cousin, Nadir Shah, who was carried in victory to Kabul mainly by the Wazirs and the Mahsuds, most of whom were from the Indian side of the Durand Line. In 1938, the same tribes, inspired by a Syrian adventurer called the Shami Pir, set out once more to remove Nadir Shah's son who now occupied the throne and restore Amanullah. This effort was checked only at the last moment by the strenuous efforts of British officials.

3. *Ibid.*, XIII, Nos. 23 and 24.

There were other major explosions in the 1930's. These had little to do with Afghanistan for the attention of the hill tribes was becoming increasingly focused on events in the east rather than the west. The disturbances do, however, illustrate that even without instigation from beyond the Durand Line, the borderlands are volatile indeed. In the spring and summer of 1930, a new political organization sympathetic to Mahatma Gandhi's Congress Party of India was founded by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a rising politician from the village of Utmanzai near Peshawar. The agitation conducted by the "Khudai Khitmatgars" (Servants of God) as Ghaffar Khan called them, or "Red Shirts" as the British called them, spread to the hill tribes and before it was brought under control a year later, an Afridi *lashkar* (war party) of 5,000 had fought its way into Peshawar.

Again, in 1936-38, the Wazirs and the Mahsuds rose against the British under the leadership of Hajji Mirza Ali Khan, the Faqir of Ipi, who remained the borderlands' most famous insurgent until his death in May of 1960. The Wazirs and the Mahsuds were unhappy at the size of their subsidies and resentful of new garrisons and roads which had been established in their homelands. When a British court restored to her parents a Hindu girl who had been carried off and married by a young Pathan, the Faqir raised the cry of *jihad* and the fierce tribes flocked to his standard. Before the affair was over, it cost the British two years of fighting and almost a million and a half pounds sterling.

Such is the turbulent background to the new phase of the perennial problem of the Pathan borderlands which began with the departure of the British in 1947 after almost exactly a hundred years of rule.

A New Setting

The British departure from India in 1947 was in many ways a model of withdrawal by a colonial power. Yet, because of the necessary breakup of the huge mass that they had welded into an empire, they left behind many dangerous problems. Not the least of these concerned the Pathan borderlands.

In 1946 and 1947 a Congress Party government dominated by Abdul Ghaffar Khan was in power in the North-West Frontier Province. When it became evident that Partition was going to occur, the British arranged a special referendum in the province giving the voters the choice of opting for India or Pakistan. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khitmatgars knew that with the coming of Pakistan, largely a creation of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League, their power would be ended. They decided, therefore, to boycott the referendum, as long as it did not give a third choice, "Pathanistan," i.e., an independent or at least autonomous Pathan state.

In the referendum, only 50.99 per cent of the eligible voters exercised their right of choice. Of these, more than ninety-nine per cent opted for Pakistan. No one knows for certain how the other 49.01 per cent of the total electorate felt. At any rate, the referendum provided the legal basis for the incorporation of the Province into Pakistan.

As for the Tribal Territory, the Indian Independence Act provided that all arrangements between the tribes and the Crown lapsed with the coming into force of the Act and the tribes were free to negotiate new arrangements with the successor sovereignty. Many of them did affirm their allegiance to Pakistan in a series of *jirgas* (assemblies) before and after 14 August 1947.

Not unnaturally, Afghanistan began to manifest anew its interest in the political future of the Pathans east of the Durand Line when it became apparent that the British were to leave India. The question was apparently broached informally to the Cripps Mission in 1942. The first public statement of Kabul's position appears to have been made by Prime Minister Hashim Khan in Bombay in June 1947. He declared that Afghanistan was entitled to have a representative at the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province and hinted at his country's support for a "Pathanistan" as advocated by Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

When the question of Pakistan's admission to the UN came before that world body in September 1947, Afghanistan cast the sole opposing vote on the grounds that it could not recognize the North-West Frontier area as part of Pakistan as long as the Pathans of the area had not been given the opportunity to opt for independence. Pakistan, of course, denied that Afghanistan had any right to concern itself with the territory it had inherited from British India.

Thus, the issue which has bedeviled relations between the two countries was drawn. It has remained substantially unchanged ever since.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters soon ceased to be a political power within Pakistan and integration of the North-West Frontier Province into Pakistan's national life has proceeded steadily, the actual province itself having been merged into the "one-unit" province of West Pakistan in October 1955. Tribal Territory has remained a source of trouble, however. The infidel challenge to tribal sensibilities which was presented by the British ended with their departure, and relations between the hill tribes and the authority in the Indus Valley improved greatly. Opportunities for education and medical care have gradually been extended to the tribesmen. Still a number of *maliks* (tribal chiefs) have been unwilling to come to terms with Pakistan and there have been sporadic disturbances during the years. Hostile *lashkars* occasionally threatened (though never seriously) the settled plains. A rudimentary governing body for an independent state under the leadership of the Faqir of Ipi

was set up in the remoter parts of the hills. On several occasions, the villages of the hostile chieftains were bombed by the Pakistan Air Force.⁴

Afghanistan's support for the hostile Pathans, both locally and in the international arena, has angered Pakistan, and relations between the two countries, which otherwise have much in common, have remained tense. In 1955, hostile crowds in Kabul attacked the Pakistani Embassy and Karachi established a virtual blockade of Afghanistan's border. There was some relaxation in 1956-58, when the Afghan King and Prime Minister visited Karachi and Pakistan's President and Prime Minister visited Kabul. In 1957, a transit agreement was signed between the two countries providing for improvement in transportation and communications between them.

None of these moves had any effect on the basic issue in dispute, however, and the skirmishing in the border hills continued. Since 1958, tension has risen again, as President Ayub of Pakistan and Prime Minister Daud of Afghanistan, two strong men, confident of their holds on their nations and their influence among the Pathans whose blood they share, have sought vigorously to enhance the positions of their countries *vis-à-vis* each other.

In late 1960, a quarrel among tribal chieftains in a remote Bajaur area flared into a major incident when the Afghans came to the support of the Khan of Jandul and his father the Nawab of Dir, while Pakistan aided the rival Khan of Khar. Both countries moved substantial forces of regular troops toward the area, although these never became directly involved. In the tribal fight that followed, the Khar forces emerged victorious, and Pakistan took advantage of the opportunity to depose the Nawab of Dir and occupy territory which never before had been administered.

The unrest engendered by this conflict is still smouldering and has apparently spread to adjacent areas. Hostile *lashkars* among the Mohmands have been bombed by the Pakistan Air Force and Radio Kabul has issued harsh warnings of further opposition. The atmosphere is tenser than it has been for years and it is conceivable, if the present pattern continues, that 1961 may rank with 1921, 1930, and 1937 as one of the bloodiest years in the recent history of the Pathan borderlands.

All of this, of course, is costing both countries heavily: in tying down portions of their regular armed forces, in support and subsidies for the contending tribesmen, in the frustration of their respective programs for the economic development and social welfare of the Pathans of their borderlands. As

4. The use of aircraft against dissidents in inaccessible areas dates back to the 1920's. It is generally a very benign affair. Leaflets are first dropped giving the time of the bombing and warning everyone to evacuate. The target is usually the house of the hostile chieftain, since among the Pathans a man's ability to defend his own house is traditionally closely associated with his honor and prestige.

in the past, when Afghanistan has sought and obtained Soviet support for its position and Pakistan has gotten approval of its stand in CENTO and SEATO, the quarrel is limiting the flexibility of both countries in their foreign policy and causing them to measure much of their over-all foreign relations by the narrow touchstone of their border quarrel. If large scale fighting breaks out, the conflict may end up in the UN, where the real issues involved are more likely than not to be obscured in blasts of propaganda and counter propaganda having little to do with the welfare of the Pathans.

Most important of all, perhaps, from a humanitarian point of view, the quarrel is costing the Pathans of the borderlands much of their hope of future progress.

It is true, of course, that the hill men delight in playing one country off against the other and competing subsidies are always more readily available in a time of high tension. Yet, according to the inviolable Pathan code of honor, an injury or an insult, however incurred, must be avenged on the person or family of the perpetrator, and fighting inevitably leads to more fighting as additional tribesmen become involved in the bitter circle of revenge and counter-revenge which grows out of every wounding or killing. More and more, as Pakistan and Afghanistan obtain and bring to bear jet aircraft and heavy tanks and artillery, are the tribesmen likely eventually to find themselves caught and crushed between the brutal weapons of modern warfare.

In a broader field, indefinite prolongation of the conflicting calls of Kabul and Karachi for "Pathan supremacy" on the one hand and integration into the national life on the other can hardly help but have an adverse effect on the traditional tribal *mores* which in the past have given the Pathans their high degree of social cohesion and stability. Finally, of course, neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan can fully succeed in their respective attempts to improve the desperate economic conditions in the borderlands as long as both are acutely concerned with using the tribes against each other.

The Future

After dealing extensively with the problems of the borderlands, Sir W. K. Fraser-Tytler, a noted British authority on the Pathans, concluded that the only solution lay in "the fusion of the two states of Afghanistan and Pakistan in some way or the other."⁵ Considering the almost uninterrupted quarrel which has run on between the two states in the decade since Fraser-Tytler wrote, the idea today seems an unpromising one. Yet, surprisingly, it has never been viewed unsympathetically by either Pakistanis or Afghans. All realize the uto-

5. W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan* (Oxford, 1950), p. 300.

pian nature of the occasional talk about confederation which crops up. However, most also recognize the basic cultural and historical affinities of the two peoples, and even more important in the world of today, the eminent desirability of their economic cooperation.

These common interests are at their greatest in the very area of their most intense disagreement, the Pathan borderlands. Yet, this disagreement, one sometimes feels, is more technical than practical, more based on public honor and established diplomatic position than on conflicting objectives. Afghanistan, for example, although it probably has more historical cause for irredentist yearnings than many countries which still pursue them, has never laid claim to Pakistani territory east of the Durand Line. Pakistan, faced with the perennial problem of unrest in its Tribal Territory, both indigenous and inspired, has never toyed as the British did with the idea of solving the problem by trying to extend its frontier westward beyond the border hills.

There is no doubt that both countries desire the progress and integration into the national life of their respective tribes. Both spend generously of their meager resources to promote social and economic development. It is almost equally clear that in some ways, both have an interest in the Pathans which transcends the Durand Line. To give only one example: every fall Pakistan welcomes more than a hundred thousand nomad Ghilzai Pathans as they come down from Afghanistan to winter in the Pakistani plains. Every spring, Afghanistan receives back the same tribes. Both are inevitably concerned with the physical health and mental attitudes of the Ghilzai; neither could prevent the migration if they would.

It was perhaps appropriate that in the days when the Afghans shared this transcendent interest with the alien British, it was expressed, as in the Treaty of 1921, in terms of each party informing the other of military operations against the tribes residing within their respective territories. There may even be something to be said, it must be confessed, for such an arrangement today in view of the tense and hostile atmosphere that currently surrounds the borderlands.

Yet, it would be unfortunate if two closely related peoples, both of whom hold the principles of Islamic brotherhood in high esteem, could not find a more humane basis for cooperation. The means for such cooperation need be limited only by the imagination and good will of the parties concerned.

The simplest and most obvious way would be another treaty provision which recognized a mutual interest between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the economic and social development of the border tribes rather than in military control of them as in the British-Afghan Treaty of 1921. Such a provision could be included in a routine friendship or non-aggression treaty or in a special agreement.

There may also be ideas to be drawn from the various limited condominium arrangements that exist for special purposes, such as those between the US and the UK in the Canton and Enderbury Islands of the Gilbert and Eilice Islands group in the Pacific and between the UK and France in the New Hebrides. In both cases, administration is joint for some purposes and unilateral for others.

Where territorial sovereignty is not an essential issue, the special commission may be an even more promising means for cooperation. Such commissions consist of persons delegated by two or more states to carry out specified functions. As Professor Lauterpacht points out, they "may be set up for all manners of purposes—inquiry into disputes . . . arrangements of all kinds of administrative questions . . . International commissions have been instituted by the actions of a considerable number of states for a variety of purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political."⁶

Such commissions have worked well and reached a fairly high degree of development among the states of the United States, for example the Port of New York Authority. They have also been important in economic development of neighboring states, as demonstrated by the relatively new St. Lawrence Seaway. In Europe, the Danube Commission is, of course, a classic example. More recently, the European Coal and Steel Community has been extremely effective in promoting the joint interests of its members without becoming involved in problems of territorial sovereignty.

The membership of a commission is not necessarily limited to the states immediately concerned; and in the case of the Pathan borderlands, one which had a connection with the World Bank or some other international developmental organization would have the advantage of being able to draw directly on such a sponsor for at least some of the funds so essential to development of the area. However, financial aid for a sound venture of this kind would probably be forthcoming anyway, and, on the whole, it would probably be better if membership was limited to nationals of the two countries concerned; perhaps one-third Pakistani officials, one-third Afghan officials, and one-third representatives of the tribes.

These are the people who really know the problems of the area and its needs. Many officials of both countries have long experience in dealing with the Pathans of the borderlands and are both sympathetic to their aspirations and at the same time conscious of the requirements of national policy. The tribesmen, though unsophisticated in many things, are skilled in self-expression and the arts of negotiation. One suspects that after a few sessions with them,

6. Lauterpacht, H., ed., *Oppenheim's International Law*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 7th ed. 1948), I, pp. 774-76.

the respective government officials might be to some degree driven together for sheer self-protection.

There would, of course, be problems. Granting that the purpose is economic and social development, just what functions should be the responsibility of the commission and how could they be best carried out: by simple coordination of the respective development programs or by entrusting certain joint programs to the commission? How much scope should be given to the tribesmen to express their preferences and affect planning? What area should be covered by the commission? In Pakistan, for example, the Tribal Territory with its six separate agencies provide a readily manipulable geographic entity. Nothing comparable exists in Afghanistan, although some of the *hukamats* correspond roughly to the agencies and districts on the other side of the border and a specially tailored package of them could probably be made up as Afghanistan's contribution.

In any event, these are but a few of the forms which cooperation could take. In a world which, willingly or not, is constantly being drawn closer together, there will surely develop additional ways of handling economic and social issues which transcend but do not necessarily affect political boundaries. Perhaps, Pakistan and Afghanistan—and their Pathans—will be able eventually to devise a new means for cooperation, which, in its turn, can show the way for other nations of the world.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER

Comment and Chronology

Further Crises

In this space, in the issue for Summer 1960, the comment concerned *crises de régime*. The exceptions to such a phenomenon in the Middle East were listed—the few of them that there were. Since that time, two of the exceptions have undergone variations on the manifestations of unrest, and another has lost the principal *point d'appui* of the old order of things.

On December 14 last the Imperial Guard and other elements in Addis Ababa revolted against the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie I (in his absence on a South American tour). In Ethiopian history, the deposition of an Emperor is no strange affair. Menelik, great-uncle of the incumbent, has been said to be the only *negūs negusti* who died in bed, still *negūs negusti* (though even he suffered a council of regency in his last days, when at the point of death). But the attempt on Haile Selassie's position must have been the first which utilized such terminology in its appeal ("2500 years of oppression") and sought to end a system in regard to which previous insurgents against the imperial authority had only sought to substitute themselves as head of it, or to be divisive of the Empire. The attempt failed, largely because the more traditional elements both of the Army and the upper echelons of government declined to follow the rebels. These latter, ironically enough, had been trained in Western ways largely at the instance of the Emperor himself, in his (some thought too gradual) effort to modernize his realm.

On February 26 of this year, King Muhammad V of Morocco died. His eldest son, now Hasan II, succeeded him as King and *Amir*

al-Mu'minīn, but whether he has inherited the quality of *barakab* his father was almost universally agreed to have is another matter. Nationalism elsewhere has been the sentiment most destructive of the institution of monarchy, but Muhammad V had been able to gather all the strands into his own hands, symbol that he was both of ancient ways and modern yearnings. His son has a formidable task, not only in Morocco itself, but in a putative *Magribi*, if such comes to be after Algerian independence.

If crisis is too strong a word, perhaps, to use concerning Moroccan affairs, it is not concerning Iran. For the last several months, observers have watched the course of two elections (see "Elections and Politics in Iran," pp. 153-164 in this issue), and heard ever louder complaints concerning the methods used to return deputies to the *Majlis* in both of them. The outcry against corruption, given further point by the parlous state of the national finances, grew. After a series of outbreaks, largely by students, the Shah on May 5 appointed Dr. Ali Amini, one of the bitterest critics of the elections and of the state of affairs in Iran generally, as Prime Minister. Dr. Amini is of the "elite"—his mother was a Qajar princess—but has long been in disfavor with his peers on account of the acerbity of his criticism of their stewardship. His appointment marks a drastic reversal of policy to meet a grave threat to the whole order.

It was remarked here last Summer that the three countries have shared "the *mystique* of an imperial tradition which has, so far, not permitted another symbol to gain overriding acceptance." The power of the *mystique* has now been brought into question in all of them.

CHRONOLOGY

December 16, 1960—March 15, 1961

General

1960

Dec. 17: Demonstrations against French policy in Algeria were staged in many parts of the Arab world.

Dec. 18: The Arab League Economic Conference ended a 10-day session with the approval of resolutions. One of these is a recommendation that member states take "rigorous economic measures" against France because of what the proposal called her "war of extermination against the Algerians." Another resolution, approved by all states except Lebanon which abstained, called upon members to tighten the Arab boycott of Israel. The body decided to resume its discussions on April 10 in Baghdad.

Dec. 19: The General Assembly adopted a resolution that recognizes the UN's responsibility in helping to promote independence for Algeria. The call for the UN to conduct a referendum was defeated when the voting produced a 40-to-40 tie with 16 abstentions.

Dec. 21: The Governing Council of the UN Special Fund announced that it had decided to allocate \$7,591,400 to aid 10 approved projects in the Middle East. Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and the UAR were all beneficiaries, mainly in the establishment of animal health institutes.

Three Democratic Senators returned from Africa reportedly convinced the US must adopt a pro-Africa policy backing independence for Algeria and a stronger UN role in the Congo.

Dec. 22: After 2 years of negotiations, the Arab League and the UN have concluded an "agreement of cooperation." The agreement gives the League official recognition by the UN as a regional organization, and it is presumed that it will make it possible to expand its direct field of work with UN specialized bodies such as the FAO and others.

Dec. 24: The secretariat of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has officially invited member countries to attend a second conference to begin in Caracas, Venezuela, on January 15.

Dec. 27: Dr. Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, said in Jerusalem that the US might upset the "relative stability now prevailing in the Middle East," in view of the "dynamic foreign policy to which the incoming administration of John F. Kennedy was committed."

Dec. 28: The North African Student Confederation called for the entry of Morocco and Tunisia into the Algerian war on the side of the rebels as the "surest way" to speed up Algerian independence.

1961

Jan. 5: The chiefs of state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR announced they had reached "full agreement" on the Congo question. It was reported that they had decided to withdraw their forces from the UN force in the Congo, but official announcement of the decision has been withheld.

Jan. 6: The African-Asian "summit" conference held in Casablanca adopted a final resolution approving the "enlistment of African and other volunteers" to aid Algerian rebels fighting for independence.

Jan. 7: In a communiqué issued in Casablanca the 5 heads of state announced their decision to withdraw their troops from the UN command unless the UN adopted a policy favorable to Patrice Lumumba. At the same time, they announced their intention to establish a NATO-like African organization to coordinate their policies and insure common defense.

Jan. 10: The National Assembly of the UAR decided to call on the other Arab states to institute a political and economic boycott of France and to nationalize French property within their territories, in support of the Algerian rebel cause.

Jan. 14: The British Labor Party announced that it was launching a fund to support a campaign, initiated by the Socialist International, to "build and strengthen" socialist institutions in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Jan. 15: Delegates from Asia and Africa started the first Asian-African women's conference, in Cairo, to discuss the woman's role in the struggle for independence and world peace.

Jan. 16: The OPEC opened its second conference in Caracas.

Jan. 18: Recommendations published by the permanent office of the Islamic Conference in Jerusalem

criticized "the hesitation displayed by Arab states" in drawing up political, military and economic blueprints for the recovery of Palestine.

Jan. 19: The conference of the constituent committee of the Federation of Arab Petroleum Workers started in Cairo. During the regular session, the following officers were elected: Anwar Salāmah (Egypt), Chairman; Muṣṭafā Rifa'i (Aden), Vice-chairman; Sa'id Jurnadī (Libya), Secretary. The following 3 subcommittees were then formed: Membership Committee; Constitution Committee; and Recommendations and Resolutions Committee.

The Asian-African women's conference ended with a slate of resolutions calling for: help for the Algerians against French "imperialism;" release of Patrice Lumumba; abolition of the Japanese-US security treaty and the removal of US troops from Japan and South Korea; overthrow of the Chinese Nationalist government; and an end to US "intervention in Laos" and recognition of Prince Souvanna Phouma as head of the government.

Jan. 21: The OPEC conference closed. The resolutions adopted were not disclosed pending approval of them by all the countries concerned.

Jan. 22: The final session of the conference of the constituent committee of the Federation of Arab Petroleum Workers approved the recommendations of its 3 sub-committees, and appointed the members of the Executive Council of the Federation of Arab Petroleum Workers. The chairman elected was Mukhtār al-Tutalli (Libya); secretary-general, Anwar Salāmah (Egypt); and vice-chairmen, 'Ali Sayyid 'Alī (Egypt), 'Abdallāh 'Ubayd (Aden), 'Abdallāh Qaddūr (Syria), Naṣūḥ Maqdālī (Syria) and Sa'id Jurnadī (Libya).

Jan. 30: The conference of Arab Foreign Ministers began in Baghdad. Tunisia's representative was absent.

Jan. 31: Foreign Minister Ṣādiq Muqaddam of Tunisia joined the conference. This ended the 2-year boycott by Tunisia of the League's affairs.

Feb. 2: A 7-point resolution was adopted at the second session of the Foreign Ministers' conference. It declared that: Arab delegations to the UN, in cooperation with the Afro-Asian bloc and other friendly nations, should work for the implementation of the UN resolution on Algeria; more material and financial aid should be provided for Algeria; Arab countries should permit volunteers to serve with the Algerian rebels and allow transit for volunteers from other states; Arab countries should maintain their efforts to secure support from foreign nations sympathetic to the Algerian Provisional Government; they should recognize Algeria's integrity; they should support the Algerian offer to negotiate with France to achieve self-determination; and they should reconsider their economic and political relations with France, should she continue to make war against the Algerians.

Feb. 4: The Foreign Ministers' conference came to a close.

Feb. 5: The convention in Cairo of some 8,000 Arab lawyers was reported to have adopted a resolution to send Arab lawyers to the Congo to defend Patrice Lumumba, when and if he is tried.

It was reported that a secret decision was made during the Foreign Ministers' conference advising Arab governments "to use armed force to keep Israel from diverting Jordan River waters."

A total of 15 resolutions were made public by the Foreign Ministers' conference. Among them were: to persuade Iranian authorities to "appreciate their relations with the Arab countries" when dealing with Israel; to urge Arab states having diplomatic representation in Cyprus to "pay attention to Israeli activities" there; the approval of a "united"—but undisclosed—plan to counter Israel's moves in Africa; and a call upon Arab League states to maintain their efforts, in and outside of the UN, to "prevent the acceptance of Mauritania as a UN member."

Feb. 15: At a press conference in Baghdad, Iraqi Oil Minister Muhammad Salīmān disclosed the resolutions adopted by the second conference of the OPEC. According to an *ANA* report, the main points of the resolutions were as follows: That returns obtained by the oil companies on their investment in the industry in member countries were "much in excess of fair and reasonable remuneration" compared with profits made by other industries or by the oil industry in other parts of the world, hence a study of concessionaire companies' investments in the oil industry as compared with other international investments will be undertaken; that all member states should provide details of previous dealings with the oil companies on the subject of oil prices in order to be able to determine measures to restore prices to a level which OPEC members consider to be just; and that each member state has agreed to subscribe £150,000 in equal shares by February 21, to meet financial requirements.

Feb. 16: The observance of Ramaḍān fast opened throughout the Muslim world.

Feb. 18: The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) ended its 2-week annual session in Addis Ababa after approving a series of proposals to extend the Commission's activities. A standing committee on trade was created, and Executive Secretary Makki 'Abbās was called to look into the possibilities of establishing regional offices outside the Commission's headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Feb. 21: The Petroleum Information Bureau in London announced that Middle East wells established a new record last year by producing 264 million metric tons of oil. This represented an increase of 33 million tons—or 14.4 per cent—on the output figure for 1959. Individual yields by the main

producing countries were:

Kuwayt	81,862,805 tons
Saudi Arabia	60,860,423 tons
Iran	52,064,856 tons
Iraq	47,482,948 tons
Qatar	8,212,360 tons
Neutral Zone	7,273,339 tons

Mar. 4: The post of Director of the Arab League Petroleum Department was reported to be still vacant.

Mar. 5: Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Perez Alfonzo confirmed a Venezuelan embassy report in Washington that Venezuela was determined to abide by an embargo on petroleum and iron ore sales to Israel.

Mar. 10: Foreign Minister Philip Taqlā of Lebanon disclosed to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee that the Arab Foreign Ministers had agreed to leave it to Iraq to tackle the question of Iran's relations with Israel.

Mar. 11: President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela said in his annual message that Venezuela would establish embassies or legations in each of the Middle East countries.

Mar. 14: The OPEC officially began to operate from its headquarters in Geneva and initiated contacts with its member states.

The Aghā Khān called on President Kennedy at the White House.

Aden

(See also, Persian Gulf, Yemen)

1961

Jan. 8: Edward Heath, Britain's Lord Privy Seal, arrived in Aden and held discussions with government officials.

Jan. 20: It was announced that a Yemeni subject, Muhsin al-'Ayni, had been declared *persona non grata* by the government of Aden and asked to leave the Crown Colony "as soon as possible." He was formerly private secretary to Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr of Yemen.

Feb. 13: William Yates, a British Conservative M. P., who had spent 2 days in Aden, left there for a 3-day private visit to Yemen.

Mar. 2: The processing capacity of BP's Aden Refinery will be increased to 6,800,000 tons a year from its present annual capacity of 5,500,000 tons, it was reported. The increase in capacity will cost £550,000.

Afghanistan

1961

Jan. 10: The new ambassador of Czechoslovakia discussed educational relations between his country and Afghanistan with the Education Minister 'Ali Ahmad Pupol.

Jan. 24: An Afghan trade delegation, led by the chief of trade in the Afghan Ministry of Commerce, left Kabul for talks in New Delhi.

Jan. 26: In reply to a *jirga's* (tribal assembly) protest against the anti-Pakistan policy of the Afghan government, the governor of West Pakistan said that Pakistan "sincerely desires brotherly relations with Afghanistan, but unfortunately, all efforts in this direction have failed."

Upon his return from a tour of Europe, the Minister of Commerce, Ghulam Muhammad Shirzad, said he had talks with high-ranking officials of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy, France and Greece, and that trade treaties have been signed with some of these countries.

Feb. 5: According to figures released in Karachi, there was a further rise in Afghanistan's foreign trade in transit through Pakistan during September last year. The total value of trade amounted to 18.9 million rupees as compared with 12.9 million in the preceding month, and 18 million rupees in the corresponding month in 1959.

Feb. 7: The protocol administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the ambassador of the King to Turkey presented his credentials to General Gürsel.

Feb. 8: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported to have appointed Muhammad Yunus Rafiq, former acting head of the department of UN affairs and conferences of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as acting head of the economic department of the ministry. In his place was appointed Rawan Farhadi, former first secretary of the Afghan embassy in Pakistan.

Feb. 17: A delegation from the USSR Ministry of Geology, headed by Deputy Minister Solopov, arrived in Kabul, to discuss problems of oil prospecting in Afghanistan with members of the Ministry of Industry and Mines.

Feb. 18: Premier Sardar Muhammad Da'ud underwent a spinal operation in Rome.

Czechoslovak machinery has been installed in the fruit-canning factory in Kandahar, it was reported.

Mar. 15: An agreement of technical assistance has been signed between Japan and Afghanistan, it was announced. It is intended to build a hose plant, a bottle plant with a capacity of 1,000 bottles a day, a laboratory, workshops and a small electric station.

Algeria

(See also, General, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, UAR)

1960

Dec. 16: In a speech to the National Assembly, Premier Debâti reaffirmed France's policy based on the installation in Algeria of provisional in-

stitutions designed to prepare the province for eventual self-determination.

Farhāt 'Abbās, in a radio speech, called on the Algerian Muslims to halt their current agitation and prepare instead to battle to defeat the "sinister masquerade" of the referendum on President de Gaulle's policy.

General Raoul Salan and Pierre Lagaillarde conferred twice in Madrid.

African states friendly to France sought "to soften" a resolution on Algeria previously presented by 24 Asian and African supporters of independence for Algeria. Senegal suggested that the Assembly urge a renewal of French-Algerian talks, and that some form of international commission be organized to facilitate contact between the parties, it was reported at the UN.

Dec. 18: Eleven African nations associated with France joined in a move to get a negotiated peace in Algeria, and Cyprus was reported to have submitted a new amendment that would eliminate any provision for UN intervention and call on France and Algeria to negotiate a cease-fire.

It was reported in Oran that the French navy stopped the Yugoslav freighter *Srbija* off the Algerian coast and escorted her to Mars-al-Kibir where the vessel will be searched for arms.

Dec. 20: President de Gaulle delivered a new invitation to the leaders of the Algerian rebellion to negotiate peace and self-determination, and to French voters to back that policy.

The UN General Assembly rejected Algerian demands for a UN-conducted referendum to determine Algeria's future. But it adopted a resolution recognizing that the UN had a responsibility to help the Algerian people exercise their rights to decide their own destiny.

Dec. 21: The Société de la Raffinerie d'Alger announced plans for the construction of an oil refinery with a capacity of 2,500,000 tons a year at Maison Carrée near Algiers. It will process Saharan crude from the Hassi Mas'ūd oilfield, shipped to Algiers by tanker from Bougie.

Dec. 22: President de Gaulle won the support of the French Socialist party for his Algerian policy, it was reported in Paris.

Dec. 25: Military authorities at Philippeville said that 11 Muslim auxiliaries and 2 French soldiers had been killed in a clash with nationalist rebels 2 miles outside the town.

Dec. 26: Clashes between Europeans and Muslims killed one person in Oran as the referendum campaign opened.

In Paris, leaders of the right-wing Independent party and the Left-wing Radical party made radio and television appeals against President de Gaulle's plans for Algeria.

Dec. 27: The French Cabinet approved the creation of 32 important Algerian governmental posts for

Muslims, including 11 as subprefects.

Dec. 31: A spokesman for the Provisional Government said in Tunis that the Algerian rebel régime will conduct a campaign calling for a boycott of the referendum.

In a television address, President de Gaulle threatened to withdraw from office if his fellow countrymen refused to give massive backing to his Algerian policies.

Two French soldiers, off duty, fired into a group of Muslims in an Algiers suburb killing 2 and wounding 14, it was reported in Algiers.

1961

Jan. 2: Units of the French Mediterranean Fleet prepared to sail for the Algerian coast with 6,000 marines and other troops in view of the rising tension in Algeria.

Jan. 3: Leaders of the opposition to President de Gaulle in Algiers insisted that any order to the French army to campaign for a "Yes" be overruled.

Jan. 4: Sixteen French generals on the inactive list published a declaration urging Frenchmen to reject President de Gaulle's policy, it was reported in Paris.

Jan. 5: French authorities in Algiers imposed a 10 P.M. curfew on Algiers effective during the 3-day voting period.

Jan. 6: About 60 per cent of those registered were officially recorded as voting in the first day of the French national referendum on Algeria, it was reported in Algiers. Nearly 600 communes in Algeria voted.

In Paris, President de Gaulle made a final television appeal for his policy.

Jan. 7: A clash at Burdj Kiltat Sidi Sahat near Afrou, 200 miles south of Algiers, left 10 Muslims and one French soldier dead and 10 Muslims and one French soldier wounded.

Jan. 8: The referendum started in France and in the various departments and territories overseas.

Jan. 9: Scattered early returns in the Algerian referendum gave President de Gaulle a 72.5 per cent "Yes" majority, according to an official announcement issued in Algiers.

Complete but unofficial returns in France showed a 75.3 per cent "Yes" vote.

A spokesman for the Muslim insurgents in Algeria contended that the results of the referendum had been falsified, it was reported in Tunis.

Muhammad Ghassayri, the Algerian Provisional Government's representative in Syria, said that there were 800,000 French troops in Algeria and "nobody can believe the results of de Gaulle's referendum were fair," it was learned in Damascus.

In Washington, the State Department expressed satisfaction with France's endorsement of the policy of self-determination for Algeria.

Jan. 11: An official spokesman for the Algerian Provisional Government, Ahmad Boumendjel, attributed the sacking of a synagogue in the Casbah last month to an excess of zeal by former police informers, it was disclosed in Tunis.

Jan. 12: A leading French settler in Algeria, René Eygasse, announced in an open letter to Premier Michel Debré, released in Tunis, that he had formed "a party of Algerian independence" for settlers. He is known to believe that European settlers can obtain better guarantees by direct negotiation with the rebel government than can the French government.

Jan. 13: President de Gaulle expressed his "entire satisfaction" with the general conduct of the French army in Algeria before and during the referendum, it was reported in Paris.

The Algerian Provisional Government was reported in Tunis, to be considering the "advisability" of issuing a "constructive communiqué" reaffirming readiness to negotiate guarantees of self-determination as a means of ending the 6-year-old Algerian war.

Jan. 15: The newspaper of the Algerian National Liberation Front issued a warning in Tunis that any Algerians who participated in "provisional institutions" in Algeria would be regarded as "guilty of high treason."

Three Europeans were killed and a fourth was kidnapped by rioting Muslims in the village of Baraki, 12 miles from Algiers, it was reported.

Jan. 16: The Algerian Provisional Government in Tunis issued a communiqué indicating its readiness "to begin negotiations with the French government on conditions of a free consultation of the Algerian people." It condemned the French plan to "impose a granted statute" in advance of self-determination.

Jan. 17: Farhāt 'Abbās arrived in Cairo from Tunis.

Jan. 18: The police fired into the air to disperse a crowd of 300 Muslims who were reported to be threatening 2 Jews in Notre Dame d'Afrique. The latter had been accused of knocking on the doors of Muslim houses. There had been rumors that non-Muslims "disguised as soldiers" had knocked on doors and tried to enter Muslim homes.

Jan. 19: Farhāt 'Abbās reached Djakarta on the first leg of his Asian tour which will take him also to North Vietnam, Ceylon and Pakistan.

Tracts signed with the name of Pierre Lagallarde were distributed in Algiers urging French settlers and Muslims to prepare for battle to halt Algier's movement toward independence from France.

In Paris, political, labor, educational, farmer and war veterans groups of the non-Communist Left united in an appeal for "loyal" peace negotiations that would do justice to the European minority as well as the Muslim majority in Algeria, it was learned.

Jan. 20: Twelve Muslim senators issued a statement approving the idea of negotiations between France and the rebel government in Tunis, it was disclosed.

Farhāt 'Abbās, in an address to the Indonesian Parliament, said that France would submit to the Algerian demand for independence only if the Algerian people continued their struggle and if the anti-colonial peoples throughout the world supported them.

Jan. 21: Two time bomb explosions killed 8 persons and wounded 27 in Tizi Ouzou, 55 miles east of Algiers, accompanying the entry into the town of the French Public Works and Transport Minister, Robert Buron.

Jan. 24: The Algerian Provisional Government issued a declaration underlining its position that there would be no peace and no cease-fire in Algeria unless the French government first negotiated political guarantees for free self-determination. It was issued by Muhammad Yazid, the information minister, in response to accusations from French spokesmen in Algiers that continued rebel military and terrorist action was creating obstacles on the road to peace.

Jan. 25: Pierre Popie, a lawyer and one of the leaders of the Liberal minority among the Europeans of Algeria, was found stabbed to death in the waiting room of his office in Algiers, it was learned. The killer was not identified.

Farhāt 'Abbās declared at a news conference in Djakarta that "it is up to the French to take the initiative" to open talks with his régime to end the war.

General Maurice Challe, former Commander-in-Chief in Algeria, asked for retirement at the age of 55 for undisclosed personal reasons, it was learned in Paris.

Jan. 27: The military arm of the rebel government said in Tunis that it was prepared to "define guarantees that would justify" the "maintenance in Algeria" of Europeans who became Algerian citizens, "within the limits of the laws that will be in force."

Feb. 4: President Bourguiba revealed an invitation by President de Gaulle to visit him in Paris. He told newsmen that he would like to accept the invitation, but that the decision did not depend on him alone. It was assumed that President de Gaulle wanted to discuss Algeria.

Feb. 5: It was announced in Tunis that a meeting of the Algerian Provisional Government has been planned after the return of Premier Farhāt 'Abbās and other nationalist leaders.

Feb. 8: President de Gaulle conferred with the Tunisian Minister of Information, Muhammad Masmūdi.

Feb. 9: A French spokesman in Algiers announced that French fighters had fired warning shots at a Soviet plane that had strayed into "the zone of French responsibility."

Feb. 10: 'Ali Suwayi, rebel commander of the Algerian sector near the Tunisian border, was killed by troops of the French Foreign Legion in a night skirmish between legionnaires and a rebel patrol, the military headquarters in Algiers reported.

Feb. 11: Muhammad Masmudi completed the first phase of "a new attempt to start Algerian peace negotiations" after a series of talks with French officials and political leaders. It was reported that the conversations were designed to be a preliminary to a meeting between President de Gaulle and President Bourguiba.

Feb. 12: Muhammad Masmudi arrived in Tunis for consultations with Algerian nationalist leaders. He is also reported to leave for Zurich "some time this week" to report to President Bourguiba on the results of his talks with President de Gaulle.

Feb. 13: Farhat 'Abbas arrived in Tunis and conferred with Muhammad Masmudi and other Algerian and Tunisian leaders. The meeting lasted 3 hours and was later described by Muhammad Yazid and Muhammad Masmudi as "fraternal in spirit."

The killers of Pierre Popie, 2 former French paratroopers, were arrested and were said to have admitted the crime.

Feb. 14: Ministers of the Algerian Provisional Government met in Tunis "to fix their positions" on the prospective visit to President de Gaulle by President Bourguiba, it was reported.

Former Premier Guy Mollet, head of the French Socialist party, was reported to say that President de Gaulle seeks direct negotiations with Algerian rebel leaders.

Feb. 17: General Fernand Gambiez took over in Algiers as top military commander in Algeria, replacing General Jean Crépin.

Feb. 18: It was reported in Zurich that President Bourguiba will go to Paris to visit President de Gaulle on Saturday, the 25th, "if preliminaries are worked out in the meantime."

Muhammad Masmudi returned to Paris.

Feb. 21: It was revealed in Tunis that the principle of an immediate and direct contact between the French and the Algerian nationalists has been accepted by both sides.

Feb. 22: It was announced in Paris and Tunis that Presidents de Gaulle and Bourguiba will meet at the Chateau Rambouillet on Monday, the 27th.

Feb. 23: The French navy halted and searched the 6,275-ton British freighter *West Breeze*, under charter to Communist China, before permitting the vessel to continue on to Britain.

French forces in Algeria arrested 9 men: 2 French officers and 7 enlisted men, who had

formed a resistance unit against any surrender of French sovereignty in Algeria.

Feb. 27: President de Gaulle and President Bourguiba met and afterwards issued a joint communiqué which announced their agreement that there exist "possibilities and hopes" for a "positive and rapid evolution" in the 6-year-old war of rebellion in Algeria.

Feb. 28: President Bourguiba disclosed that he believed that the question of peace or continued war in Algeria rested now with the Algerian rebel leadership.

Two European women were burned to death and at least 5 persons were wounded in a flare-up of violence between Muslims and Europeans in the city of Oran.

Mar. 1: The French Cabinet approved a series of decrees proposed by Louis Joxe, Minister for Algeria. Among them were: a decree ending the arbitrary power of the military to order administrative detention of suspected Muslim nationalists without formal charges; a second one calling for the nomination of two prefects of police, presumably civilians, one in Algiers and the other in Oran; and a third one which calls for the government to cut by more than half—from 39 to 17—the number of arrondissements in which police powers remain in military hands. Only on the frontiers and in the Aurès and Kabylia mountain regions will soldiers continue to be in charge of police work.

President Bourguiba, King Hasan II of Morocco, Farhat 'Abbas and other Algerian nationalist ministers met in Rabat primarily to hear President Bourguiba's report on his talks with President de Gaulle.

March 2: At the close of their meeting early this morning, President Bourguiba and Premier Farhat 'Abbas issued a communiqué to the effect that no obstacle now exist to direct negotiations for an end to the Algerian rebellion.

Thirteen of the 19 persons on trial were acquitted by a military tribunal in Paris of charges of participation in the European insurrection against France in Algiers in January 1960. The 6 persons convicted are all in flight, including Joseph Ortiz, who was condemned to death, and Pierre Lagaille, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Mar. 4: It was reported in Rabat that secret talks were in progress between a representative of the French government and one of the Algerian Provisional Government.

Mar. 7: Farhat 'Abbas returned to Tunis from Morocco.

Michel Debré's office denied reports that an Algerian truce had been concluded.

Mar. 8: The French government promised to transfer Ibn Balla, the imprisoned leader of the

Algerian rebellion, from an island prison to comfortable "controlled residence" near Paris within the next 2 or 3 days, it was reported.

The Algerian Provisional Government told France that "we are for official negotiations, direct and without any prior condition," it was revealed in Tunis.

France decided to establish universities at Oran and Constantine to increase educational opportunities for the Muslims.

René-Pierre Jannin was named prefect of police in Algiers and Jules Flettner, prefect of police in Oran.

Mar. 12: President Nâṣir advised Algerian nationalist leaders to hold peace talks with the French. He declared that he will not oppose Algerian peace efforts by President Bourguiba, with whom he has been at odds.

Mar. 13: After a meeting with President de Gaulle, the Cabinet issued a communiqué which was reported as "an obvious invitation to the rebels to begin formal negotiations" without setting as a condition the signing of a formal cease-fire agreement.

Cyprus

1960

Dec. 16: Estimates for the 1961 development costs were officially released. About 1 million pounds will be spent on agricultural development, including water, and about 1.1 million on public works. Another £140,000 will be spent for small community projects and £270,000 for the development of medical services.

Dec. 17: Archbishop Makarios signed a bill providing for the establishment of the Republic's courts.

Dec. 18: Foreign Minister Kyprianou left for Paris to attend the first conference for Greek, Turkish and Cypriot foreign ministers, as members of the treaty of alliance signed by the 3 countries.

Dec. 19: At a joint meeting in Nicosia the secretaries of the Turkish cooperatives in Nicosia and Kyrenia districts and representatives of the Turkish farmers union agreed that the decision taken on the distribution of American cereals aid was unacceptable because it would be detrimental to Turkish farmers, it was reported.

Dec. 23: On his return from Paris, Foreign Minister Kyprianou said that the conference there had agreed to establish a committee of plenipotentiaries to deal with all matters under the treaty of alliance, except certain cases such as intervention of the tripartite headquarters and its Greek and Turkish forces in case of internal disturbances, which would be taken up only by the committee of ministers.

Dec. 26: Pavel K. Yermoshin, the Soviet Union's first ambassador to Cyprus, arrived in Nicosia to assume office.

1961

Jan. 6: An American steamer brought 6,500 tons of barley to Larnaca.

Jan. 13: Fights broke out in Nicosia's Metaxas Square between youths shouting "Long live Makarios!" and placard-bearing members of the former EOKA. Two youths were injured.

Jan. 17: John Clerides died in Nicosia. He was 73.

Feb. 2: A delegation representing several trade unions called on Archbishop Makarios to protest delays to begin projects provided in the development budget approved by the House of Representatives.

About 300 unemployed Turks held a procession in Limassol carrying slogans urging the government to take urgent measures to eliminate unemployment.

Feb. 6: Unemployed Cypriots demanded bread and work in a demonstration in front of the office of the Works and Communication Minister, Andreas Papadopoulos, who told trade union leaders that the government would start relief work as soon as the year's budget was approved.

Feb. 7: After the budget debate, the president of the House of Representatives, Glafkos Clerides, announced that he had included the subject of the inclusion of Cyprus in the Commonwealth in the agenda for February 14. Deputy Christodoulides termed the inclusion premature and asked for the postponement of its inclusion. The issue was put to a vote and the House voted for postponement of the issue.

During a meeting of the central and regional councils of the trade and industrial federations of Cyprus, it was unanimously agreed that the interests of Cyprus demand that the republic stay within the Commonwealth, provided that the decision for the republic's leaving the Commonwealth is not subject to the veto of the President or Vice-President of the republic.

Cyprus' diplomatic representative in London, Antis Soteriades, signed a protocol providing for the membership of Cyprus in the UNESCO.

Feb. 10: It was announced that the Swiss ambassador to Lebanon, Dr. Guido Keel, will also serve as the Swiss ambassador to Cyprus. He will continue to reside in Beirut.

Feb. 13: The *Athens News Agency* reported that the office of the Vice President issued a statement confirming that there is a dispute in the Cabinet over the question of separate municipalities. The Turkish view, it reported, was that the municipalities should be separated geographically, but the Greek side proposes that all Greek citizens and property should come under Greek municipal jurisdiction.

Feb. 16: The House of Representatives voted 41 to 9 in favor of the inclusion of Cyprus in the Com-

monwealth for a period of 5 years. After that period the House will be free to decide whether it should continue as a member.

Feb. 23: It was officially announced that Lefkios Rodosthenous, a Greek deputy for Limassol, was arrested by the police on a charge of receiving £4,000 from a shareholder of a Nicosia transport company, by using threats. A high court had lifted his parliamentary immunity prior to his arrest.

Feb. 24: An agreement in principle between the UN and Cyprus on a grant of technical and economic aid to Cyprus was signed in Nicosia.

Feb. 27: Lefkios Rodosthenous appeared in a Nicosian court and was remanded for a further 8 days to facilitate inquiries into allegations concerning the possession of a pistol, theft and blackmail.

Regulations concerning the recruitment for the republic's army were published. Initially recruits will be required to serve for 3 years. Recruiting will be carried out in stages over the next 2 years, the first one from March 2 to March 16.

Mar. 3: Archbishop Makarios was reported to have said that if the application of Cyprus to join the Commonwealth was approved, he would go to London to take part in talks during the second week of the prime ministers' conference.

Mar. 5: Archbishop Makarios said at Ormidhia that the Zurich and London agreements should be faced in a positive way and not in a negative one.

The professors of the communal secondary education schools had a general special meeting and decided to stage a warning strike on March 8 to demand more salaries.

Mar. 6: Lefkios Rodosthenous and Andreas Moustakas of Kato Platres were arraigned at the Nicosia district court.

The Cyprus constitutional court issued its decision in reference to the constitutional status of capital punishment for murder in Cyprus. It decided that such a sentence can only be imposed in cases of premeditated murder.

Mar. 8: The preliminary hearing of Lefkios Rodosthenous started in Nicosia.

The secondary teachers staged their strike. Most classes were suspended.

Mar. 11: The 1961 budget of the tripartite headquarters of the Cypriot Greek and Turkish foreign ministers was examined and approved at a meeting of the committee of deputies in Nicosia.

Mar. 13: The British Commonwealth elected the Republic of Cyprus as its twelfth member.

Ethiopia

(See also, Somalia)

1960

Dec. 16: Emperor Haile Selassie arrived in Asmara. The Ethiopian embassy in Washington reported

that the attempt by the Imperial Guard to overthrow the government had "ended in complete failure." The implication of Crown Prince Asfa-Wassen in the *coup* was denied by reports saying that he might have acted "under duress." A message from General Mengsha, the Chief of Staff, broadcast in Ethiopia, said that 2 of the revolutionary leaders, Majors General Mengestu Neway and Tsigae Deebub had fled.

Dec. 17: The Emperor returned to Addis Ababa and resumed control of the government.

A report from Jibuti said that 19 leaders of the government were believed to have been executed by the rebels. General Mulugeta Bullie, chief of the rebels, was reported slain.

Prince Samson Beyene, counselor of the Ethiopian legation in Stockholm, announced that he had taken charge of the legation 2 days after Teferi Chareou, the Ethiopian Minister there, had announced his sympathy for the rebels.

Dec. 18: It was announced in Frankfurt that Ethiopian Airlines would resume flights to Addis Ababa today.

Emperor Haile Selassie declared that all members of the Ethiopian Imperial Guard who participated in the *coup* would be forgiven if they surrendered with their arms. As the hunt for the rebels continued, funeral arrangements were made for the slain ministers, among whom were the Ministers of Commerce, Information, Justice, War and the Chief of Staff.

Dec. 19: The body of Ethiopia's former security chief, a leader of the *coup*, was publicly hanged in Menelik Square. He was Lieut. Col. Workineh Gebeheyo. In the meantime, an official funeral was held for the Ministers and officials slain. Crown Prince Asfa-Wassen was exonerated from any part in the rebellion.

Dec. 20: Emperor Haile Selassie declared that the short-lived rebellion "will not change our system or our devotion to the people and to their development."

Dec. 21: Two more rebel leaders were captured. They were Getatchew Bekele, an official in the Ministry of Defense, and Captain Asrat Deferassau, an officer of the Imperial Guard.

Dec. 24: Ethiopian troops captured Major General Mengestu Neway and killed his brother, Germame. The former commanded the Imperial Guard and the latter was governor of Jijiga province. The brothers were reported to have been the main plotters of the short-lived *coup*.

Dec. 25: The bodies of Germame Neway and Captain Baye Telahun were hanged in downtown Addis Ababa.

Dec. 26: A joint session of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies reaffirmed allegiance to the government of Emperor Haile Selassie.

Dec. 29: A commission has been set up by the

Emperor to investigate the recent revolt. It is headed by Colonel Tamrat Yiguzze, a provincial governor.

1961

Jan. 2: Nearly 400 Ethiopian tribesmen have been wounded and a number killed in 2 days of clashes with Somali tribesmen in the Ethiopian province of Harar, it was reported. Meanwhile, Ethiopia lodged a "strong protest" against the government of Somalia.

Jan. 13: A cultural agreement between the Soviet Union and the Ethiopian government was signed. It provides for the exchange of students and teachers and the exchange of cultural, sports and tourist delegations.

Jan. 21: Emperor Haile Selassie has accepted an invitation to visit Jordan, it was disclosed in Addis Ababa.

Feb. 6: Emperor Haile Selassie opened a conference of African states sponsored by the UN at Addis Ababa.

Feb. 17: Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams arrived in Addis Ababa.

Feb. 28: Emperor Haile Selassie received the Soviet ambassador to Ethiopia who handed him a special message from Premier Khrushchev.

Mar. 3: The Emperor named 25 young men to junior administrative posts. The appointments to the Foreign, Defense, Trade and other key ministries coincided with the trial of Major General Mengestu Neway.

Iran

(See also, General, Iraq, Israel)

1960

Dec. 24: Twenty-one miners were killed in an explosion at the Shamsak coal mine north of Tehran. First reports indicated that 70 workers were feared trapped.

1961

Jan. 7: Eighty-eight Iranians were reported drowned in the Persian Gulf in an illegal attempt to cross over to Kuwait to find work.

Jan. 10: The first phase of the general elections for 200 seats in the Majlis opened with balloting in some towns. Minor scattered clashes were reported.

Jan. 11: Dr. Riza Fallah was reported to have been appointed as Deputy Prime Minister.

Jan. 22: Election results stood as follows: 27 Melliyun Party, 30 Mardom Party and 8 independents.

Jan. 24: The Iran Oil Exploration and Producing Company (Consortium) reported that some oil had been found for the first time in their Pazanum field.

Jan. 25: NIOC Chairman Dr. A. Entezam published the text of a telegram from Enrico Mattei, President of ENI, once again denying reports that SIRIP had any intention of abandoning offshore exploration, and confirming their continuing exploration in complete cooperation with NIOC.

Jan. 26: Supporters of ex-Premier Muhammad Mossadegh led 10,000 students of Tehran University in a demonstration charging that the elections were not free, it was reported.

Jan. 31: The Shah opened a new dried-fruit packing plant, established by the Rehabilitation Bank at Takistan near Qazvin.

Feb. 1: The Shah denounced those at home and abroad who were opposing his program of gradual reform and progress.

Feb. 2: Elections in Tehran began.

Feb. 4: The elections in Tehran were completed. The total count at this point from all over the country indicated that 130 deputies had been elected—58 Melliyun, 52 Mardom and 20 independents. Ex-Premier Eghbal was among those elected from the town of Meshhed.

Feb. 5: It was reported that hundreds of university students, shouting anti-government slogans, demonstrated in the bazaar district of Tehran protesting the conduct of the elections. The government announced that the university would be closed to prevent further disorders.

The security police arrested candidate Muzafar Baghai. The specific reason for his arrest was not disclosed.

Feb. 6: Students demonstrated in Tehran against the closing of the university and Danishvara College, a teacher-training school.

Feb. 12: Classes in Tehran University were resumed. It was revealed that 80 students had been arrested during the demonstrations.

Feb. 14: Election results to date stand: 69 Melliyun, 60 Mardom, and 28 independents.

Feb. 16: The government claimed the right to take over berthing operations at the port of Abadan. Iraqi pilots threatened to strike in protest.

Feb. 18: Queen Farah Diba received the "highest royal decoration" ever awarded to any Queen in Iran. It was called Highest Royal Social Services Medal in appreciation of her social work.

Feb. 21: The Shah opened the 20th Majlis with a call for a new law to insure honest elections.

Feb. 23: Student demonstrators, described by police as "definitely Communists" set fire on Dr. Eghbal's car, pushed the ex-Premier from his laboratory in the University of Tehran.

Feb. 28: The Iran-German Investment Guarantee Agreement was signed in Tehran. It guarantees

capital investment by nationals of both countries in each other's territory. It now awaits Parliamentary approval.

Mar. 4: Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip left Tehran for Isfahan and Shiraz on a 2-day tour of Iran's ancient monuments.

Mar. 9: According to a *Reuters* dispatch, Iran is not in fact exporting oil products from Bandar Mashur instead of Abadan as reported by the same agency earlier. A limited quantity of fuel oil has been put through the pipeline from Abadan to Bandar Mashur, since the closure of Abadan to tanker traffic on February 16, but this is solely for bunkering purposes at Kharg Island.

Mar. 12: Premier Sharif Emami presented the members of his Cabinet to the Majlis. The following were appointed:

Dr. Muhammad Sajadi: *Deputy Premier and Supervisor of Economic and Financial Affairs*

Dr. Jahanshah Salih: *Education*

Ghuds-Nakhi: *Foreign Affairs*

'Abd al-Baghi Shuwai: *Finance*

Muhammad 'Ali Muntaz: *Justice*

Dr. Javad Ashtiyani: *Health*

General Naghdii: *War*

General 'Azizi: *Interior*

Ministers of Trade, Mines and Industry, Agriculture, Roads, Posts and Telegraphs, Labor, and Customs, have remained unchanged.

Bad weather forced W. Averell Harriman, ambassador at large in the Kennedy administration, to land at Abadan. He was scheduled to visit for 2 days at the invitation of the Shah.

Mar. 14: The Finance Minister met with a group of 14 representatives of the Consortium company to discuss the possibility of increasing the country's oil revenues.

Mar. 15: General Teimour Bakhtiar, head of the security service, was succeeded by his assistant, Hasan Pakrevan, after he resigned because of ill health.

The Shah was reported to have chosen his son-in-law, Ardeshir Zahedi, present ambassador to the US, as Court Minister.

Iraq

(*See also*, General, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, UAR)

1960

Dec. 18: Nine representatives of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce left for Moscow for a 10-day visit at the invitation of the Foreign Trade Organization of the USSR.

Dec. 19: Waṣfi al-Tall, Jordan's new ambassador to Iraq, presented his credentials to Najib al-Ruba'i, President of the Sovereignty Council.

IPC Managing Director G. H. Herridge and General Qāsim had a 6-hour meeting.

Dec. 20: For the fourth time since August 15th the negotiations for the revision of the 1952 agreements between Iraq and the IPC were adjourned. Mr. Herridge and 3 other company officials left for London after 4 weeks of negotiations in Baghdad.

Dec. 26: A military court sentenced 10 persons to be hanged for complicity in killings during an attempted 1959 revolt. Eighteen soldiers were condemned to death, but the court commuted their sentences and recommended that they be reduced to 5 years.

Dec. 28: Seven more persons were sentenced to death on murder charges during the abortive 1959 revolt.

1961

Jan. 6: On the 40th anniversary of the foundation of the Iraqi army, General Qāsim announced the abolition of the curfew imposed in Iraq at the time of the July 14, 1958 revolution.

Jan. 8: The West German government has allocated 15 scholarships to Iraqi students for the academic year 1961-62, a Ministry of Education spokesman disclosed.

Jan. 9: Seventy-six persons were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, ranging from 6 months to 2 years, by a military court, for alleged complicity in initiating disturbances among workers at a cement factory in Baghdad last year.

Jan. 11: In an interview with the *Financial Times*, Minister of Oil Muhammad Salmān predicted a new era of partnerships between oil companies and the oil-producing countries. He had had a meeting with IPC Managing Director Herridge and was on his way to the OPEC meeting in Caracas.

Instruments of ratification of the Iraq-Soviet loan agreement of August 18, 1960, were exchanged in Moscow last week and became effective today.

Jan. 13: An Italian firm was reported to have been awarded a £1 million contract for the laying of a 60-km. natural gas pipeline from Rumailah oil field to Baṣrah, where it will supply a power station, plastics factory and fertilizer plant.

Jan. 16: The government announced its decision to reopen its consulate in the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem.

Jan. 17: It was announced in Copenhagen that an Iraqi-Danish trade agreement providing for "most favored nation" treatment had been ratified by the 2 countries.

Jan. 21: It was announced that a committee will be formed to consider the practical possibilities of turning Baṣrah into a free port.

Jan. 22: The Central Bank released figures indicating that sterling assets in the currency reserve fund dropped from 40.5 million dinars in December, 1957, to 19.3 million in September, 1960.

Jan. 23: The US signed a cultural agreement with Iraq.

Muhammad Salmān arrived in Havana, Cuba, after representing Iraq at the OPEC meeting in Caracas.

Jan. 24: The Director General of Civil Defense, Hasan 'Ali Ghālib, disclosed that a new civil defense law was being drawn up to supersede a decree issued in 1956. It is planned to establish a higher council to organize civil defense in various districts.

Jan. 26: An amendment to the penal code went into effect, which prohibits judges from commuting death sentences to periods of less than 7 years' imprisonment.

Jan. 28: It was disclosed that the Italian firm, awarded the £1 million-contract for the construction of the natural gas pipeline, was SAIPEM, an ENI member.

Jan. 29: A special committee was reported to have drafted a bill covering national assistance to aged or disabled persons and orphans, providing a minimum aid of 120 fils per day in Baghdad, Mosul and Baṣrah, and 100 fils a day elsewhere.

Feb. 1: The contract with SAIPEM was signed.

Feb. 3: It was reported that thousands of youths in Baghdad demonstrated in front of the Defense Ministry against imperialism. The rally was directed at the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference in another part of town.

Feb. 6: The Tunisian Foreign Minister announced that General Qāsim had invited President Bourguiba to visit Iraq. General Qāsim was reported to have already accepted the latter's invitation to visit Tunisia.

Feb. 8: Foreign Minister Hāshim Jawād disclosed that Iraq plans to open 5 new diplomatic missions this year in Brazil, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Nigeria and "a Scandinavian state."

Minister of Education Isma'il al-'Arif joined representatives of the International Special Fund and UNESCO in signing a blueprint embracing aid to a government industrial training school in Baghdad.

Feb. 11: The results of elections for administrative office in the Teachers' Syndicate revealed that the Nationalists were victorious in 11 districts, while their opponents won in only 3.

Feb. 14: The Oil Ministry was reported to have asked all government departments to seek its approval before giving employment to persons who have resigned from posts with the oil companies. The reason given was that such resignations are "detrimental to the government's plan to speed up the Iraqization of the companies."

Feb. 16: The cutting off of piloting rights on the part of Iraqi pilots in the Shatt al-'Arab touched off negotiations between representatives of Iran and Iraq.

Feb. 17: Iraq was added to the list of countries that have recognized the government of Antoine Gizenga in the Congo.

Feb. 19: *Al-Aqbar* reported that permanent Iraqi diplomatic representation will be established in Geneva, as soon as the OPEC sets up its headquarters there.

Feb. 20: The Ceylonese Trade Minister, T. B. Ilangaratne, told a press conference that General Qāsim has been invited to visit Ceylon at a convenient time.

Feb. 21: It was announced that, under the terms of a trade agreement signed between Ceylon and Iraq, the latter will export horses, mules, dates, grain, cement and oil products to Ceylon, and import a variety of commodities from her, including tea, spices and silk fibers.

Director General of Ports Mušir al-Shāwī declined to give details of the talks taking place between Iraqi and Iranian representatives, but he reasserted Iraq's ownership and rights in the Shatt al-'Arab.

Feb. 23: Plans for the construction of Iraq's first harbor on the Persian Gulf were completed and announced by Director General of Ports Mušir al-Shāwī.

Feb. 26: It was reported that Shaykh Siddiq Miran, the chief of the Kurdish Khush Nao tribe, had been killed in a mountain clash in the Erbil region, while his brother, Kamāl, and cousin, Sulaymān, had been injured.

Feb. 27: It was disclosed that talks were being held between representatives of Iraq and the UAR with the object of establishing a joint committee to determine means of increasing trade between the 2 countries and to overcome difficulties which have arisen in implementing the trade agreement of 1958.

Feb. 28: The government has agreed to pay \$12,568 to UNESCO as Iraq's contribution to the organization's 1961 budget, it was revealed.

The payroll for nearly 2,000 workers at the Darbandi Khān dam site, amounting to some 50,000 dinars, was stolen.

Mar. 2: It was announced that 6 persons, including "a" German pilot, had been arrested and remanded in custody in connection with the theft mentioned.

Mar. 4: Yūsuf al-Hājj Ilyās resigned as Director General of Oil Affairs. In his place was appointed 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Wattārī as Acting Director General.

It was announced that Iraq had abandoned her intention to establish diplomatic relations with Nepal in view of that country's relations with Israel.

The Ministry of Education revealed that students will no longer be permitted to leave the country for study abroad, unless they first produced certificates proving that they had been accepted for registration by the foreign school.

Mar. 5: Foreign Minister Hāshim Jawād signed an agreement which entitles Iraq to seek the assistance of UN experts in various fields.

Military Governor General Ahmad Ṣāliḥ al-'Abdi ordered the closure of the Rabita printing press in Baghdad, on the grounds of alleged discovery of receipts acknowledging contributions to a fund raised in aid of "families of nationalist martyrs in Mosul," on its premises.

Mar. 7: Kamāl al-Chaderchi, leader of the National Democratic party, resigned, but his resignation was rejected by the party's Central Committee.

The Iraqi government announced its intention of banning some 100 internationally known individuals from entering Iraq, on the grounds that they maintain contact with Israel. Among them is Sir John Cockcroft, the British atomic scientist.

Mar. 11: The Director General of Ports, Mušir al-Šāhī, denied reports that Iraqi pilots were on strike in the Shāṭṭ al-'Arab. He charged that the pilots were not working because the Iranian National Transport Company did not wish to utilize their services.

Mar. 13: It was disclosed that the Mosul branch of the Peace Partisans' Organization had been closed, by order of the military governor.

General Ahmad Ṣāliḥ al-'Abdi was reported to have ordered the freezing of the accounts of the Iraqi Journalists' Union, after an appeal by some members that the organization should be purged of "fake journalists," in order that it might become an "independent professional body."

Mar. 14: The Iraqi government decided to exchange ambassadors with Canada, it was learned.

Capital held by the state Maritime Transport Company will be increased from 2 to 5 million dinars, in order to cover the cost of a 5-year program embracing the construction of 6 freighters and 2 oil tankers, it was revealed.

Israel

(*See also, General, Cyprus, Jordan, Palestine Problem, Morocco, UAR*)

1960

Dec. 17: Rabbi Charles Weinberg, president of the Rabbinical Council of America, sent an appeal to Premier David Ben-Gurion in Israel asking him to seek the postponement of the election there of the chief rabbinate. December 22 had been set as the election date.

Dec. 18: A report from Washington disclosed that

US officials were studying "with mounting concern" indications that Israel, with the assistance of France, may be developing the capacity to produce atomic weapons. Israel called the report "very flattering . . . but untrue."

Dec. 19: The Israeli embassy in Paris declared that "Atomic research in Israel is devoted exclusively to the needs of industry, agriculture, medicine and science . . ." Simultaneously, a French Foreign Ministry spokesman officially denied reports that France was aiding Israel to launch any kind of "atomic military programme."

Dr. Robert Servatius was received in Jerusalem by Dr. Gideon Hausner, the Israeli State Attorney General.

Dec. 20: Lincoln White of the State Department said in Washington that the US was still waiting for a reply to its 10-day old request to the Israeli government for information regarding the existence and purpose of the nuclear reactor plant in the Rehovot region.

After a meeting with Eichmann, Dr. Servatius said that his client had admitted "the facts," but his feelings could not be described as "regret." Eichmann denied that he is still a "hardboiled Nazi."

Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel assured the US government that Israel's nuclear reactor would not be used to make an atomic bomb. He delivered Israel's formal reply to Secretary of State Christian Herter, but the contents of the letter were not disclosed.

Dec. 21: In response to inquiries in the Knesset about the nuclear project, Premier Ben-Gurion asserted that the nuclear reactor was for peaceful uses. He further described the project's expected development.

Dec. 22: The State Department said that Israel's nuclear reactor no longer represented "a cause for special concern."

Dec. 23: A Cabinet committee reported that a senior army officer submitted a forged document in 1954 to blame then Defense Minister Lavon for the secret 1954 security operation that had actually been carried out without the minister's knowledge. The report was endorsed by the Cabinet.

Dec. 26: The Knesset held its first secret session. The closed debate came upon a motion by the Herut party, which had asked for a secret discussion of the reasons for the resignation of Major General Chaim Laskov as Chief of Staff.

It was announced in Jerusalem that Israel has decided to pay Dr. Servatius the \$20,000 he asked for expenses and fees.

Dec. 28: Yitzhak Navon, Premier Ben-Gurion's political secretary, confirmed the Premier's decision to take a 4 or 5-week leave as a result of the Lavon crisis which has split his party. It was reported that he would use the time to decide

whether to resign or accept the Cabinet decision exonerating Pinhas Lavon.

In an address to the 25th Zionist Congress, Premier Ben-Gurion said that "Orthodox" Jews who lived outside Israel were godless and violated the precepts of Judaism every day they remained away from the country.

Dec. 29: A petition signed by Martin Buber and 44 senior members of the Hebrew University faculty urged the country's politicians to cease fighting for personal power lest they endanger the future of the state.

The rabbinical elections was postponed for the third time. The event was put off until February 1. *Dec. 31:* The Hadassah delegation to the World Zionist Congress endorsed Premier Ben-Gurion's position on Jews living outside Israel. Rabbis David Seligson and William Berkowitz of New York, on the other hand, disputed him.

1961

Jan. 1: Minister of Agriculture Moshe Dayan presented documents to contradict Mr. Lavon's description of the secret operations in 1954. No action was taken by the Cabinet, and Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen will transmit the material to the Knesset committee.

Major General Zvi Tsur succeeded Major General Chaim Laskov as Chief of Staff.

Premier Ben-Gurion said he had been misunderstood by American Jewish leaders who said he believed that Jews outside Israel had no God. He clarified his position by saying that his quotation of the Talmud on the subject was made "when I was addressing myself specifically to the minority of Orthodox Jews."

The Cabinet voted to finance the defense of Adolf Eichmann.

Jan. 2: Gadna, the paramilitary youth battalions in Israel, opened a course for youth leaders from Asian and African countries. Twenty-seven men and 16 women from 9 countries will take part in the 3-month course to train them as organizers of youth movements.

Jan. 3: Finance Minister Levi Eshkol introduced the budget for the fiscal year beginning April 1. It is equivalent to \$3,364,200,000 and represents a 10½ per cent increase over last year's budget.

The Knesset rejected a minority demand for debate on Premier Ben-Gurion's dispute with his Cabinet over the Lavon affair. The Premier was reported to have refused to join the majority of his Cabinet in approving the report exonerating the former Defense Minister.

Jan. 5: Premier Ben-Gurion left for an undisclosed destination in Israel to take a vacation.

Jan. 8: It was announced after a Cabinet meeting

that Israel has accepted an invitation to take part in the 1964 New York World's Fair.

The World Zionist Congress issued an appeal to Jews throughout the world to come to Israel "for the good of both the country and themselves."

Jan. 10: The senior army officer, who was involved in the Lavon affair, was discharged from the armed forces. His name was not disclosed. Attorney General Gideon Hausner had found insufficient evidence to prosecute him for forgery or issuing false documents.

Israel's diplomats were instructed to convey expressions of "disappointment and profound surprise" to the leaders of Mali, Ghana and Guinea over a resolution, adopted at the African "summit" conference in Casablanca, referring to Israel as "an instrument of imperialism and neo-colonialism."

Jan. 11: At the closing session of the World Zionist Congress, Dr. Nahum Goldmann was re-elected president.

Jan. 12: Premier Ben-Gurion accused Pinhas Lavon of having organized opposition parties in a campaign of "back-biting and slander" in a "poisonous war" against the party to which both men belong. He laid his charges before the 301-member central committee of Mapai.

Jan. 13: The Mapai central committee affirmed its faith in the Premier and asked all Cabinet ministers not to resign in the Lavon affair.

In Tel Aviv, Yehezkel Sahar, Israel's ambassador to Vienna, was convicted of perjury and sentenced to a term of 9 months in prison after having been found guilty in a libel suit at the trial of Amos Ben-Gurion, the Premier's son.

Justice Minister Rosen submitted a motion to the Cabinet that all ministers resign because of Premier Ben-Gurion's public display of a lack of confidence in the coalition group for its action absolving Pinhas Lavon.

Jan. 16: Premier Ben-Gurion was reported to have decided to yield, at least for the time being, to the Cabinet ruling on Lavon. He wrote a letter to Justice Minister Rosen retracting his accusation of bias against the committee. The Progressive party's political committee, however, persisted to demand the resignation of the Cabinet.

Jan. 18: Foreign Minister Golda Meir charged Morocco with "a heavy responsibility" for the drowning of Moroccan Jews attempting to leave for Israel January 11.

Jan. 20: In an interview in Tel Aviv, Pinhas Lavon declared that he would neither resign his labor-federation office nor submit to a "one-sided" investigation by his party.

Jan. 23: All the political parties represented in the Knesset agreed to postpone the election of a new Chief Rabbinate until the end of 1961, it was announced.

Jan. 24: Dr. Servatius said that he would be obliged to relinquish the defense if he were not soon permitted to have a private meeting with his client.

Jan. 25: Dr. Servatius left Israel unexpectedly. At the airport, he said that the ministry's delay in supplying the charge sheet and a record of Eichmann's 4,000-page statement to the police might necessitate a postponement of the trial.

Jan. 30: Dr. Servatius sued the West German government for failure to favor his application for funds to pay Eichmann's defense costs.

The Ben-Gurion government survived a motion for a vote of no confidence. The motion was defeated, 77 to 26.

Jan. 31: Premier David Ben-Gurion submitted his resignation.

Feb. 1: Attorney General Gideon Hausner presented official charges against Eichmann to defense lawyer Robert Servatius.

Feb. 3: The Secretariat of the Mapai party adopted a resolution asserting that Pinhas Lavon does not speak for the party as secretary general of Histadrut.

Feb. 4: Demonstrations protesting against the Mapai's decision to relieve Pinhas Lavon from his post as secretary general of Histadrut led to the arrest of 9 persons in Tel Aviv.

Feb. 5: An announcement was issued in Tel Aviv saying that President Itzhak Ben Zvi would start consultations with party leaders in the Knesset prior to appointing someone to form a new government.

Feb. 6: The Mapai party formally nominated David Ben-Gurion to head Israel's next government.

Feb. 7: Israel convicted and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment 50-year-old Professor Kurt Sitte, a German nuclear physicist who worked on research contracts for the USAF in Israel, for having transmitted security information to a foreign power.

Feb. 9: Pinhas Lavon resigned as secretary general of Histadrut. His resignation was accepted.

Feb. 10: Aharon Becker became acting secretary general of Histadrut.

Feb. 12: Professor Kurt Sitte filed an appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court.

Feb. 13: Five persons were arrested in Jerusalem during a demonstration of Hebrew University students opposed to the return of David Ben-Gurion as head of the government.

Feb. 15: President Itzhak Ben Zvi called on David Ben-Gurion to form a new government.

Feb. 20: The US Development Loan Fund announced a loan of \$6,000,000 to Israel to finance part of the foreign exchange costs of expanding the Israeli telephone service. It also announced an agreement to lend, subject to terms yet to be negotiated, \$10,000,000 to the Industrial Development Bank of Israel.

Feb. 21: David Ben-Gurion told his party at a caucus in Jerusalem that he will not try to form a new government after next week. The meeting was held to discuss prospects for a coalition with the National Religious Front. Although Ben-Gurion had not accepted the President's request to form a new government, he permitted a small committee from his party to look into such prospects.

Feb. 22: Israel presented an indictment against Adolf Eichmann, accusing him of personal responsibility for the murder of European Jews during World War II.

Justice Minister Rosen told an East Berlin attorney that Israeli law prohibited his association with the prosecution of Eichmann. The attorney had applied to represent East German Jews.

Feb. 23: The executive committee of the National Religious Front voted against going into a new government with David Ben-Gurion.

Feb. 24: The trial of Eichmann was scheduled for April 10, it was announced in Jerusalem.

The Mapai reaffirmed David Ben-Gurion's leadership over the party.

Feb. 26: Three judges were named to sit in the trial of Eichmann. They are: Benjamin Halevi, president of the Jerusalem district court, Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau, and Judge Itzhak Raveh of the Tel Aviv district court.

Dr. Servatius said he would protest the appointment of Judge Halevi, it was learned in Bonn.

Feb. 28: David Ben-Gurion informed President Itzhak Ben Zvi that he was unable to accept the task of forming a new Cabinet.

Mar. 2: President Itzhak Ben Zvi summoned representatives of the 6 political parties and rebuked them for putting the country into "confusion and chaos."

Mar. 5: The Association of Secondary School Teachers called a strike demanding higher status and wages.

Mar. 7: The Mapai party reaffirmed its intention of either reforming a coalition with David Ben-Gurion as Premier or going to the polls, it was reported in Jerusalem.

President Kennedy announced the selection of Walworth Barbour to be the successor of Ambassador Ogden Reid.

Mar. 12: The Supreme Court in Jerusalem upheld the conviction for perjury of Yehezkel Sahar.

Mar. 13: Poet Robert Frost opened the Samuel Paley Lectures on American culture and civilization at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Jordan

(See also, Israel, Palestine Problem, UAR)

1960

Dec. 19: The prosecutor in the Amman "bomb" trial called for the death sentence for 11 of the 12 accused.

The Minister of Health, Dr. Jamil al-Tutunji, announced that the American Medical Institute had declared its willingness to supply the necessary quantities of Salk vaccine to launch an anti-polioimmelitis campaign in Jordan next year.

Dec. 25: The Minister of the Interior instructed Jordanian theaters not to import films made in Communist countries.

Dec. 29: The 11 accused in the Amman "bomb" trial were sentenced to death. Seven of the condemned were tried in absentia. One defendant, Munib Madi, former director of the Jordan Press Bureau, was acquitted.

Dec. 31: Three West German experts arrived in Amman to begin technical studies under the terms of the cooperation agreement of last May between Jordan and the Federal Republic.

1961

Jan. 8: The Council of Ministers approved a civilian aviation agreement covering a regular exchange of flights between Jordan and Sweden.

Jan. 9: The Jordanian government approved the nomination of 'Abd al-Karim Shuqûr as Iraqi ambassador to Jordan, and informed the Baghdad authorities about it, it was learned in Amman.

Bashir al-Rifa'i, Director of Rural Reform, and his chief assistant, Antoine al-Nabûr, left for New Delhi to represent Jordan at the Afro-Asian conference on rural affairs due to open there on January 17.

Jan. 11: The American embassy announced that the US Development Loan Fund authorities had agreed to make a loan of \$1 million, repayable by long-term installments, to the Arab Real Estate Bank, an Egyptian concern operating in Jordan. It was stipulated that the money must be devoted to industrial undertakings in Jordan.

Jan. 14: The Jordanian Trade Union Federation endorsed the International Federation of Arab Trade Unions' resolution to boycott French ships and aircraft in Arab countries, in protest against France's policy in Algeria.

Jan. 16: It was announced that Foreign Minister Müsâ Nâşîr will attend the meeting of Arab foreign ministers to be held in Baghdad on January 30.

Jan. 17: The House of Notables passed amendments to the Explosives Act, making sentence of death the penalty for people found guilty of possessing,

transporting, selling or buying unlicensed explosives.

Jan. 21: Nine men charged with espionage on behalf of Israel were sentenced to hard labor for life by the Second Military Court in Jerusalem. Four others received sentences of 10 years', and one of 15 years' hard labor while 11 were acquitted, but the court recommended a re-trial on a minor charge of "infiltration."

Jan. 23: King Husayn said in a broadcast speech that those "who were trying to undermine the foundations of Arab history in a wicked attempt to make it begin with themselves" could never succeed in their efforts. The address was transmitted on the eve of "Greater Arab Renaissance Day."

Jan. 28: The IPC representative in Jordan, Ronald L. Reed, said that the company would retain its concession rights and properties in Jordan and would continue to pay the Jordanian government the sum of JD 60,000 a year under the terms of the concession agreement.

Under the terms of an agreement signed today, the USOM to Jordan will pay the government \$61,785 for the continuation of the current campaign against malaria launched by the Ministry of Health.

Feb. 2: Jordan's first oil refinery at Khau, near Zerka, was formally inaugurated by King Husayn. Built by the SNAM Progetti group, it has a potential capacity of 330,000 tons of various products per year.

Feb. 5: Premier Bahjat al-Talhûni issued a defense order listing goods that must be imported solely from the US. The measure was taken to comply with a US request that Jordan increase her imports from the US to about half the annual assistance from the US to Jordan's budget, amounting to \$40,500,000.

Feb. 12: The Council of Ministers met and heard a report from Foreign Minister Müsâ Nâşîr, on the proceedings at the Baghdad conference of Arab foreign ministers. It also appointed Dr. Sayf al-din al-Qilâni as Director-General of Information to succeed Subhi Zayd al-Qilâni, who died last week.

Feb. 14: It was announced that Jordan's total imports in 1960 amounted to JD 40 million in value, mainly of manufactured goods and agricultural equipment.

Feb. 20: Iraq's new ambassador to Jordan, 'Abd al-Karim Shuqûr, arrived in Amman.

Feb. 21: Premier Bahjat al-Talhûni announced that IPC has agreed to pay generous indemnities to the 200 company employees, who have been declared redundant.

About 400 cases of lockjaw were reported in Aqaba.

Feb. 25: The Iraqi ambassador presented his credentials to King Husayn.

The government received \$4 million as part of the US's grant-in-aid program to Jordan's budget for 1960-61.

Feb. 26: The Foreign Ministry disclosed that the government had advised the UN that, owing to the country's difficult financial position, it would be unable to pay its share of the cost of maintaining the UN emergency forces in the Congo and the Gaza strip.

Mar. 2: A royal decree was issued calling the House of Representatives to assemble for an extraordinary session to debate the budget for the financial year opening on April 1.

Mar. 6: It was learned that King Husayn had sent a personal letter to President Nāṣir on February 23 suggesting that the estrangement between Jordan and the UAR should be ended, in the cause of Arab unity.

Foreign Minister Müsā Nāṣir notified Jordan's ambassadors in Lebanon and Bonn of his decision to have them exchange posts, effective early in April.

Kashmir

1960

Dec. 22: The Pakistani Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Akhtar Husayn, said in Rawalpindi that the government of Pakistan had received information, as early as November, that the Indian authorities were contemplating carrying out clean-up operations in the demilitarized zone on their side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

1961

Jan. 15: Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir of Pakistan disclosed that the People's Republic of China had agreed in principle on the demarcation of its border with Pakistan.

Jan. 20: The President of Azad Kashmir, K. H. Khurshid, threatened to seek and accept assistance from "any quarter" to "liberate" that part of Kashmir held by India.

Feb. 18: The Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, meeting in Rawalpindi, called for the release of the deposed and imprisoned Prime Minister of Kashmir, Shaykh Muhammad Abdallah, and demanded that he be turned over to the UN military observers in Kashmir.

Lebanon

(See also, General, Sudan)

1960

Dec. 18: A bomb exploded in the entrance to the printing press of *Beirut al-Masa*. No damage or casualties resulted.

Dec. 20: Sulaymān al-'Ali, Minister of National Economy, and 'Abd al-Rahmān Tayyārah, Director General of the ministry, discussed the ministry's report on transit royalty negotiations with Tapline, prior to submitting the report to the Council of Ministers.

Dec. 30: Leading textile manufacturers decided to close down their mills as a protest against the continuing competition of imported textiles.

1961

Jan. 1: The Doctors Association announced an indefinite strike in support of demands for better pay for medical officers.

Jan. 2: The Minister of Health denied the report of an indefinite strike on the part of doctors.

Jan. 3: Norman Burns, Director of USOM to Jordan, was appointed to succeed Dr. J. Paul Leonard as president of the AUB. The appointment is effective September 1.

Jan. 10: *Al-Nahar* reported that as of June 1960, when IPC started the pumping of crude oil through the 30-in. loop line from the Lebanese border to the Tripoli terminal at a rate of 3,000,000 tons annually, the company would have to pay an additional £237,500 in transit royalties per annum.

A Soviet delegation headed by Nikolay Smelakov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, arrived in Beirut to discuss the renewal of the Russian-Lebanese trade agreement which expired on December 31.

Jan. 16: The Lebanese ambassador to the Sudan informed the Foreign Ministry that the Sudan had decided to reduce the customs duties on Lebanese fruit imports from 50 to 20 per cent.

A mild earthquake was registered in Lebanon. No injuries were reported.

Jan. 18: The Council of Ministers decided to raise Lebanon's diplomatic representation with Yugoslavia to embassy level.

Jan. 19: The Chamber of Deputies passed an emergency bill prohibiting the import and possession of gambling machines, whether "electrical or non-electrical" and whether used for betting or for mere amusement.

Tapline President John Noble arrived in Beirut from the US, where he had been consulting with the company's board of directors. The Minister of National Economy disclosed that an official invi-

tation had been sent to Tapline to begin negotiations.

Jan. 22: The Kuwait government agreed to grant the Beirut Municipal Council a long-term loan of £L 45 million at 4 per cent interest, it was learned.

Jan. 23: A protocol increasing the value of Soviet-Lebanese trade from £L 15 million to £L 20 million a year was signed by Nikolay Smel'takov and Khalil Taqi al-din, Director of Economy at the Foreign Ministry.

Five hundred "judicial assistants" went on strike for increased salaries and better working conditions. The Prime Minister threatened to dismiss the clerks if they persisted in their strike.

Jan. 24: The clerks suspended their strike and returned to work.

The head of the Lebanese Office for the Boycott of Israel disclosed that Lebanon had lodged a protest with its counterpart in the UAR for having allowed seed potatoes to be unloaded from the Norwegian ship *Mars* last month after the unloading of a similar consignment had been forbidden in Beirut.

Jan. 30: The Chamber of Deputies approved this year's budget. The estimates, which amounted to £L 273,800,000 compared with £L 220,000,000 last year, had been under debate since January 2.

A bill seeking special powers in connection with matters affecting the civil service was passed. It empowers the Cabinet to decree salary and pension increments for civil servants, except those employed by the judiciary, and for their regrading, following consultations with the Civil Service Board.

Feb. 1: The Council of Ministers approved recommendations made by the ministerial committee to the effect that the minimum wage throughout the country should be increased from £L 95 to £L 125 per month.

The Council also approved a proposal to establish a training center for senior representatives of Arab Ministries of Education in Beirut, in cooperation with UNESCO.

Feb. 4: Explosives were thrown at the house of former President Camille Sham'un, but landed in the garden without causing either damage or casualties.

Air Liban employees returned to work after a 2-day strike in protest against the resignation—following differences with certain French members of the Board of Directors—of the airline's General Manager, Henry Najjaji. A spokesman said that the issue remained one "for the directors to decide."

Feb. 7: The trial of Salim Lahhûd, one-time Foreign Minister and head of the Litani River Project Department, opened in Beirut. Together with representatives of an Italian and a French firm, he is charged with irregularities in awarding contracts for the Litani scheme.

Feb. 9: The President of the Beirut Lawyers' Syndicate announced in a press statement that the organization wished to dissociate itself from the resolutions adopted by the Cairo conference of Arab lawyers.

An FAO spokesman in Beirut revealed that Lebanon has joined the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean.

Feb. 13: The trial in absentia of Šâlih al-Shishakli, brother of ex-President of the Syrian Republic, 'Adib al-Shishakli, and one of the 13 accused of disturbing Lebanon's relations with the UAR, opened before a military court in Beirut.

Feb. 17: The Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 'Abdallâh al-Mashnûq, announced that he had signed an agreement with Kuwaiti authorities for a £5 million loan to Lebanon, payable over a period of 10 years at 4 per cent interest.

Feb. 19: In a raid carried out on Raml jail, Beirut, supplies of heroin, cocaine and hashish, banknotes of several different currencies, and even a radio and television receivers, were seized from prisoners.

A civil aviation agreement between Lebanon and Czechoslovakia was signed in Beirut by the Director General of Transport, Fu'âd Shadar and the Czech Deputy Minister of Communications, Karl Stekl.

Feb. 22: A radio-telephone link between Beirut and Damascus, embracing 72 lines, was inaugurated.

Police arrested 9 students from the AUB on a charge of having instigated their fellows to suspend their classes in celebration of the third anniversary of the union of Egypt and Syria.

Al-Anwar reported that in the course of recent consultations with Prime Minister Šâ'ib Salâm and Economy Minister Sulaymân al-'Ali, Tapline offered to make an advance payment on Lebanon's share of oil transit royalties, pending the conclusion of an agreement between Arab transit states regarding the division of 50 per cent of Tapline's profits among them. The Economy Minister was reported to have refused the offer and requested the company to start separate talks with Lebanon—a step not welcomed by the company.

Feb. 26: In reply to President Nâṣîr's alleged criticism of the Lebanese Falangist party and the PPS, Prime Minister Šâ'ib Salâm read a prepared statement to the press, calling all Lebanese to strive to preserve Lebanon from all dangers, so that there should be "one Lebanon and not two."

Feb. 27: The Prime Minister received the Soviet ambassador, Sergei Kiktev, who handed him a letter from Premier Khrushchev.

Mar. 2: Kamâl Jumblât told reporters in Damascus that he hoped for "a new policy in Lebanon whereby the administration and security forces" would "curb the activities of the PPS and Falangists" for the sake of Lebanese unity.

Mar. 5: A convoy of vehicles taking people to Damascus to congratulate President Nāṣir on the third anniversary of the UAR was attacked as it passed the village of Kahala.

Mar. 6: An "Algerian Week" was launched in Lebanon, calling for donations throughout the country in support of the rebel cause.

Mar. 7: An attempt to wreck the house of Prime Minister Ṣā'ib Salām was foiled by a Jordanian who extinguished a burning fuse leading to a pile of 105 sticks of dynamite.

Mar. 11: *Al-Nabar* was suspended for 10 days for having published a cartoon depicting Lebanon as a province of the UAR.

Mar. 13: The IPC Employees Union and the Refinery Employees Union cabled President Shihāb to use his influence to stop the dismissal of IPC redundant employees.

Mar. 14: It was disclosed that Deputy Emile Bustāni has revived his plan (now officially sponsored by the government) for setting aside 5 per cent of total profits from Arab oil to finance long-term projects in the area.

ently advising the Libyan government on petroleum affairs, left Baghdad for Libya, accordingly to study matters concerning the relinquishment of concession areas.

Feb. 25: It was learned that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semyrnov arrived in Libya en route to Tunisia on a "personal and private visit." He was met by the chief of protocol in the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mar. 11: The Libyan cabinet met. Among the resolutions passed was a reply to Premier Khrushchev's letter on the Congo. It said in effect that Libya supports all liberation movements and it endorsed the leadership of the UN in such matters.

Mar. 12: King Idris decreed the appointment of 'Ali Nūr al-dīn as governor of the Libyan National Bank for a period of 5 years. Other appointees were 'Ali Nūr al-dīn al-'Unayzi as ambassador to Lebanon and Jordan, and Nadīm al-dīn Farhāt as ambassador to the German Federal Republic. He also revoked the decree dated April 29, 1960 appointing Dr. 'Unayzi as governor of the Libyan National Bank.

Libya

(See also, General, Algeria, Tunisia)

1960

Dec. 17: Police mobile units and cavalry drove back 5,000 demonstrating students trying to reach the French embassy in Tripoli to protest against Algerian events, it was reported.

It was announced that the Libyan Petroleum Commission has brought in its fourth producing well in Block 66 in Tripolitania. The well flowed 40° API oil at a rate of 650 b/d from a depth of 5,000 feet.

1961

Jan. 16: Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) announced that its affiliate, Esso Sirte Inc., had begun controlled production testing of the Raguba-1 discovery well in Concession 20 in the Cyrenaica province of Libya.

Jan. 20: In a formal statement to *Petroleum Week*, Muhammad al-Sayfat, Chairman of the Libyan Petroleum Commission, stated that Libya has "no interest" in any world oil price control or production restriction schemes, has no intention of joining OPEC in the foreseeable future, and intends to reaffirm the 50-50 oil profit sharing principle for Libyan concessions.

Jan. 29: The Libyan Petroleum Commission announced that Gulf Oil of Libya had found oil with well J-66 in Concession 66 in Tripolitania. The well tested at a rate of 500 b/d of 38° API oil.

Jan. 31: Dr. Nadim al-Bajājī, the Iraqi oil expert and former Minister of National Economy pres-

Morocco

(See also, General, Algeria, Israel, Tunisia)

1960

Dec. 17: It was reported in Rabat that a shipment of Soviet arms and munitions arrived at Casablanca allegedly for the Algerian rebel army.

King Muhammad V laid the cornerstone of a new textile factory in Fez.

Dec. 19: Morocco's new school of forestry at Salé was inaugurated by King Muhammad V.

Dec. 24: A dispatch of the Moroccan press agency, Maghrib Arab Press, alleged that Spanish authorities in the presidios of Ceuta and Melilla were expelling Moroccans from the fortified Spanish settlements. An official spokesman for the Spanish Embassy in Rabat denied the allegation.

Dec. 27: Morocco "threatened" France with reprisals as a result of the third atomic explosion at Reggan. The left-wing National Union of Popular Forces was reported to have urged abrogation of Morocco's military agreement with France.

1961

Jan. 4: In a speech opening the conference of African leaders in Casablanca, King Muhammad V invited the leaders to unite their continent in a consultative council that would have some resemblance to NATO.

It was reported in Madrid that Spain and Morocco are near a final agreement on the evacuation of the 2,000 Spanish troops remaining on Moroccan territory.

Jan. 11: Forty-two Jewish immigrants died in a ship-

wreck off the Mediterranean fishing port of Alhucemas. They were believed to be Moroccans trying to re-enter Morocco without passports. Only 3 survivors were reported.

Jan. 12: The captain of the shipwrecked vessel was questioned. He disclaimed any knowledge about the nationality of his passengers. The same sources who reported that the victims were trying to re-enter Morocco changed their story. The Maghrib Arab Press Agency charged that alleged Zionist groups "under the cover of humanitarian, cultural or social work," were organizing the clandestine emigration of Moroccan Jews.

The Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem asked Morocco to relax her restrictions on the emigration of Jews to Israel.

Jan. 13: Leaders of the Moroccan Jewish community told the government that "discriminatory actions" had been taken by the police against Jews. They were referring to the detention of about 2,000 Moroccan Jews by police in Casablanca during the last 10 days. It also charged that the director of a Talmudic school had been seized in Casablanca and held for 3 days without charges.

Jan. 14: It was announced in Rabat that Guinea and Morocco would shortly exchange ambassadors. This was disclosed after Guinean President Sékou Touré left Rabat after a 24-hour visit with the King.

Jan. 18: Survivors of the Agadir earthquake began to move back to a prefabricated emergency city, it was reported. Crown Prince Mawlay Hasan and several Cabinet ministers flew to Agadir to turn over new lodgings to 4,000 refugees.

The Moroccan embassy in Bonn issued a communiqué denying what it termed a "tendentious German press report" to the effect that the Finance Ministry in Rabat had used money contributed to the International Agadir Relief Fund to cover a budget deficit.

Jan. 21: Morocco denied reports from Spain that Moroccan planes had flown over the Spanish Saharan enclave of Ifni.

Jan. 23: The government charged that Zionist organizations were waging a "criminal campaign" by driving Moroccan Jews to Israel "under any conditions." Information Minister Ahmad 'Alawi denied charges of discrimination and asserted that Moroccan Jews who desired to leave the country could obtain passports unless their destination was Israel. He said Morocco cannot permit her citizens to emigrate to Israel and settle on lands that "rightfully" belong to the Arabs of Palestine.

Jan. 27: The government closed the Algerian-Moroccan border following a French government regulation requiring Moroccans to have visas to travel to Algeria.

Jan. 30: Addi Ou Bihi, one of the last "feudal" chieftains of Morocco, died in Rabat in Avicenne Hospital, where he had been under treatment for

dysentery. He was close to 70 years old, it was reported.

Feb. 1: The royal cabinet announced that Premier Khrushchev has accepted an invitation from King Muhammad V to visit Morocco. The King received a return invitation, the communiqué said.

Feb. 4: Crown Prince Mawlay Hasan arrived in Accra, Ghana, for a 3-day visit.

Feb. 7: The Algerian Provisional Government called a draft of all Algerians in Morocco between 20 and 30 years old. It was reported that from 10,000 to 25,000 Algerians were affected, but the draft number was said to be a "military secret."

Feb. 8: The Maghrib Arab Press Agency reported the arrest of 3 Moroccans alleged to be working for a French spy ring in Rabat.

The Minister of National Economy declared that the government will offer direct subsidy of private investment and will guarantee liberty of capital transfer. A new investment law, to be published on February 10, includes subsidies of up to 20 per cent of investment in the Tangier region and up to 15 per cent in other areas, besides the other advantages provided by the 1958 investment law.

Feb. 9: Moscow radio disclosed that a French jet fighter had twice opened fire on a plane carrying President Leonid Brezhnev who was on his way to Rabat. The incident which took place some 80 miles from Algiers caused "astonishment" on the part of the government, Information Minister Ahmad 'Alawi said.

Feb. 10: A government spokesman announced that an unspecified number of Soviet jet planes had been delivered to Morocco. Meanwhile, President Leonid Brezhnev continued talks with Moroccan officials.

Feb. 11: Morocco accepted "unconditional aid" from the Soviet Union, it was announced. Fourteen MiGs and a group of Soviet technicians were reported to have arrived in Rabat.

Feb. 12: The US was reported to have informed the Moroccan government of the "possible unfavorable consequences of its increasing military links" with the Soviet Union.

Feb. 13: Reports from Washington that the US had cautioned Morocco on the possible consequences of accepting military aid from Russia were received by Moroccan officials with disbelief and "defiance." The US embassy denied that officials in Rabat had sought to dissuade the Moroccans concerning the transactions.

Feb. 14: The Women's Zionist Organization of America appealed to the Human Rights Commission of the UN to urge the Moroccan government to stop what it termed "repressive action" against Moroccan Jews.

In an appeal to the King, the Council of Moroccan Jewish Communities urged him to use his authority to prevent discord between the Jewish and Muslim citizens of Morocco. It denounced

the distribution of tracts as aimed at creating such a dissension.

Feb. 15: A convention of "cooperation and technical assistance" was signed by Madeira Keita, Interior Minister of Mali and Moroccan officials which opened Morocco's universities and military and technical schools to Mali students.

Senator Jacob K. Javits asked the State Department to inquire into reports of persecution of Jews in Morocco.

Feb. 18: The American Jewish Congress and 9 affiliated organizations appealed to Morocco to end what they called her "campaign of persecution and terror" against the 200,000 Jews in Morocco.

Palace sources in Rabat denied the existence of such a "campaign" and referred to a declaration by King Muhammad V reaffirming that Morocco's Jews and Muslims had the "same rights and duties."

Feb. 19: A dispatch from the Maghrib Arab Press Agency said that all Spanish forces are to be evacuated from Morocco by March 2.

Feb. 20: The Moroccan delegation walked out of the World Health Assembly in New Delhi to protest the admission of Mauritania to the WHO.

Feb. 21: US Ambassador Charles W. Yost gave a personal message to King Muhammad V from President Kennedy. The ambassador was on a farewell visit.

The Minister of Interior urged Moroccan Jews to remain in their native land. Travel to Israel was banned with threat of loss of citizenship and loss of property to violators.

Feb. 26: King Muhammad V died after a minor operation. He was 51 years old. Shortly afterward Crown Prince Mawlay Hasan, 33, was proclaimed King, as Hasan II. The palace announced the country would go into mourning for 7 days.

Feb. 27: King Hasan II assumed his official duties by receiving condolence calls from Moroccans and foreign dignitaries and message from chiefs of state throughout the world as the nation went into mourning.

Feb. 28: King Muhammad V was buried in the mausoleum of Mawlay Hasan.

Mar. 2: French forces stationed in Morocco were evacuated. Six military training schools, however, were maintained.

Mar. 3: During a ceremony investing him with his father's titles of Imām of the Faithful and Prince of the Believers, King Hasan II pledged to follow the example set by his father, and asked the people to show him the same fidelity given to the late King.

Mar. 5: At the close of his first Cabinet meeting, King Hasan II announced that France had agreed to speed up the evacuation of her 6 military training schools originally scheduled to be done by the end of 1963.

Mar. 9: The first Soviet technical assistance mission to Morocco met with authorities in Rabat to study a project for the construction of a shipbuilding yard on the Mediterranean.

Mar. 11: The USN ship *Richard M. Bache* arrived at Casablanca carrying the Moroccan UN contingent from the Congo port of Matadi.

King Hasan II was reported to have indicated that he does not intend to act merely as the symbolic head of the kingdom but intends to rule with a "strong central government."

Mar. 13: The Spanish government said that Moroccan "marauders" pillaged a Spanish-American oil camp in the Spanish Sahara and kidnapped 11 men, 3 of them Americans, 2 Canadians, a Frenchman and 5 Spaniards.

Mar. 14: The Moroccan embassy in Madrid said that the 11 men kidnapped were found safe by a Moroccan army patrol.

Pakistan

(See also, Afghanistan, Kashmir)

1960

Dec. 18: Japan and Pakistan concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce. The treaty was signed by President Ayub Khan, before he left Tokyo, and by Premier Hayato Ikeda and Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka of Japan. Under the treaty's terms, Pakistan and Japan will grant each other most-favored-nation treatment, as well as a waiver of visas and fees for visitors from both countries.

Dec. 20: President Ayub Khan arrived in Dacca after his 19-day visit to Southeast Asia and the Far East.

Dec. 21: Pakistan and Canada signed an air transport agreement providing the establishment of scheduled international air service by the airlines of both countries.

Dec. 26: Pakistan formally asked the US Development Loan Fund for a \$33,830,000 loan to finance more than 100 medium and small-scale industries, it was reported.

Dec. 28: In a speech at Fort Sandeman, President Ayub Khan promised a new constitution soon after the drafting commission submits its recommendations in April.

1961

Jan. 2: New coins and postage stamps were issued marking the change-over to the decimal coinage system.

Jan. 6: The Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, Zulficar Ali Bhutto, said in Moscow that talks between the USSR and Pakistan on Soviet aid for exploration of oil in Pakistan had made considerable progress.

Jan. 10: A trade agreement between Pakistan and Italy was signed in Rome.

Jan. 12: Instruments of ratification of the Indus Waters Treaty were exchanged in New Delhi.

Instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Pakistan and the US were exchanged in Karachi.

Fuel Minister Bhutto said that an oil-prospecting agreement with the USSR will be completed "within 3 months at the very latest."

President Ayub Khan, accompanied by Finance Minister Muhammad Shoaib, left for state visits to Yugoslavia and Germany.

Jan. 16: President Ayub Khan and Marshal Tito, in a joint communiqué, urged all states to settle outstanding national problems by peaceful means and in accordance with the UN Charter.

Jan. 17: The exchange of territories on West Pakistan-East Punjab border was effected under an agreement between Pakistan and India.

Jan. 26: President Ayub Khan inaugurated the SEATO-sponsored conference of heads of universities, in Karachi.

Jan. 27: The completed Warsak power project was formally handed over to Pakistan by Canada.

Jan. 30: Control on prices and distribution of cotton yarn and textiles was lifted.

Feb. 1: Queen Elizabeth II arrived in Karachi to start a 16-day visit to Pakistan.

Feb. 4: The Queen arrived in Peshawar.

Feb. 10: The Queen arrived in Lahore after a short stop-over in Rawalpindi.

Feb. 11: The Agricultural Development Bank Ordinance was promulgated to provide for the establishment of an Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan.

Feb. 13: It was reported that Pakistan and the USSR have reached agreement on the terms for financial and technical aid to oil exploration in Pakistan.

Feb. 15: One hundred persons were reported drowned in the Meghna River as a result of the collision of 2 launches.

Feb. 16: Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh left for India.

President Ayub Khan said that Pakistan was in legal occupation of the territory along the Chinese border and had every right to hold talks with that country on demarcation.

Feb. 18: The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan started to function.

Feb. 22: The 4-day session of the Indo-Pakistan moveable property agreement implementation committee began in Rawalpindi.

Feb. 25: It was reported that about 2,000 Leftist students demonstrated outside the UN Information Center in Karachi in protest against an alleged riot at Jubbulpore, India, during which Muslims were killed.

Feb. 27: Police dispersed a demonstration by some 5,000 students marching to the Indian High Commission chancery in Karachi. Sixty-six policemen

were reported injured, including five students. Prime Minister Nehru was reported to have said that the demonstration was "deliberately incited."

Feb. 28: Fuel Minister Bhutto was reported to have said that he would sign a \$35,000,000 Soviet-Pakistani oil agreement in Karachi on March 4.

Mar. 2: President Ayub Khan signed a law which stipulates that a Pakistani Muslim who wishes to have a second wife must get permission from his first wife, and if he wishes to divorce his first wife, he must get permission from the town or city council. Violations are punishable by a fine of \$1,000 and a year in prison.

Mar. 4: The Soviet-Pakistani oil exploration loan was signed. The 12-year loan carries an annual interest of 2½ per cent.

Mar. 7: President Ayub Khan accepted an invitation from President Kennedy to visit the US in November. The announcement was made after Finance Minister Muhammad Shoaib conferred with President Kennedy on a proposed 4-year Food for Peace program for Pakistan valued at \$1,000,000.

Mar. 11: The US and Pakistan signed 3 agreements, 2 providing for the supply of farm commodities and the third amending the 1955 Defense Support Agreement.

Palestine Problem

(See also, General, Israel, Jordan, UAR)

1960

Dec. 20: Three members of an Israeli border patrol were slightly injured in an exchange of fire with Egyptians near Nizana in the Sinai.

A police announcement in Beirut said that 4 Palestinians had been arrested on suspicion of spying for Israel in Lebanon and Syria.

Dec. 22: It was announced in New York that General Carl von Horn would return to his former post as head of the UN Armistice Commission in Palestine after relinquishing command of the Congo force.

1961

Jan. 10: The Jordanian Foreign Minister, Müṣā Niṣār, told the House of Representatives in Amman that the Palestine issue was fraught with "fresh dangers," called for increased vigilance and caution. He was, he said, apprehensive on 3 points: 1) the new US administration's policy towards the Palestine problem had not been clarified; 2) the UN General Assembly resolution which extended the UNRWA's mandate in 1959 provided for "reconsideration of the whole problem" of Palestinian refugees at the 1961 session of the Assembly; and 3) prevailing inter-Arab differences.

Jan. 14: Dr. John Davis, Director of UNRWA, laid the foundation stone of a vocational training center for Palestinian refugees, to be built on the outskirts of Damascus.

Jan. 18: Addressing the final conference of the International Refugee Year Committee in Geneva, Dr. Davis revealed 5 "misconceptions" currently voiced about Palestinian refugees, namely, that they were congenitally shiftless, and preferred international charity to working for their own living; that Arab host governments maltreated them by neglecting them, and even by "holding them as hostages" in their struggle with Israel; that the problem could and would have been solved long ago, were it not for selfish politicians who had sought to keep them idle; that the problem would be solved automatically if a political settlement could be negotiated between Israel and her Arab neighbors; and that the time had come to force host governments to solve the problem more swiftly.

Jan. 27: The Israeli ambassador to Canada, Yaakov Herzog, challenged British historian Arnold Toynbee to a "public discussion," after the latter told several hundred students at a McGill University luncheon that Israel's treatment of the Arabs since 1947 was morally comparable to the murder of 6 million Jews by the Nazis.

Jan. 30: It was revealed in London that a consignment of Centurion tanks had been sent to Israel, in fulfillment of a contract signed in 1958.

Major-General Carl von Horn resumed work at Jerusalem as Chief Armistice Supervisor in Palestine.

An UNRWA press release indicated that the officers and men of the Indian contingent serving with the UN emergency force in the Gaza strip gave up 2 days' rations to mark India's National Day, January 26, and donated them to Palestinian refugees.

Jan. 31: In Montreal, Dr. Arnold Toynbee engaged in a public debate with the Israeli ambassador to Canada, and repeated the statement he made last week concerning Israeli treatment of Arabs.

Feb. 1: President Nāṣir told the opening conference of Arab lawyers that the reported shipment of Centurion tanks to Israel did not "alarm" the UAR. He added: "We want to liberate the Palestinian people, and give them back their political and social rights. . . . We back the people of Palestine. We have not forgotten their original aim, which we will yet realize, uncurbed by imperialist action or imperialist assistance to Israel."

Feb. 3: Among the resolutions adopted at the close of the foreign ministers' conference in Baghdad was a secret one on Palestine.

Feb. 6: In appreciation for Dr. Toynbee's statements on the Palestine issue, President Nāṣir was reported to have signed an order effecting the

release of James Zarb, a British citizen of Maltese extraction, who was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment and hard labor for alleged espionage activities.

In a report submitted to the Jordanian Minister of Education, Undersecretary Khalil al-Salim revealed that following a UNESCO conference in Paris last December, that body has decided to make a 5 per cent increase in its appropriation for the education of Palestinian refugees. He added that the number of UNESCO experts working permanently in Arab countries was to be raised from 14 to 21.

Feb. 9: Major General Carl von Horn had a meeting with General Jamāl Faysal of Syria, during which they discussed the general situation pertaining to the Syrian-Israeli frontier.

Feb. 11: A Jordanian was killed in a border clash between Israeli and Jordanian soldiers. Findings of an investigation conducted by the UN Mixed Armistice Commission were not announced.

Feb. 20: Premier Bahjat al-Talhūnī, of Jordan, announced that negotiations with the UN concerning the release of Palestinian Arabs' accounts frozen by Israeli banks had been "successfully concluded."

Feb. 21: Jordan protested to the UN Mixed Armistice Commission against an alleged flight by several Israeli aircraft over the Jenin and Hebron regions.

In a speech at Damascus, President Nāṣir said: "The day of reckoning is drawing near and the UAR will drive the first nail into Israel's coffin and destroy the Zionists before they succeed in conquering the Arabs."

Feb. 23: President Kennedy was reported to have decided that the time and diplomatic climate are not right for an immediate White House initiative to promote a permanent peaceful solution between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Feb. 26: Senator Kenneth B. Keating called on President Kennedy to initiate immediate steps to end Arab-Israeli tensions.

Feb. 27: The Arab Higher Committee for Palestine announced in Beirut that it proposed to create "responsible official machinery" to deal with all matters connected with the Palestine issue. This would be devoted to mobilizing the Palestinian people "politically, morally and militarily," and to forming a Palestinian army.

Mar. 1: It was announced in Beirut that police had arrested 2 Palestinian "infiltrators" who declared that they had sought refuge in Lebanon in order to "escape from the present régime in Palestine".

The Lebanese Ministry of Education ordered that "information on Israel" should be torn out of books likely to be read by students in "official and private institutions," allegedly in a move to conform to the law and the resolutions laid down by the Arab Office for the boycott of Israel.

Mar. 13: Editors in Cairo criticized Vice President Johnson for his proposals to solve the Palestine refugee issue. The Cairo press said the Johnson plan would provide a \$500 million contribution to resettle Palestine refugees and repatriate some.

Persian Gulf

1960

Dec. 19: Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath announced in the House of Commons that Britain was considering returning 3 Bahrayni prisoners serving sentences on St. Helena to the custody of the Ruler of Bahrayn.

Dec. 21: It was announced in London that Sir William Luce, former Governor of Aden, will replace Sir George Middleton as Britain's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf as of next May.

Dec. 22: It was reported that the Japanese-owned Arabian Oil Company has completed the 7th and 8th wells in the Khafji field offshore from the Neutral Zone. Both have a potential of 8,400 b/d. The company also announced that its drilling program for 1960 has been completed.

1961

Jan. 3: It was disclosed in Cairo that there has been a split in the rebel command of the Imām of Oman. Representatives said that Imām Ghālib ibn 'Ali had dismissed Muhammad al-Hārithī and Shālih ibn 'Isā al-Hārithī, his representatives in Cairo and Damascus, respectively. The Imām's office in Cairo disclosed that Muṣṭafā Ghazāl had been named to head the office in Cairo and Faysal ibn 'Ali, the office in Damascus.

Jan. 15: An agreement granting the Shell Company offshore oil exploration and production rights over an area of some 1,500 sq. miles was signed by the Ruler of Kuwait and the Managing Director of Royal Dutch Shell.

Shaykh Faysal ibn 'Ali said in Cairo that the Imām saw no reason why he should not negotiate for "complete evacuation of British troops from Omani territory, and the restoration of conditions which prevailed in Oman before the 1955 revolution," so long as the Omani people saw fit to "continue their struggle."

Jan. 17: Shaykh Shālih ibn 'Isā al-Hārithī arrived in Damascus.

Jan. 19: In an interview in Damascus, Shaykh Shālih contradicted Shaykh Faysal by saying that there had been, in fact, contacts with the British, but they had been conducted on the Omani side "by irresponsible persons, and on a level incompatible with the dignity, sovereignty and interests of the Omani people."

Jan. 31: In Beirut, Shaykh Tālib ibn 'Ali said that

his brother, the Imām, had rejected a British suggestion that he should enter into direct negotiations with Sultan Sa'īd ibn Taymur of Muscat and Oman (whom Shaykh Tālib described merely as "Ruler of Muscat.")

Feb. 1: In London, a Foreign Office spokesman said that Britain had taken no initiative in connection with the Omani issue. Any settlement must be effected between the Ruler, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the rebels, he said, though British authorities would always be available for negotiations.

Feb. 20: On his arrival in Damascus, Shaykh Tālib ibn 'Ali told reporters that "the door to negotiations with British representatives on the Omani issue was still open," and he was hopeful they would be resumed.

Feb. 22: An official spokesman in London said that "We can confirm that a meeting is likely to take place in the near future. . . . We have been in consultation with the Sultan of Muscat. The Foreign Office continued to emphasize, however, that so far no "official" contacts between British representatives and those of the Imām had taken place and reiterated the position that negotiations must be conducted between Imām and the Sultan themselves.

Mar. 1: The Japanese Arabian Oil Company announced its decision to increase its capital from 10,000 million Yen to 40,000 million Yen. It also announced the allocation of 5,000,000 shares each to the Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti governments and the appointment of 3 Saudi and 3 Kuwaiti nationals in executive posts.

The Omani office in Damascus reported that Omani insurgents planted a mine on the route of Brigadier Waterfield, Minister of Defense in the Muscat government, and other officers. A private car which preceded the commander's vehicle ran over it and was blown up, killing its 2 passengers.

Saudi Arabia

(*See also, General, Persian Gulf*)

1960

Dec. 19: Crown Prince Faysal and the Saudi Council of Ministers submitted their resignations to King Sa'ūd.

Dec. 21: Radio Mecca announced that King Sa'ūd had accepted their resignations. The announcement added that a new Council of Ministers, under the Kings' personal leadership, had been formed. The new Council consists of:

King Sa'ūd: Prime Minister
Amir Talāl ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz: Finance and Economy

Shaykh Ibrāhim al-Suwaiyil: *Foreign Affairs*
 Amir 'Abd al-Muhsin ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: *Interior*

Amir Muhammad ibn Sa'ud: *Defense and Civil Aviation*

Amir Badr ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: *Communications*
 Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Tariki: *Petroleum and Mineral Affairs*

Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abdallāh ibn Hasan
 Al-Shaykh: *Education*

Shaykh Ahmad Shatā: *Commerce*
 Dr. Hasan Nasif: *Health*

Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Dabbagh: *Agriculture*

Dec. 23: King Sa'ud issued a royal decree appointing Shaykh Nāṣir al-Manqūr Minister of State for Council of Ministers Affairs in the new Saudi Cabinet.

Dec. 24: Radio Mecca announced that the Saudi Council of Ministers met for the first time to take the oath of office and hear a policy statement read by Shaykh Nāṣir al-Manqūr. The Cabinet approved the setting up of a National Council to draft a constitution for Saudi Arabia. The announcement added that one-third of the members of the Council would be elected and the rest appointed from among tribal chiefs, businessmen and government officials.

1961

Jan. 2: In a statement read over Radio Mecca, King Sa'ud announced that a committee of leading 'ulama' under the chairmanship of the Chief Qādi will be established as a court of appeals, empowered to review the decisions of the kingdom's Shari'a courts and to overrule them if necessary. He also declared that it was the intention of his government to extend tariff protection to local industries during their formative period and to abide strictly by the provisions of the budget.

King Sa'ud ordered the lifting of the travel restrictions which required foreigners entering or leaving Riyadh to have their passports endorsed.

Jan. 4: Royal decrees were issued approving Saudi Arabia's participation in the Special Fund, endorsing the decisions of the first OPEC conference, and establishing a Supreme Planning Board. The Board will be presided over by the King or his designate from among the members who comprise the Ministers of Finance and National Economy, Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Communications, Commerce and Agriculture. A secretary general will be appointed to execute the Board's decisions. This body, which replaces the Economic Development and Technical Aid Committees and absorbs their functions, is authorized to draw up its own by-laws and to appoint sub-

committees. Its functions are to formulate economic development policies and to coordinate these policies with the various ministries and departments of the government, and to supervise their execution.

Shaykh 'Abdallāh Bal-Khayr, former Director General of Broadcasting, Press and Publications, assumed his duties as Private Secretary to King Sa'ud.

Jan. 7: Amir Talāl ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Minister of Finance, was appointed as Vice-President of the Supreme Planning Board at its first session.

Jan. 8: A circular letter from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency revealed that Saudi Arabia's revenues and expenditures for the fiscal year ending December 8, 1961 are estimated at SRls. 1,786 million (SRI's 4.50=\$1). The budget for the preceding year was balanced at SRI's 1,673.5 million. The expected increase in revenue includes an allocation of SRI's 78 million from reserve funds and also from oil revenues, despite the recent price reductions, and an increase of some 25 per cent in the yield from customs duties.

Jan. 12: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a Saudi-Spanish friendship agreement had been signed in Madrid by the Saudi ambassador and the Spanish Foreign Minister.

Jan. 14: Economic Advisor Raja'i al-Husayni, of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, assumed the duties of Acting Secretary General of the Supreme Planning Board.

Jan. 15: The Grand Mufti approved a proposal to establish nursing schools for girls under the jurisdiction of his office. The schools will be maintained at the expense of the Ministry of Health.

A royal decree was issued canceling the municipal real estate tax in those areas of the kingdom where it had been applied.

Jan. 18: Aramco President Thomas C. Barger announced that the company's crude oil production and refinery output in 1960 were "the highest in its history." Production totaled 456,453,173 barrels, or an average of 1,247,140 b/d, which compares with the previous record of 399,820,590 barrels, or an average of 1,095,399 b/d, set up in 1959. The Ras Tanura refinery processed 82,311,-386 barrels of crude in 1960 as compared with the previous record of 79,844,596 barrels set in 1959.

It was reported that Ghālib Tawfiq had been appointed Director General of the Ministry of Interior and Ahmad 'Abbar had been appointed Deputy Director General.

Jan. 19: The Minister of the Interior ordered that exit visas need no longer be obtained in advance, and that they be issued to travelers upon their departure from the kingdom.

Jan. 21: Minister of State for UN Affairs Ahmad

support for the decisions of the Casablanca Conference al-Shuqayri met with President Nāṣir in Cairo and delivered a message from King Sa'ūd expressing reverence.

Jan. 22: A special committee was formed by royal decree under the presidency of King Sa'ūd and the vice presidency of Amir Talāl ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz, to expedite the enlargement and renovation of the Holy Mosque.

Jan. 25: At a meeting of the Council of Ministers, King Sa'ūd called for the study of the creation of free ports at Dammam and Jiddah, the review of the Regulations on Investments with a view to making them more attractive to foreign capital and the formation of a special committee to investigate the problem of decreased land values in Riyad.

Jan. 26: Foreign Minister Ibrāhīm al-Suwaiyil reiterated in Cairo the Saudi position on the resumption of diplomatic relations with Britain and France saying that his government will not resume relations until Britain agrees to a settlement of the Buraimi dispute and until France grants independence to Algeria.

Jan. 29: The Council of Ministers approved the articles of incorporation of the Saudi Arabian Refining Company.

Jan. 30: A Saudi Arabian delegation headed by Foreign Minister Ibrāhīm al-Suwaiyil attended the Arab League Foreign Ministers Conference in Baghdad.

Feb. 1: Shaykh 'Abdallāh al-Tariki returned to Saudi Arabia from Caracas where he attended the OPEC meeting.

Feb. 12: The Cabinet approved an initial allocation of SRI's 2 million towards the cost of development work at the port of Yembo on the Red Sea. An earlier decree had allowed the contractor for this project to import all the necessary equipment duty-free; dues will become payable, however, if the equipment is later sold on the Saudi market, it was disclosed.

Feb. 20: The Saudi Gas and Industrialization Company was reported to have inaugurated a new LPG bottling plant in Riyad and plans to open another in Jiddah.

Feb. 21: It was reported in *al-Bilad* that an architect had been commissioned to design a new headquarters building in Riyad for the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. The offices of the ministry at Dammam and Jiddah will be moved in about 2 years' time. At present the Oil Ministry occupies a wing in the Ministry of Communications building in Riyad.

Mar. 8: It was disclosed in London that Mr. de Ribbing's "fact-finding" visit to Buraimi had revealed that "wide differences" still existed between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi on the other.

Somalia

(See also, Ethiopia)

1960

Dec. 29: Somalis from Somalia and Ethiopian Somalis in the Ogaden area were reported to have had several clashes in the last 4 weeks. Tribesmen from the former British Somaliland were charged with having raided and looted across the Ogaden border. Two Ethiopian security policemen were said to have been killed and 3 Ethiopian Somali tribesmen wounded.

1961

Jan. 1: Somalia charged that Ethiopian planes and troops killed more than 100 Somali nomads in the former British-administered zone that was ceded to Ethiopia 4 years ago, it was learned in Mogadishu.

Jan. 2: Crowds demonstrated against the US and Ethiopia in Mogadishu, reportedly in protest against US military aid to Ethiopia and the death of some 100 Somali tribesmen in the Damot area inflicted by Ethiopian planes and troops.

Jan. 3: For the second time, demonstrators marched through the streets of Mogadishu and in front of the Ethiopian and US embassies.

Jan. 9: 'Abdi Rizāq Hājī Husayn, Minister of Interior, said that shipments of gasoline from northern Somalia across the Ethiopian frontier had been suspended because the fuel was being used by Ethiopia on "aggressive missions against Somalia."

Jan. 20: During a stopover at Nairobi on a trip to the pan-African conference in Tanganyika, the secretary-general of the Somali National Movement, 'Ali 'Abdallāh, warned that war might develop between Somalia and Ethiopia unless other African states intervened.

Feb. 8: It was reported in Lagos that the Somali Republic has been admitted to membership of the commission for technical cooperation in Africa south of the Sahara, at the commission's current session in Lagos.

Feb. 14: The UAR trade and economic mission, currently visiting the Republic of Somalia, held a meeting with Somali representatives.

Mar. 6: In reply to a telegram from President Nkrumah of Ghana, Somali President Adān 'Abdallāh 'Uthmān endorsed the UN resolution on the Congo, adopted on February 21, 1961, and said that the Somali delegation has been instructed to support the resolution during the forthcoming UN General Assembly meeting. He also voided his approval of an African commander for UN forces and civilian operations in the Congo if all the independent African countries agreed on it.

Mar. 7: President Adān 'Abdallāh 'Uthmān arrived in Chisimaio during a tour of the upper and lower

Giuba provinces. During a speech there, he revealed that US Ambassador Andrew Lynch had handed him a note in which the US government approved an estimated 3.5 million somalos for the implementation of the Chisimaio harbor project and promised favorable consideration of Somali requests for the completion thereof.

Mar. 13: The CPR ambassador to the Somali Republic, Mr. Chang, arrived in Mogadishu, accompanied by 6 embassy officials.

Ahmad Muhammad Adān, ambassador-designate to the USSR, called on the President.

Sudan

1960

Dec. 26: A joint communiqué in Khartum and Moscow announced that President Ibrāhim 'Abbūd would visit the Soviet Union next summer.

Dec. 31: The Information Minister, Muhammad Tala'at Farid, declared that the Sudan was calling home her ambassador in Paris, in view of the Sudan's opposition to French atomic tests in the Sahara, it was reported in Khartum.

1961

Jan. 9: A protocol was signed in Moscow at the end of a 10-day visit by a Sudanese trade delegation. The terms provide for the doubling of the value of Sudan-Soviet trade this year as compared with 1960. Under their trade agreement of March 3, 1959—now extended for a year—the value of exchanges was fixed at £S 2,330,000 a year each way.

Jan. 10: President Ibrāhim 'Abbūd issued an order changing the name of the Sudanese army to the "Sudanese Armed Forces."

Jan. 14: Following a visit by a Yugoslav delegation to the Sudan, agreements on trade and payments, scientific and cultural cooperation, were signed in Khartum. Details have not been released.

Another agreement was signed, whereby the joint shipping company will start operations with 2 cargo-ships also supplied by Yugoslav shipyards.

Jan. 16: An agreement covering air services between the Sudan and the UK was signed by the Minister of Communications, Brigadier Maqbūl al-'Amin, and the British ambassador, Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews.

Jan. 17: The Minister of the Interior, Brigadier Ahmad Magdub al-Būhri, suspended publication of the independent Arabic newspaper *al-Ayam*, on the grounds that an article by its owner and editor, Bashir Muhammad, was "insulting in tone towards foreign diplomatic representatives."

Jan. 23: The Supreme Military Summary Council was formed. The members are: Capt. Muṣṭafā 'Ali Naṣīm, Capt. Ādam Ibrāhim and Capt. 'Uthmān Idris.

Feb. 1: A communiqué was issued in Khartum, announcing the first trade agreement between the Sudan and Rumania. It revealed no details.

Feb. 2: President 'Abbūd shuffled his Cabinet and named Makki al-Manna, deputy manager of the agricultural bank, to be Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation. Brigadier Ahmad Magdub al-Būhri was shifted from Minister of the Interior and Local Government to Communications Minister. He was replaced by Brigadier General Maqbūl al-'Amin al-Hājj, former Minister of Agriculture.

A government spokesman said that the Sudan would allow no planes other than those of the UN to traverse her territory en route to the Congo.

Feb. 4: Three delegates of the World Bank arrived in Khartum to discuss with the Sudanese authorities the terms and conditions of a loan to finance the construction of the Roseires dam.

Feb. 6: In an address at the opening of a new water supply plant in Nahud, President 'Abbūd said that "the revolution" would not permit any attempts to restore the Sudan to the situation which existed before it took place.

Feb. 7: The Sudanese embassy in London issued a cable dispatched by the Foreign Office in Khartum in reply to the request of the President of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR. It "declined to comply" with the petition for passage of medical supplies and food to the Congo by way of the Sudan's territory.

Feb. 10: A Chinese trade fair was inaugurated in Khartum. It will be open for a month.

Feb. 12: Sir Roderick Wallis Parkes succeeded Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews as British Ambassador to the Sudan.

Feb. 17: Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams conferred with Foreign Minister Ahmad Khayr during an 8-hour stopover in Khartum.

Feb. 19: The ambassador of Finland to Cairo arrived in Khartum to present his credentials as ambassador to the Sudan.

Mar. 6: The government charged that the UN command in the Congo had been careless in deploying Sudanese forces and announced it was therefore withdrawing its 400 troops from the UN force. The Sudanese garrison of 135 men was forced to surrender at the port of Matadi after a futile attempt to stop attacks by about 1,000 Congolese.

Mar. 15: The Sudan has agreed to exchange diplomatic relations with the Republic of Chad on an embassy level, it was announced.

Tunisia

(See also, General, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan
Morocco, UAR)

1960

Dec. 30: President Bourguiba asserted his independence of the Algerian rebel leadership by voicing conditional endorsement of French proposals for political reform in Algeria. This was a response to statements by rebel leaders that President de Gaulle's proposals amount to a solution "dictated by France."

1961

Jan. 17: A clash between Muslim traditionalist demonstrators and the Tunisian police and National Guards in the "Holy City" of Qayru'ān cost 5 lives. The demonstrators were protesting the transfer "for disciplinary reasons" of a traditional Qur'ānic teacher.

Jan. 22: Officials in Tunis said that Tunisia "with regret" was unable to comply with the suggestion made by General Qāsim that she should be represented at the Foreign Ministers' Conference on January 30.

Jan. 24: The Tunisian ambassador to Jordan, Muhammad Sharshur, said that the only means of ensuring Tunisia's attendance at Arab League meetings lay in putting the Tunisian-UAR dispute on the agenda, in an interview with the Jerusalem newspaper *al-Manar*.

Bağdad radio said that Foreign Minister Șadiq Muqaddam "might" attend the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Jan. 25: Foreign Minister Șadiq Muqaddam left Tunis for Baghdad to deliver a message from President Bourguiba to General Qāsim. The contents of the message were not known.

Jan. 29: It was reported in Tunis that Habib Bourguiba, Jr. is expected to go to Washington as ambassador late next month. He will replace Ambassador Salim who is expected to return to Tunis as Foreign Secretary. Foreign Minister Șadiq Muqaddam is tentatively scheduled to replace Habib Bourguiba, Jr. as ambassador in Paris.

The Soviet Union has agreed in principle to grant Tunisia credit to build 3 dams in northwest Tunisia, *Afrique-Action* reported. The Soviet Union had also granted funds to establish an engineering school.

Jan. 30: It was announced in Tunis that the government would resume its seat in the Arab League. A delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Șadiq Muqaddam, left for Baghdad.

Jan. 31: UAR Foreign Minister Mahamūd Fawzi and Foreign Minister Șadiq Muqaddam conferred for an hour in Baghdad; it was learned.

Feb. 7: Reports reaching Tunis indicated that "a discreet compromise" was reached between Tunisia and the UAR on the question of Șalih ibn Yusuf. It was said that Tunisia had abandoned her demand for the expulsion of Șalih ibn Yusuf from the UAR.

Feb. 10: President Bourguiba arrived in Zurich for a visit.

Feb. 23: The government announced that Queen Elizabeth of Britain would pay a visit in Tunis in April.

Feb. 28: Habib Bourguiba, Jr., in an interview, said the Kennedy Administration must choose between making its own policy in Africa and allowing its policy to be "screened" in Paris or elsewhere.

Mar. 2: After a conference with Algerian nationalist leaders in Morocco on his meeting with President de Gaulle, President Bourguiba returned to Zurich to resume his vacation. He had also attended the funeral of the late King Muhammad V.

Mar. 3: President Bourguiba and Șalih ibn Yusuf met in Zurich. After a 15-minute talk it was reported that they "apparently failed to reach an agreement."

Mar. 9: President Kennedy announced a state visit to the US in May by President Bourguiba.

Mar. 13: President Bourguiba returned to Tunis from a 3-week vacation in Zurich. He was met by Premier Farhāt Abbās and other Algerian nationalist rebel leaders.

Mar. 15: Tunisia accepted an invitation to participate in the New York 1964-1965 World's Fair.

Turkey

(See also, Afghanistan, Cyprus)

1960

Dec. 16: The amendment to the provisional constitution, called "The Law for the Establishment of the Constituent Assembly," was promulgated. It provides for the Constituent Assembly to adopt a new constitution, prepared by university professors and jurists, and pass an electoral law by May 27.

A provisional electoral law for the House of Representatives was promulgated, providing that the Chamber of Representatives be formed by appointments and by special election, that all elections must be completed within 21 days following the approval of the constitution on December 16, 1960, and that the Constituent Assembly convene on January 6, 1961.

Dec. 24: Finance Minister Ekrem Alican resigned his post. His resignation was accepted by General Gürsel.

Dec. 25: Karacaş Kemal Kardaş Turkey's representative to the IMF in Washington, was appointed to succeed Ekrem Alican.

Two attorneys defending Adnan Menderes were

arrested and charged with trying to distribute publicly a 30,000-word defense of the deposed Premier. They are Burhan Apaydin and Talat Asal.

Dec. 26: An official of the military junta reported that 65 persons had been arrested over the weekend and charged with anti-government propaganda activities. They were reported to be supporters of Adnan Menderes.

Dec. 29: It was revealed in Washington that several "aid packages" totaling at least \$250,000,000 are in prospect for Turkey and will be delivered piecemeal over the next few weeks.

Dec. 30: Turkey concluded an agreement with the IMF whereby the government is authorized to draw upon \$37,500,000 for the period of one year. It was also reported that the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) is advancing another \$50 million to ease Turkey's foreign payments deficit.

1961

Jan. 2: The Minister of Communications, Sutki Ulay, resigned his post, but retained his membership on the National Unity Committee of the military régime.

Jan. 4: The 18-member military Cabinet resigned "to provide Chief of State Gürsel with the opportunity of taking advantage of the service of the many capable persons elected to the Assembly." The Assembly will come into existence when 273 delegates convene on January 6.

Jan. 5: Former President Celal Bayar and seven others were acquitted of the charge of having been indirectly responsible for the anti-Greek riots in Istanbul on September 6, 1955. He remains in custody, however, on charges of having violated the Constitution, while the 7 other persons were released.

General Gürsel named a new Cabinet consisting of 11 ministers. The list follows:

Selim Sarper: Foreign Minister
 Hayri Mumcuoglu: State Minister
 Nasir Zeytinoğlu: State Minister
 Ekrem Tuzemen: Justice
 Muzaffer Alankuş: Interior
 Kemal Kurdaş: Finance
 Turhan Feyzioğlu: Education
 Mukbil Gökdögan: Public Works
 Mehmet Baydur: Commerce
 Ragib Uner: Health
 Fethi Aşkın: Customs and Monopolies
 Osman Tosun: Agriculture
 Orhan Mersinli: Communications
 Ahmet Tahtakılıç: Labor
 Sahap Kocatopcu: Industry
 Fehmi Yavuz: Housing
 Cihat Baban: Press and Radio

The Ministry of Education ordered all provincial governors to close unauthorized schools said to be conducting "secret" classes in the Qur'an.

Jan. 6: Two hundred seventy-one Deputies took an oath of office as the Assembly opened in Ankara. The Assembly will act, jointly with the National Unity Committee, as a legislative and constituent body. It is bound by law to transfer its power to a civilian administration, to be elected by October 29.

Jan. 7: Two more defendants charged with having transported demonstrators to Topkapi, where former President Inönü was attacked by a mob in May, 1959, were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Jan. 10: Nine of the 11 national daily newspapers printed in Istanbul decided to close for a 3-day protest against the press and advertising laws adopted by the National Unity Committee. The 2 exceptions are *Havadis* and *Son Posta*. The owners said that the advertising law is "undemocratic" because it empowers a body of 32 men to allocate official advertising for 3 months if the standard of the contents of the paper is considered unsuitable.

Jan. 14: The nine newspapers reappeared in Istanbul.

Jan. 16: The State Department announced a grant to Turkey amounting to \$43,600,000 to aid her defense system.

Jan. 24: At Yassiada, the prosecution demanded death sentences for ex-Premier Adnan Menderes and 3 former deputies.

Jan. 28: The death sentence was also asked for ex-President Celal Bayar. The same penalty was asked for Adnan Menderes, for the second time, on the charge of conspiring with the ex-President in an attempt to kill the chief leader of the opposition to their government.

Feb. 1: Ahmed Emin Yalman, editor of *Vatan*, left the paper after he was outvoted at a stockholders' meeting.

Feb. 2: The Minister of Construction and Rehabilitation, Fehmi Yavuz, resigned because, he said, he wanted to "free himself from the burdens of administration."

Feb. 4: Interior Minister Muhammed Kiziloglu was named Assistant Premier.

Feb. 6: The Minister of Education, Turhan Feyzioğlu, resigned from the Cabinet.

Feb. 13: It was reported in Ankara that 7 new political parties have announced their intention of competing for the leadership of the next civilian government.

Feb. 14: It was learned that Raymond Hare has been appointed US ambassador to Turkey.

Feb. 17: The Minister of Health in the Menderes régime, Dr. Lütfi Kirdar, died while testifying at the Yassiada trials.

Feb. 19: Seventeen persons were arrested during the funeral of ex-Minister of Health Lütfi Kirdar following a demonstration during which members of

the crowd began to intone the *Tekbir*, a practice not permitted since the time of Kemal Atatürk.

Feb. 24: In reply to a Russian note which claimed that Turkey's cooperation with NATO in establishing IRBM bases on her soil has created a dangerous situation for the Soviet Union, a Turkish note was handed to the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, which said in effect that the primary duty of any sovereign state was to take the "most effective measures for its security."

Feb. 25: The prosecution demanded the death penalty for Adnan Menderes and 17 former government officials. It was the fourth time the penalty was asked for the ex-Premier.

Feb. 28: Assistant Premier Muhammed Kiziloglu signed his post. In his letter of resignation he alluded to a conflict between him and the members of the Constituent Assembly on the one hand and other public forces, such as student organizations, on the other.

The budget for the fiscal year 1961 was approved by the Constituent Assembly. This year's estimates are placed at \$964,300,000 in receipts including American aid and revenues from other sources, and a similar amount for expenditures. The budget shows an increase in revenue of about \$293,000,000, as compared with the one of 1960, it was reported.

Mar. 4: It was reported that 11,000 Turkish army cadet officers are leading classes in village schools in a campaign against illiteracy. Some 20,000 professional teachers are being deferred from compulsory military training to remain in the schools, but will fulfill their military obligation during the summer holidays.

Mar. 13: As a result of a meeting at Rhodes, it was reported that 12 editors and publishers of leading Greek and Turkish newspapers have decided to improve the flow of news between their countries in an effort to foster greater understanding and better relations.

Mar. 15: A military court convicted 26 persons of planning to overthrow the ruling Committee of National Unity. The sentences ranged from 6 months to 4 years. Six persons were acquitted on the same charges.

United Arab Republic

(See also, General, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine Problem)

1960

Dec. 17: President Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir pledged that the UAR would "place all its potentialities" at the disposal of Algerians struggling for independence, it was reported in Cairo.

Dec. 23: In an address to a rally in Port Sa'id on the 4th anniversary of the withdrawal of British-

French forces, President Nāṣir warned that if the UAR became convinced that Israel was making an atomic bomb, "this will be the beginning of war between us and Israel."

Dec. 24: The UAR and the US agreed to extend the Egyptian-American Service for Rural Improvement until 1964.

President Nāṣir seized the Belgian Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits, it was reported.

Dec. 26: The UAR announced that President Nāṣir will attend the conference of African leaders in Rabat January 3.

1961

Jan. 9: The UAR National Assembly appealed to all Arab states to boycott France, politically and economically. It urged them to nationalize all French property in their territories. It also appealed to "friendly countries and Afro-Asian states" to recognize the Algerian Provisional Government, and to those Arab countries which had NATO bases to "abolish them."

Jan. 11: In a statement to the National Assembly, Deputy Foreign Minister Husayn Dhū al-Fiqr Ṣabri declared that the Arabs were ready to resist any "pressures" President-elect Kennedy might apply on them to fulfill "campaign promises" to Zionists.

Jan. 14: It was announced that the United Arab Airlines had signed a contract worth more than \$2 million with the British De Havilland Company for the purchase of 2 more Comet 4-C jet airliners.

Jan. 16: Britain and the UAR have designated their prospective ambassadors: Muhammad 'Awād al-Qūni will represent the UAR in London, and Sir Harold Beeley will represent Britain in Cairo, it was announced in Cairo.

Jan. 23: The request of the UAR to withdraw her forces from the UN force in the Congo was disclosed at the UN. The removal was to take effect on February 1.

President Nāṣir urged the National Assembly to concentrate on drafting a permanent constitution for the UAR.

Jan. 24: Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu asked the Security Council to look into the alleged interference with his régime by the UAR. He charged that arms have been smuggled into parts of the Congo opposed to his régime, allegedly from Egypt.

Jan. 26: It was officially announced in Cairo that Muhammad 'Awād al-Qūni had been appointed UAR ambassador to Britain, and, in London, that Sir Harold Beeley had been nominated as British ambassador to the UAR.

Jan. 28: Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld's last attempt to dissuade President Nāṣir from withdrawing the UAR's contingent of troops from the Congo failed. President Nāṣir replied through

UAR delegate 'Umar Lutfi that he saw no good reason to change his mind.

Jan. 30: It was announced that 300 Egyptian and Syrian students are scheduled to undergo a one-year course in modern agricultural techniques in West Germany. Twenty-five of them are women.

Feb. 9: It was disclosed that an economic mission of senior government officials and businessmen from the UAR will start a tour of 11 newly independent African states next week for the purpose of selling products of the UAR and of establishing close economic ties.

Feb. 11: The UAR asked Ghana, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco to implement a resolution passed at the current Casablanca conference to form an African broadcasting union.

Feb. 14: The UAR announced that it had recognized the rebel government of Antoine Gizenga at Stanleyville as the "legitimate national government of the Congo." It was revealed that the diplomatic pace of this development, which was known to be under way, had been accelerated by the death of Mr. Lumumba.

Feb. 16: In Brussels, Belgian university students reportedly smashed windows in the embassy of the UAR in reprisal for the burning of the Belgian Embassy in Cairo by Egyptian students yesterday.

Feb. 17: Husayn Dhū al-Fiqār Ṣabri, Deputy Foreign Minister, protested against Secretary of State Dean Rusk's reported statement that the UAR had sent arms to the rebel régime in the Congo. He told Ambassador Frederick Reinhardt that the statement, as reported, carried "flagrant equivocation" and he demanded a clarification from Washington.

Dr. Mahmūd Fawzī, the Foreign Minister, left Cairo for Accra, Ghana, to attend a conference of African foreign ministers.

Feb. 18: Egyptian police arrested Zygmunt Nagorski, US Embassy information officer on a charge of distributing political pamphlets without permission. He was freed after 12 hours' detention after the intervention of Foreign Office officials at the request of the US Embassy.

Feb. 21: President Nāṣir flew to Damascus to preside at ceremonies commemorating the birth of the UAR.

It was reported in Brussels that Ṣāliḥ Khalil, UAR ambassador to Belgium, had cancelled an embassy reception planned for the following day, in the light of "present circumstances." Relations between the 2 countries had become strained after demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in Cairo and Brussels respectively after the death of Patrice Lumumba.

President Nāṣir publicly declared that the UAR was aiding Congolese rebels and would continue to do so "until they win their freedom."

President Nāṣir sent personal communications to Mr. Harold Macmillan, President Kennedy and

Premier Khrushchev, outlining his country's views on the Congo.

Feb. 22: A military parade in Damascus climaxed the week-long celebrations of the birth of the UAR.

Feb. 23: It was reported that the UAR had warned Archbishop Makarios that an exchange of ambassadors between Cyprus and Israel would have "grave consequences."

Feb. 25: Belgium announced that she had severed diplomatic relations with the UAR.

Feb. 26: President Nāṣir placed all Belgian properties in the UAR under sequestration, the Cairo radio announced. Members of the Belgian Embassy staff were reported to have been asked to leave immediately.

Feb. 27: More than 200 Belgian nationals were reported to be leaving Egypt following the expulsion order, and Hasan 'Abbās Zaki, Executive Minister of the Economy, started to take custody of all Belgian property in the UAR.

Mar. 5: A series of trade, payments, technical co-operation and industrial credit agreements were signed between the UAR and the Mali Republic.

Egypt

1960

Dec. 23: A new trade and payments agreement was signed by Ceylon and Egypt, in Ceylon.

Dec. 27: A source at the Ministry of Economy disclosed that Egypt had exported £E 880,000 worth of gasoline during the first 9 months of 1960. These exports included 51,000 tons to East Germany, 10,000 tons to Cuba and 3,000 to the Sudan.

1961

Jan. 7: It was learned that Poland had delivered 2 more tankers to Egypt in accordance with the terms of an agreement providing for the construction of 5 500-ton tankers.

Jan. 18: A new agreement for the supply of \$4.5 million worth of US surplus farm products to Egypt was signed in Cairo. Payment will be made in Egyptian currency and 80 per cent of the counterpart funds will be used to finance development schemes. The agreement is complementary to that of last August under which \$58.2 million worth of grain supplies are being shipped to both regions of the UAR.

Jan. 19: Rev. Dr. Etienne Drioton, one of the leading experts on ancient Egypt, died at the age of 71.

Jan. 25: A report from Rome stated that ENI had concluded an agreement in Cairo for the purchase of about 1,500,000 tons of Egyptian crude in exchange for nitrogenous fertilizers. The agreement

covers the period from 1961 to 1963 and provides for the exchange of commodities to the value of \$24,000,000.

Jan. 30: UAR Minister of Economy 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Qaysini announced that the capital of the state-owned General Petroleum Company (GPC) will be increased by £E 3,000,000 to a total of £E 6,000,000. Muhammad Ahmad Salim, Managing Director of GPC, explained that the capital will enable the company to undertake offshore exploration operations in the Gulf of Suez.

Feb. 6: In an agreement signed in Cairo, the West German government agreed to provide DM 6.5 million to implement a new technical aid agreement with Egypt. The sum will be spent in equipment and services for the establishment in Egypt of a Bureau of Standards, an Institute for Petroleum Research and an apprentices' training workshop.

Feb. 10: The *Middle East Economic Digest* reported that the Banca Commerciale Italiana per l'Egitto has announced the transfer of its management to the National Bank of Egypt in accordance with the law of January 1957 giving foreign banks 5 years to transform themselves into Egyptian banks. Its £E 500,000 capital will subsequently be transferred to Italy, the report said.

Feb. 23: An agreement signed in Cairo provides for the purchase of modern fishing equipment and boats from Poland by Egypt. Poland will also provide technical assistance for a study of the coastal erosion problem and for a report on the improvement of the fishing port of Damietta, west of Port Sa'id.

Feb. 26: The trade and payments agreement with Ceylon was ratified.

Syria

1960

Dec. 17: The Minister of Agriculture, Ahmad al-Hāji Yūnis announced that final estimates of this year's cotton crop in Syria amounted to 104,000 tons, valued at 200 million lire. This represented a 9 per cent increase over last year's output, mainly owing to the use of improved methods of planting, fertilizing, picking and ginning, he said.

Dec. 18: The Minister of Agrarian Reform, Ahmad al-Hunaydi, announced President Nāṣir's approval of a budgetary increase of 3 million lire in the allocation for housing projects in agrarian reform areas in Hassatche and Deir ez-Zor.

Syrian students in Damascus and other towns were reported to have held demonstrations denouncing France's policy in Algeria.

1961

Jan. 4: At a meeting, the General Petroleum Authority (Syrian Branch) decided to invite bids for the construction of 6 storage tanks at Latakia.

Jan. 11: The Minister of Industry, Wajih al-Sammān, decided to set up a committee to study the possibilities of marketing the 70,000-ton gasoline surplus produced at the Homs refinery.

The Directorate of Civil Aviation announced that Aleppo airport is now equipped to receive jet aircraft.

Jan. 15: An official Italian delegation left Damascus for Cairo after a 2-day visit, during which its members had talks with representatives of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

Jan. 18: 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sarrāj, President of the Syrian Executive Council, issued a communiqué recognizing the Algerian Provisional Government's representative in Damascus, Muhammad al-Ghasiri, as an Algerian consul, and affording his office the status of a consulate.

Jan. 19: Minister of Industry Wajih al-Sammān officially opened the new butane gas plant at Homs, built by the Czechoslovakian firm Technoexport.

Jan. 22: A delegation led by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Economy, 'Abd al-Sattār Nuwaylāti, left for Riyadh to discuss the possibility of extending the 1955 trade agreement between Syria and Saudi Arabia.

The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs signed a contract with the West German Dika organization for the supply and installation of 2 1,000-kw generators for Latakia, at a cost of 940,000 lire.

Jan. 23: The last phase of the Rastan dam on the Orontes River has been completed, the Major Projects Organization announced.

Jan. 25: Five vessels, carrying 45,000 tons of wheat, barley and flour, reached Latakia. These shipments were part of an order for 250,000 tons of agricultural produce which Syria contracted to buy from the US last year.

Jan. 28: The Director of the Tobacco Monopoly announced that Syria produced 6,000 tons of tobacco last year, representing a decrease of 1,500 tons on the 1959 crop.

Feb. 5: Decrees were issued whereby all foreign currency transactions must be approved by the Ministry of Economy; sums owed to creditors abroad cannot be transferred, but instead, must be deposited with a Syrian bank on their behalf; and exporters must hand over to the authorities the proceeds of their exports 3 months after shipment.

The Minister of Economy, Dr. Husnī al-Sawwāf, replaced Dr. Izzat al-Tarābulsi as Governor of the Central Bank, and the Egyptian Central Bank has agreed to transfer to the Syrian Central Bank a sum of £2 million sterling to help with urgent commitments, it was announced.

Feb. 9: Sheep exports from Syria were banned. Meat prices were reported to have risen by 5 to 7 per cent during the last fortnight.

Feb. 13: It was learned that Colonel Akram Dayri was appointed Minister of Economy, in addition to his duties as Minister of Labor and Social Affairs.

Feb. 13: At a press conference in Damascus, the President of the Syrian Executive Council, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sarrāj, warned that "fraudulent acts of smuggling" which motivated the recent currency restrictions would be "firmly suppressed."

Feb. 18: The Syrian Executive Council opened its study of the general budget for the next financial year.

Feb. 19: The UN Special Fund authorities were reported to have agreed to contribute half a million dollars towards the cost of establishing canned fruit and other food industries in Syria. The Ministry of Agriculture has an allocation of \$380,000 to the total cost of the project.

Feb. 22: An official spokesman of the Ministry of Agriculture announced that only 19,814 tons of cotton from last September's harvest remained to be sold, out of a total crop of 104,680 tons.

Feb. 27: A General Petroleum Company, similar to the one in Egypt, will be built in Syria, the UAR Economic Development (EDO) announced.

Feb. 28: The Syrian Branch of the UAR General Petroleum Authority signed an agreement granting to the state-owned Petroleum Cooperative Society the exclusive right to market butane gas in Syria.

Mar. 1: An industrial institute built in Aleppo under the terms of Syria's cultural agreement with West Germany was officially opened.

Mar. 3: A decree was promulgated requiring all banks operating in Syria to be "Arabized." Only the Central Bank, a state bank, is exempted from the new law. All the others must become limited joint-stock companies with a minimum capital of £S 3 million. At least 35 per cent of the capital will be owned by the Government Economic Organization. All shares will be nominal; all the members of the Boards of Directors must be UAR nationals; nationals of other Arab countries can, however, hold a proportion of the shares not exceeding 25 per cent, with proportional seats on the Board of Directors, subject to the approval of the President in each case.

Yemen

(See also Aden)

1961

Jan. 16: Negotiations for the construction of a bunkering port on the Yemeni Red Sea coast were reported to have begun between the Soviet Union and the Yemen government.

Jan. 18: A trade and payments agreement and a protocol for the exchange of commercial representation in each other's country was signed between Yemen and the Korean Democratic People's Republic (North Korea). Yemen is to export coffee beans, cotton, hides and other agricultural products and North Korea will send machinery, textiles and chemicals to Yemen.

Jan. 31: An 86 km section of the Hudaydah-San'a highway was opened to traffic.

Feb. 3: Mecca Radio said that King Sa'ud had donated SRs 100,000 for the relief of "victims of a fire which gutted 1,200 slum houses in Hudaydah, Yemen, about a fortnight ago."

Feb. 4: Imām Ahmad opened a fund for the Hudaydah fire victims with a donation of 25,000 rials.

It was disclosed that a Yugoslav mission had arrived in Yemen to discuss means of improving trade relations between Belgrade and Ta'izz. It was also revealed that the North Korean delegation left.

It was revealed that the Minister of Communications, 'Abdallāh al-Hujārī, had left for a 3-weeks' visit to East Germany and that a Yemeni "religious delegation" had returned from a month's tour of Communist China.

Feb. 12: Dr. Amadeo Guillet presented his credentials to King Ahmad as minister and envoy extraordinary of the Italian Republic in Yemen.

Feb. 20: Mr. William Yates, a British Conservative M.P., said in Aden that he saw no valid reason why closer relations should not exist between the UK and Yemen.

Mar. 2: It was reported that a Houston independent oil company has been awarded a 10,000 sq. mile exploration concession on the coastal plain and in the offshore waters of the Yemen. The concession covers the area formerly held by Overseas Investment.

BOOK REVIEWS

LEBANESE VIEWS ON THE 1958 CRISIS

Malcolm H. Kerr

SIYĀSAH LUBNĀN AL-KHĀRIJIYAH ("The Foreign Policy of Lebanon"), by Fu'ād 'Ammūn. Beirut: Dār al-Nashr al-'Arabiyyah, 1959. 154 pages. £L 1.00.

BA'D AL-MIHNAH WĀ QABLHĀ ("After and Before the Crisis"), by Michel Asmar. Beirut: Al-Nadwa al-Labanāniyah, 1959. 122 pages. No price indicated.

HAQIQAT AL-THAWRAH AL-LUBNĀNIYAH ("The Truth About the Lebanese Revolution"), by Kamāl Junblāt. Beirut: Dār al-Nashr al-'Arabiyyah, 1959. 179 pages. £L 1.50.

WĀQI' AL-THAWRAH AL-LUBNĀNIYAH ("The Reality of the Lebanese Revolution"), by Nadia Karāmī and Nawāf Karāmī. Beirut: Publisher unknown, 1959. 320 pages. £L 5.00.

MUDHAKKĀRAT SĀMĪ AL-ŞULH ("The Memoirs of Sāmī al-Şulh"), by Sāmī al-Şulh. Beirut: Maktaba al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1960. 766 pages. £L 15.00

AL-AYYĀM AL-'ASIBAH ("Days of Crisis"), by Ghassān Tuwayni. Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, n.d. 62 pages. No price indicated.

THAWRAH AL-AHRĀF LUBNĀN ("The Revolution of the Free in Lebanon"), by Isma'il Mūsā al-Yūsuf. Beirut: Manshurat al-Zayn, 1958. 268 pages. £L 2.50.

It is now over two years since the end of the Lebanese civil war of 1958, and during this interval a series of events have occurred which, taken together, signify the end of the crisis and the clearing away of all the most clearly visible débris. There was, first of all, the accession to

office of President Fu'ād Shihāb in September 1958; then the extraordinary four-man coalition Cabinet of October headed by Rashid Karāmī, whose task it was to pacify and reconcile the country under the slogan "No victor and no vanquished." It accomplished this objective with enough success to enable a larger and more widely representative Karāmī Cabinet to take its place after a year had passed. In June and July 1960, it proved possible to hold elections for a new Parliament without serious incidents, thus replacing the Parliament elected in 1957 under President Camille Sham'un. Finally, following the elections, President Shihāb installed a new Cabinet headed by Sā'ib Salām (like Karāmī, a leading opponent of Sham'un) and the picture was complete: a new President, Parliament and Cabinet, plus a profusion of declarations of brotherhood and outlining of new government programs of national construction and public welfare, plus the general return of security and prosperity to the country, all signify the end of an unhappy chapter in Lebanon's history. If the factions fall to violence again, it will be in a new context of events and personalities.

In fact, to judge by some of the literature on the 1958 crisis that has been appearing in Beirut bookshops, one might suppose that the whole issue revolved around personalities. Alternatively, depending on whose axe is being ground, it was the "diabolical plots" of Camille Sham'un and his "stooges" (Sāmī al-Şulh, Charles Malik) to turn Lebanon into a base for British and American imperialists to use against the "free Arabs" of the U.A.R.; or it was 'Abd al-Nāṣir's expansionist ambitions, abetted by his agents

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(Şâ'ib Salâm, Kamâl Junblât), that precipitated the violence. An accompanying theme is the lust for office: Sham'un wanted to avenge the loss of their seats in Parliament in the 1957 elections.

Rather oddly, the opponents of Sham'un have had the stage pretty much to themselves in this propaganda orgy. Among the books under review, those by 'Ammun, Junblât, Nadia and Nawâf Karâmi and Yûsuf are examples of this; on the other side, *The Memoirs of Sâmi Şulh* (whose author was Sham'un's Prime Minister from November 1956 to September 1958) is the only pro-Sham'un book to have been published, as far as this reviewer is aware, and it did not appear until the spring of 1960, on the eve of Şulh's unsuccessful bid for re-election to Parliament. This is a pity from the standpoint of balancing the arguments, especially since Şulh's *Memoirs* are so poorly written and tell us so little about anything except himself; but the imbalance is perhaps a fair reflection of the fact that while Malik and Şulh are politically dead and Sham'un removed from the center of the stage, all of the leading insurrectionists—Salâm, Junblât, Sabri Hamâdah, Karâmi, Ahmad al-As'ad and others—are more alive than ever. It is also a pity that no neutral views of the crisis have been published except for the booklets of Michel Asmar and Ghassân Tuwayni, both of which are very good but cover only a few selected points. For these are the only two writers on our list who show much sobriety or intellectual integrity.

While all this literature includes rather little that is edifying or even credible, it does tell us a good deal in two respects. In the first place, it reflects much of the mentality of 1958, especially on the rebel side. If the reader has his doubts that Sham'un was a paid agent of the British intelligence service, he need not doubt that thousands of educated and uneducated Lebanese Muslims are firmly convinced of it. If he doubts that many rebels were more loyal to 'Abd al-Nâṣir and the UAR than to Lebanon, he need only glance at the sycophantic dedications and quotations on the flyleaves of

Isma'il Yûsuf's frantic, popularly written book. In the second place, some of these books, particularly Junblât's and Şulh's, reveal much about the personalities of their authors, who are themselves representative of two opposing currents in the political life of Lebanon since independence.

As a factual summary of the events of 1958, Nadia and Nawâf Karâmi's¹ *The Reality of the Lebanese Revolution* is certainly the most comprehensive, describing in some detail the mounting tension in Lebanon since the time of Suez (when Sâmi Şulh replaced 'Abdallâh Yâfi as Prime Minister), the question of a second term for Sham'un, the efforts of neutral personalities to mediate between the two sides, the fighting in various parts of the country, the American landings and Robert Murphy's negotiations in Beirut, Shihâb's election on July 31, his succession to office on September 23, the pro-Sham'un "counter-revolution" of October, and finally, the formation of the four-man Cabinet which ended the crisis. But the book is grossly unreliable, for it purports to offer an inside story, not so much on the rebel side (whom the authors hysterically support) as on the Sham'unist side, and here most of the material consists of rumors and allegations, the truth or falsity of which could not possibly be known to the authors, nor to many others either. Thus we learn the dark secrets of Sham'un's efforts to buy support for his re-election from Salâm, Yâfi, Junblât, ex-President Bisharah al-Khûri, and even 'Abd al-Nâṣir, in exchange for incredible reversals of his policies (pp. 36-8); we hear the details of conversations between Murphy and the Maronite Patriarch, the rebel leaders and Sham'un himself—in which Murphy roundly criticizes the Eisenhower Doctrine! (pp. 294-8); and so on. Aside from such fantasies with which this book (and all the other books, except Asmar's and Tuwayni's) abounds, it is characteristic of the authors' mentality that they dismiss the pro-Sham'un counterrevolution of October as an "artificial uproar" by those who "did not understand the new Lebanese reality springing from the revolution." The

1. Druze partisans of Kamâl Junblât, no relation to Rashid Karâmi.

chief motive of counterrevolutionaries was allegedly to provoke the intervention of the American troops so as to neutralize Shihâb's accession to the Presidency (pp. 312-3).

Synthetic impatience with the interests of the Christian side is also a characteristic of Kamâl Junblât's book, *The Truth About the Lebanese Revolution*. The author, currently Minister of Finance in the Salâm Cabinet, has been in Parliament since 1943 (with the exception of 1957-60), is the founder of the Progressive Socialist Party, and in 1958 led the rebel uprising in the Shûf mountain district. But unlike the Karâmis, Junblât is no ordinary propagandist: he is a doctrinaire revolutionary pamphleteer and something of an intellectual, who does not hesitate to reject national traditions, myths and slogans that are ordinarily considered 'sacrosanct' by Lebanese politicians: free enterprise, inter-sectarian distribution of government jobs, the National Pact of 1943 (a formula of compromise between Christians and Muslims on various foreign and domestic issues), and the formula "no victor and no vanquished" with which the crisis ended in October 1958. To borrow an American platitude, these represent the "Lebanese Way of Life," with which Junblât is profoundly depressed and disgusted, for he sees in it anarchy, grasping materialism, hypocrisy, corruption and the enshrinement of national mediocrity through half-way measures. "The National Pact," he writes, "is not an end in itself, and creates nothing positive. On the contrary, it is a first step toward the achievement of secularization of [public life]." If no further progress is made, "the Pact will inevitably fall to pieces without its place being taken by any positive concept of the state, the community, and the nation. . . At that point the Pact will become—in fact it has already become, apart from its [neutralist] concept of foreign policy . . . —nothing more than a mutual exchange of lies. . ." (pp. 153-4). "The recent revolution ended where it should not have ended, i.e., with the present régime newly re-establishing political sectarianism—fifty-fifty, no victor and no vanquished—instead of bringing forth [new leaders] . . . who alone could reform Lebanese institutions with vigor, wisdom, and power. . ."

(p. 155). In proposing his socialist program he says, "The theory of liberalism, or absolute freedom in politics, is a mistake as far as Lebanon is concerned. It has bequeathed to us this individualist anarchy in our public and private life, so that people in this country have become selfish and wrapped up in their own interests, heedless of everything except what directly concerns themselves, exerting themselves only for what falls within their narrow horizons, interested in nothing that does not bear them a definite advantage." (p. 161). Lebanese economic prosperity in recent years, Junblât remarks, is in large part due to the fact that Beirut has become "a nightclub for the royalty and capitalists of the Arab world" and a cosmopolitan center for licit and illicit commerce (p. 33).

All these things, to Junblât's mind, were among the ultimate causes of the 1958 revolution—or, as he would have put it perhaps, among the justifications for his own participation in the insurrection, for as far as he is concerned, "the true causes of the recent Lebanese revolution still stand and cannot be treated except by means that are revolutionary in spirit and program" (p. 173). If radical reform was what Junblât was after in 1958, he was surely aware that his revolution was not that of his co-rebels Salâm, Hamâdah, Yâfi and As'ad, whose chief objective was simply to continue playing the old game with their own deck of cards rather than Sham'un's. Perhaps it is Junblât's frustration arising from this realization that drives him to an almost insane state of frenzy in his attacks on Sham'un, to unspeakable bad taste in his vituperation of Charles Malik (pp. 73-6), and to self-deceiving hypocrisy in justifying his own record (see, for example, his attempt to explain away the part he played in forcing Bisharah al-Khûrî's resignation and supporting Sham'un's election in 1952, though he was "well aware" that Sham'un was "an agent of the British intelligence service"—(pp. 23-32)). From Junblât's explanation of the wide powers and opportunities for self-advancement inherent in the office of Lebanese President (pp. 37-41), the reader is left to conclude that Sham'un's chief fault in Junblât's eyes is that

he behaved in office not as a revolutionary but according to the usual rules of the game. The fact that traditional politicians also eventually resorted to armed rebellion, on the other hand, was not due to Sham'ün's failure to institute radical reforms but rather because he overplayed his hand.

From Junblät's book the picture emerges of a passionate reformist, discouraged by his own penetrating vision of the all-too-real weaknesses of Lebanese public life and the enormity of the task of curing them, but driven by the combination of his passion and his discouragement to the loss of the tolerance, sense of proportion and realism he needs if he is to accomplish anything.

It would be difficult to imagine two more opposite personalities, temperamentally and politically, than Kamál Junblät and Sāmī Ṣulḥ. Junblät is young (43) French-educated, fiery, articulate, radical, iconoclastic, reclusive. Ṣulḥ is old (70), Turkish-educated, banal in expression, tradition-minded, sentimental, convivial. Ṣulḥ is no littérateur and it is very doubtful that much of his *Memoirs* was written by himself; indeed, many passages make no pretense of it. Even with the aid of his editor, the book is a literary monstrosity. The narrative is constructed like a coffeehouse conversation, with wild leaps from one subject to another without regard to chronology or logical connection. It is heavily salted with sentimentality, heroic poses, corny humor and a childlike sensitivity which takes all political opposition as a personal affront. The book quickly became known among Beirut jesters as the "Musakkarāt" (intoxications) of Sāmī Ṣulḥ rather than "Mudhakkarāt" (memoirs).

As an account of the 1958 crisis the book is a great disappointment. The 300 pages devoted to the years 1957-1958 are filled chiefly with reprints of Ṣulḥ's public statements of the time, press clippings, photographs, long quotations from Kamál Junblät's and Fu'ād 'Ammūn's books followed by half-hearted and pointless rebuttals, and a woefully scanty narrative of events which occasionally leads up to the critical point and then drops it, leaving the reader hanging in mid-air. This section of the book,

covering the most crucial period, is a scrap album rather than a memoir. Nevertheless, his general position is amply reiterated (e.g., p. 477); the causes of the insurrection lay in the anger of opposition leaders over their 1957 electoral defeat, in the government's failure to break relations with Britain and France after the Suez attack, to join the Syrian-Egyptian defense pact and generally to subordinate Lebanese policies to those of Cairo and Damascus, 'Abd al-Nāṣir's failure to incorporate Lebanon into the United Arab Republic, and the rebel leaders' greed for UAR money. The smuggling of arms from Syria began in 1955; the question of Sham'ün's re-election was no more than a pretext for the rebellion; the real issue was that of UAR interference, since without it the government could easily have dealt with the rebels, who had no genuine popular support; all formulas of compromise between the government and the rebels were "nonsense," for authority must prevail and the guilty must be punished. The 1957 elections were a model of fairness, claims Ṣulḥ, as attested by alleged expressions of satisfaction by Dr. Yūsuf Hittī and Muhammad Bayhūm, the two neutral Ministers of State appointed the Cabinet in order to placate the opposition (p. 395)—conveniently ignoring the fact that in actuality Hittī and Bayhūm resigned midway through the elections in protest against the government's unneutral conduct. And lastly, Ṣulḥ stoutly defends his government's espousal of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 and its appeal for US military intervention in July 1958.

There are many questions on which one would have hoped to find some detailed discussion in Ṣulḥ's *Memoirs*, but which are unfortunately glossed over. There is very little of interest on the 1957 elections, on the debate over the Eisenhower Doctrine, on the passive role of the Lebanese Army during the insurrection, on the even more passive role of the American troops, on the negotiations carried on by Robert Murphy, or on the steps leading to the election of Shihāb (which, incidentally, Ṣulḥ opposed, for reasons unexplained: see pp. 693-8).

But if there is little to learn about 1958 from

these *Memoirs*, there is much to be learned about Sāmī Šulh and the mentality he brought with him to the crisis after 38 years in Lebanese public life. "Papa Sāmī," as he was commonly called, was for many years a man of great popularity in the Muslim quarters of Beirut where he is now reviled as a renegade. His family mansion in the quarter of Burj Abi Haydar was known as "*bayt al-ummah*" ("home of the nation") owing to his expansive hospitality, until it was razed by the rebels in 1958 (a deed which appears to have wounded Šulh more deeply than the revolution itself). It is clear that he relished this popularity, just as he relished being eight times Prime Minister. "In reality," says Šulh, "popularity is not a feeling of general awe, nor of great prestige. Popularity is composed of numerous anecdotes and recollections and warm associations which weave a net of friendships between the masses and politicians. I like to be popular; this is one of my petty faults. I see no harm in this; on the contrary, it is a source of satisfaction to the politician to know that the people whom he meets on the street are people who love him." (pp. 72-3).

In the little world of Sāmī Šulh, homely popularity counted heavily in politics, and indeed, politics revolved around personal relationships. Following the notorious 1947 elections, when the Parliamentary credentials committee reported irregularities in the election of certain candidates, Šulh unabashedly defended them on the grounds that they were eminent personages who surely ought to be welcomed in Parliament (pp. 194-5). In another passage, he recounts with disarming simplicity how he became Prime Minister in 1952 because Salim al-Khūrī, brother of the President of the Republic, had grown tired of 'Abdallāh Yāfi (p. 124). Even when he embarks upon a long critique of the Lebanese Constitution, which grants many powers to the President of the Republic for which the Prime Minister must bear the responsibility, the discussion is linked to personal differences he held with members of Sham'ūn's palace entourage (pp. 313-21).

Unfortunately for Šulh, during his later

ministries, particularly from the time of Suez onward, Lebanese politics became increasingly drawn toward international issues whose psychological impact on the population was so great as to render his familiar little world of personality politics suddenly obsolete. It was one thing to be Prime Minister in the last year of Bisharāh al-Khūrī's discredited régime, and Šulh emerged unscathed. It was quite another thing to cope with the events of 1957-1958, and the reader senses that Šulh was only partially aware of his growing estrangement from his own community, *i. e.* the Muslims of Beirut, as he became more and more irrevocably identified with the policies of Camille Sham'ūn and Charles Malik. It is at least to his credit that he had the courage to stand firm in this situation once the insurrection began, unlike two of his Ministers who quickly resigned.

Šulh ends his *Memoirs* on a note not unlike that of Junblät, that is to say, in a spirit of disillusionment and a sense of betrayal at the hands of an uncooperative and unappreciative world. "What was my crime?" he asks the reader at repeated intervals. He ended his career, appropriately, in exile in Turkey, where he had begun it as a young law graduate. But his final disillusionment came shortly after the publication of his *Memoirs*, when he not only was badly beaten in a bid for re-election to Parliament, but suffered various indignities at the hands of the authorities during the course of the campaign.

There is little that need be said of Fu'ād 'Ammūn's booklet on *The Foreign Policy of Lebanon*, except to note the fact that the Director General of the Lebanese Foreign Ministry (he returned to this post, which he had left in 1956, after Sham'ūn's departure) is capable of such superficiality, ignorance and demagogic. We learn in the first chapter that Amir Fakhr al-din II, Governor of Lebanon in the 17th Century, had laid the foundations of modern Lebanese diplomacy by following a policy of positive neutrality in the cold war between Spain and France and by securing "technical assistance" from Tuscany. We learn also that India is a Buddhist country (p. 72) and that U Nu of Burma is "an outstanding person-

ality representing the Soviet bloc" (pp. 45-6). The author approvingly quotes Benjamin Franklin allegedly telling the Constitutional Convention in 1789, "There is a great danger threatening the United States, the Jewish danger. . . If the Constitution does not specify the exclusion of the Jews from the United States they will be ruling us in less than a century. . . I warn you . . . if you do not eliminate the Jews once and for all, your children and grandchildren will curse you from their graves." The Truman record, adds 'Ammūn, bears out Franklin's prophecy (pp. 80-1).

In addition to these points, 'Ammūn offers a general castigation of Sham'un, but says nothing noteworthy that Junblāt does not say much better.

After the heavy dose of propaganda, fantasy, blindness and simple foolishness served up by Messrs. Yūsuf, Karāmī, Junblāt, Şulh and 'Ammūn, one can only welcome the antidotes of Ghassān Tuwayni and Michel Asmar, which serve at least to show that calm reflection and common sense were not altogether absent from Lebanon in 1958. Tuwayni, the brilliant young editor of the independent Beirut daily, *al-Nabār*, and a former member of Parliament, has published in booklet form a collection of his editorials appearing between March 9 and August 5, 1958. He was also a member of the so-called "third force" of prominent personalities which attempted to mediate a compromise solution between the two sides. But he did not hesitate to rebuke both sides sharply, nor to speak frankly on some of the most sensitive issues. On March 15 he remarked candidly that the Muslims in Lebanon generally look to 'Abd al-Nāṣir for leadership almost to the point of deification; many Christians who are upset by this want their own symbolic leader, thus creating a natural opportunity for a man in Sham'un's position, as the latter could not but realize. This brief statement, made two months before the outbreak of violence, summarizes in a nutshell what was perhaps the most fundamental psychological issue of the crisis.

Tuwayni's major criticisms of Sham'un relate to two questions: re-election and the inter-

nationalization of the crisis. While insisting that Sham'un should finish his legal term on September 23 rather than resign at once as the opposition demanded, he equally insisted that Sham'un's clear duty was to renounce publicly all thoughts of a second term, and that his failure to do so only lent moral support to the opposition. (See especially the editorials of March 20 and May 23.) On the other hand, Tuwayni urged Sāmī Şulh to resign in order to enable a coalition Cabinet to take office, since it was clear that internal security had slipped beyond the government's control (May 28).

Tuwayni opposed the government's action in taking their complaint against interference from the UAR to the Arab League and the United Nations, not on the grounds that there was no interference, but because appealing for outside aid would only increase the primary need, which was to restore the internal unity of the country. The real crisis, wrote Tuwayni on June 10, would come after the fighting ceased: "the problem of deciding the future of a country which we have made a state, but which we have not known how to make into a nation." He was likewise critical of appeals to the United States: "For what kind of independence is this which cannot subsist without foreign 'aid,' not to say protection; and what self-government lasts for an hour whose régime depends on foreign troops to solve the crisis?" (July 1.) "It is a cause of regret that Foster Dulles has more faith in Lebanon's independence than do the Lebanese authorities" (July 3). This was of course before the US decision to land the Marines; and when this was done, Tuwayni reserved his criticism not for Washington's response, but for Sham'un's appeal: "To certain Christians who still tell themselves that the age of protectorates and Crusades is not over, we say quite frankly that the Sixth Fleet did not land its troops to protect them, but to protect its own vital interests; and that its vital interests have no religion, but that if we must give a religious label to those with whom its interests lie, we should say that it is the Muslims with whom the West will try to make friends" (July 16). Not long afterward, many an embittered Lebanese Christian felt

that this was exactly what was happening.

On the other hand, Tuwayni repeatedly taunted the opposition leaders for allowing themselves to become prisoners of their own followers' extremism, for continuing the insurrection long after the re-election of Sham'un was out of the question, and for being more interested in their own advancement than in the welfare of the country. He declared that much as he wished to see radical reform in Lebanon, he was not with the revolution because it promised nothing worth the shedding of a drop of blood. "Shall we liberate the people with the tribes of Ṣabri Hamādah or the gangs of Sulaymān Franjiyah?" (June 15).

Michel Asmar's book tells us little about the events of the crisis itself. It consists of reprints of radio lectures delivered shortly before and shortly after the insurrection, some by Asmar himself (the founder of a nonpartisan academic circle called *Le Cénacle Libanais*) and others by various political figures, including Charles Ḥilū, Pierre Jumayyil, Husayn 'Uwayni, Raymond Iddah (Eddé) and Rashed Karāmī. Perhaps the best of these talks is one by Asmar entitled "Reflections on Lebanese Politics" delivered in November 1958. Like Junblät, he is dismayed by the self-seeking and irresponsible mentality that pervades public life:

We are faced here with the entire mentality of a people, and a psychology corrupted to its foundations, which need to be changed... A plan of this scale enlists everyone: from the people in their homes to the society through its leaders, to all those of good will who acknowledge the corruption of their own education and are determined to create for forthcoming generations an education entirely superior to that which they themselves received. Without this, . . . the national inclination to inertia will never lack the means to avoid reforms whatever they may be. . . . It is well that we . . . confess that most of us were born and raised amid concepts different from those upon which our public life should rest today. In the past we were dominated by divisions in politics, intersectorial quarrels, anarchy in the economy, selfishness and personal interest in our social relations, exaggerated elegance and grace in our leisure, and disgust with life. . . .

. . . Negativism and unconcern and doubt cannot be an inspiration to action and productivity. . . As for the ultimate guarantees of a sustained program of national action, I see none outside the conscience

of the Lebanese. Neither the memory of the glories or miseries of the past, nor feelings of the effort and sacrifices of the present, nor the sympathy and support of the outside world, nor even the power of political institutions—nothing can substitute for training the national conscience to grasp the common national heritage and preserve and broaden and strengthen it and carry it from generation to generation. And here enters the question of political guidance. . . We need . . . to train a political elite worthy of accepting responsibility for national needs and fulfilling them in the most complete fashion (pp. 23-6).

GENERAL

ISLAM AND THE WEST: THE MAKING OF AN IMAGE, by Norman Daniel. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960. 443 pages. \$12.50.

Reviewed by Edward J. Jurji

In ten full-size chapters, five appendices, notes and classified bibliography, index and five plates, this book sets forth a clear-cut objective judgment on the West's image of Islām. The work focuses on the formative period extending from the beginning of the twelfth to the middle of the fourteenth century. The subject is as confined to matters of religion as the author can make it. His chief concern is with the absorption of Christian traditions, already existing, and their development into a new body of opinion.

What the West actually developed was a partially deformed image of Islām. The image assumed the proportions of a dogma maintained, *vis-à-vis* Islām, by Christian Western society, though not by the Church. The author initiates an impartial examination into the reasons and causes for this deformed image. He may be said to have rescued the person of the Prophet and the doctrines of Islām where a "gratuitous nastiness of the part of Christians" (p. 320) proved highly unworthy.

The probe into motives and causation is always difficult, if not mystifying. But the book does not shy away from that task in setting up

a background for communal antipathy by followers of one faith against those of another. Nor does the narrative fail to clarify the functions served by such communal opinion. Subsequent history is surveyed to show how once a canon of opinion was crystallized, it was to survive long unbroken. Even when shaken to its foundation, such an attitude of hostility did not fail to influence the very people who ultimately succeeded in shaking it.

In the all too brief concluding remarks the author touches upon recent changes that have taken place. Ironically, as he points out, the scientific-atheist outlook in the USSR now adopts much of the same medieval Christian attitude toward Islām from which the Christian West has slowly graduated. A suggestion is made that we do not move into something entirely new. Rather that we build upon work done in the Middle Ages. While giving up the old pejorative tone, the new emphasis will aim to illuminate and fructify the relations of Christians and Muslims.

St. John of Damascus emerges in this work as the real founder of the Christian tradition on Islām. "To over-civilized Syrian-Greek ecclesiastics," says Mr. Daniel, re-echoing F. Cumont, "Islam seemed to be only a temporary manifestation by simple desert-dwellers apt to revert to ancient superstition" (p. 3). St. John began the long tradition of arguing about the Persons of the Godhead in the context of Qur'anic Christology. In applying to Muslims dialectical techniques used among Christians themselves, the West evolved, by its own refined standards, a shortcut to establishing Islamic heresy. This was obviously too alien to the Islamic mind to accomplish any useful purpose. In short, responsibility for the distorted Latin image of Islām rests not with the West, but rather with Byzantine and Arab Christians, as well as with converted Jews and Mozarabes.

Yet what was frozen in the past begins to thaw at last. What the medievals studied we may study again, making use of what they did. But we may do it for its own sake without any thought of propaganda, and with malice toward none.

A procedure is mapped out (p.307). To begin with the biography of Muhammad awaits retrieval. It is essential that Christians see him as a holy figure. His prophethood and the accidents of his life need to be ascertained in the light of historical criticism. Secondly, the mind of Muslims in many ages needs to be recaptured: the first Companions and the key figures of the 'Abbāsid heyday. A third field is the area of theology where Islām and Christianity share many points. Scholars such as Massignon and Asin, Nicholson and Gibb, are cited. Protestant and Roman Catholic scholars, as well as Eastern Orthodox and those of the ancient Churches, lay us heavily in debt by their researches and re-evaluation.

One wonders why treatment of so profound a theme accords such minimal space to the social and historic ramifications of the problem. Yet this, and a normal quota of errors, do not mar the book; nor do they detract from its importance as a first-rate performance. If only as a contribution to the history of intolerance, and as a judgment on how interfaith images and relations belong together, Mr. Daniel's volume deserves the respect of all whom he lays under heavy debt.

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ARAB WORLD

FATIMA AND HER SISTERS, by Dorothy Van Ess. New York: The John Day Company, 1961. 187 pages. Index. \$4.00.

Reviewed by Alma B. Kerr

Dorothy Van Ess, in her reminiscences with *Fatima and Her Sisters*, covers half a century of life in Iraq, beginning with the Ottoman rule and ending with the eve of the revolution. Her book presents a kaleidoscopic picture of tribal

cultural patterns in an Islamic environment. In the final chapter, "Today and Tomorrow," the author shows the full impact of communications on this ancient Arab tribal society. This account is as startling as it must have appeared to the writer after a few years' absence from Baṣrah. Here she found the women, whom she had described as "fettered," freed and participating in a jet-propelled society, thoroughly emancipated. For a Westerner to grasp the significance of such an upheaval, it might be well to read this final chapter first. Mrs. Van Ess reminds her readers that the tempo of life for women in Iraq did not change until schools for girls were opened. During the long years of Ottoman rule there were no government schools for women. The author went there as a bride to open a mission school for girls, but it was not until 1920 that the first government girls' school was opened in Baghdad. Today women of Iraq have equal rights. One can find them in all professions—even in diplomacy and in politics.

To students of social and cultural anthropology and to Americans who seek to understand and appreciate the Arab world, this book offers first-hand information. While it was not her purpose to do social research, the Baṣrah region afforded her such an opportunity. The city of Baṣrah is an oasis on the watered fringes of desert lands where hordes of Arab tribes migrated when droughts in the Arabian peninsula made it difficult for them to sustain their flocks. This influx changed the character of the Land of Two Rivers. These illiterate, half-pagan tribes brought the Word of God, Islām, together with their ancient customs, taboos and voodoo practices. It is in this tradition that Islām grew in this area, and it is with this in mind that one can fully appreciate the impact of the chapter, "God, the Compassionate, the Merciful."

Perhaps the more interesting part of the book is the discussion of the secluded women of Basrah. Dorothy Van Ess, unlike other Western women of this period—unless it was the brilliant Gertrude Bell—linked her life with the people. Miss Bell moved in a different circle, in Iraq's capital, Baghdad. Here high dignitaries sought her counsel. Mrs. Van Ess, on the other

hand, walked more humbly among the isolated Baṣrah women, offering them love and compassion, sharing their joys, sorrows, loves and longings. She demonstrated her faith, simply and honestly, neither condemning, nor patronizing, nor resorting to pious preachings, much less speaking of her part as a teacher.

Fatima and Her Sisters exudes some of the splendors of the *Arabian Nights* in setting the stage for the characters in this book. When as a bride Faṭīma was to be beautified for her nuptials, the author recorded the magic of *Laylat al-Hinnā'* (*Hinnā'* Night) when the milk-mother decorates the hands and soles of the bride with *ḥinnā'* in traditional fashion, "all to the steady rhythmic beat of drums, the chanting of the *Mullayas* from the Koran . . . the interruption of the shrill piercing bridal trilling, the excited babble of many female voices in a heavy atmosphere pungent with incense, coffee, tobacco . . . In those early days the women bedecked themselves in rainbow colors, magenta, purple, orange, crimson, turquoise in rich brocades and rustling silks. . . . A delight to the senses," she called it.

There is an established protocol for every occasion in Baṣrah which the author followed carefully so as not to offend or shock her friends. When she was asked to join the Shi'a Muslim women to view the *Ashur*—the day of mourning—following *Mubarram*, Dorothy Van Ess, an American missionary, asked to be instructed with other pupils on the significance of the moving ceremony. When the "passion play" was enacted she sat with the thousands of black-draped women and children sharing their sorrow over the suffering of their martyred leaders, Ḥusayn and 'Ali. Readers who have witnessed this tragic drama will appreciate her remarks, "I defy anyone, sitting in that atmosphere, not to be caught up in the spirit of it . . ."

Both the late Dr. Van Ess and Mrs. Van Ess are revered in Baṣrah. They were true pioneers and they reflect the best traditions of service abroad, for they had faith in the people of Iraq. In conclusion, Dorothy Van Ess writes about the Iraqi woman: "With her roots in a great tradition of the past, with incredibly rapid advance of opportunities in the present,

and her rich gifts of personality, who can say what her future will be?"

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INDEPENDENT IRAQ 1932-1958: A STUDY IN
IRAQI POLITICS, by Majid Khadduri. Second edition. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 388 pages. Map. \$7.20.

Reviewed by C. J. Edmonds

For this second edition of his *Independent Iraq*, first published under the same auspices in 1951, Dr. Majid Khadduri has carried a stage further his close study of Iraqi politics since that country was emancipated from the mandatory control of the League of Nations and achieved complete independence in 1932. The alteration of the dates of the sub-title from "since 1932" to "1932-1958" is perhaps a little unfortunate for, just as the detailed narrative in the first edition ends with the repudiation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Portsmouth in January 1948, so in this new edition it ends with the young King Faysal's majority and assumption of the royal prerogatives in May 1953. References to events after that date are for the most part cursory or incidental and, to take a single example, the reader will find in the chapter on Foreign Policy no reference whatever to the Suez incident and its repercussions on the Baghdad Pact and on Iraqi relations with Britain, France or, more important, Egypt in the interval up to the revolution of July 1958.

But this is no cause of reproach, for the value and authority of Dr. Khadduri's work lies precisely in the fact that he does not rush his fences. The whole presentation is exact, well documented and, thanks to his practice of seeking out and questioning the leading personages involved, illuminated by an unusually accurate knowledge of what went on behind the scenes at critical moments. The appreciations and judg-

ments are thus always pondered, objective, shrewd and convincing.

The principal interest of this revised edition lies, of course, in the new political material, covering in the main two periods: the first from the outbreak of the Second World War to the Rashid 'Ali affair of 1941, and the second the stormy years of transition from the end of the war to 1953.

For the first period not only has the author had access to several important new sources, notably the *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, the Arabic posthumous *Memoirs* of Colonel Salah al-din al-Sabbagh (the ablest and most forceful of the sinister quadrumvirate of officers who dominated the political scene from 1938 to 1941), the *Diaries*, still in Arabic manuscript, of 'Uthmān Kamāl Haddad (secretary to the Mufti of Jerusalem and his emissary for the early negotiations with the Axis Powers), as well as various British official and personal publications, but he has also been able to question at first hand several of the principal actors in the drama including the Regent 'Abd al-Ilah and others previously inaccessible such as Dr. Grobba (German Minister at Baghdad in the pre-war years), and Rashid 'Ali and the Mufti themselves. From the earliest days of the war, and particularly after the German victories of May 1940, Iraqi politicians of all persuasions were obsessed with the idea that the need of Britain and France was the Arabs' opportunity to demand a *quid pro quo* for their support: the immediate emancipation of Syria and, at the very least, the implementation of that part of the British White Paper of 1939 which had provided for the progressive advance of Palestine to independence within ten years but which the Government had decided to suspend for the duration of the war. It is now possible to follow step by step the rise of the four officers to a position of such power that successive Cabinets were as putty in their hands, their alliance with the alien Mufti, arch-enemy of England and the West, and the rake's progress of Rashid 'Ali. Beckoned forward by the glittering vision of being hailed as the liberator of Palestine and goaded on by largely irrelevant quarrels with the Regent and Nūrī al-Sa'īd, by

his own reckless character and by his abysmal ignorance of the world outside Iraq, he finally gave his name to the crowning folly of an open breach with Britain at a moment when the Axis Powers were in no condition to come to his help, an outcome which he certainly never contemplated when, with his appointment to the premiership at the end of March 1940, he became the principal agent for the policy of confident and at first cheerful blackmail.

For seventeen years from Rashid 'Ali's collapse there was a truce from the military intervention in politics that had been responsible for six changes of Cabinet in five years. But as the direct dangers of the war receded, and still more after the German surrender, the permanent and familiar factors that influence political life in Iraq came back once more into play: pan-Arabism, the ever-simmering Palestine grievance (now exacerbated by the lamentable showing of the Arab armies against Israel in 1948), personal rivalries, and a venal and scurrilous press ever ready to fan the flames of private vendettas, a neurotic type of nationalism, or a crude xenophobia.

The last eight years of the Regency, from 1945 to 1953, present a gloomy record of instability with fourteen different Cabinets under eleven different Prime Ministers, two of these Cabinets actually brought down by mob-cum-student violence in the capital and others badly shaken, the Communists always standing by to lend a hand in promoting disturbances, political parties (the formation of which the liberal elements persisted in thinking would provide a remedy for the general malaise) being alternately licensed and suppressed, several periods of martial law, and one bright interval, the 22-month premiership of Nūrī when the foundations were laid of a remarkable economic expansion. The next five years, the last of the monarchy, are hardly touched upon in this book, but the political pattern continued much the same: ten Cabinets with seven different Prime Ministers, of whom Nūrī enjoyed one continuous spell only two months short of three years but the others, some more "conservative" and some more "liberal" than he, could only average less than five months of office apiece.

The observers who, despite the lessons of the short-lived alliance of the Ahāli radicals with General Bakr Ṣidqī in 1936, greeted the military *coup d'état* of July 1958 as the natural, inevitable and proper bursting of the bonds of reactionary repression by the fermenting liberalism of the new generation have been grievously disillusioned, and the new régime with, still after two-and-a-half years, no Constitution other than a "temporary" decree, no Parliament, and continuing censorship and military government, has until now been far more autocratic than anything experienced in the Hashimite era. "Democracy like any other system of government," says the author in his concluding chapter, "is only an instrument, which cannot operate in a vacuum—it functions in accordance with the existing forces of society; . . . in Iraq . . . it was bound to operate in accordance with the social milieu in which it existed." The record shows Nūrī al-Sa'īd towering head and shoulders above his contemporaries, and if in those last thirteen years, from 1945 to 1958, Iraq achieved a material prosperity and promise of social advance undreamed of before the war, and if she rose to an honored place among the nations of the world out of all proportion to her size and population, much of the credit must surely go to him. It is permissible then to wonder whether the policies of Nūrī (which must be clearly distinguished from those of the Amir 'Abd al-Ilāh), with all their weaknesses, were after all so very inappropriate to the social milieu onto which the forms of western democracy had been grafted. It will be interesting to see what Dr. Khadduri will make of it all, perhaps in three or four years' time, when he has applied his own penetrating methods of research to events since 1953.

◇ C. J. EDMONDS was from 1935 to 1945 Advisor to the Ministry of the Interior in Iraq.

THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM, by Jamal Mohammed Ahmed. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Middle Eastern Monographs: III), London: Oxford University Press, 1960. 135 pages. 25s. net.

Reviewed by Helen Anne B. Rivlin

One of the most judicious and sensitively written books on the subject written by a Middle Easterner and a Muslim, this volume by Jamāl Muḥammad Ahmād presents new insights into the intellectual origins of Egyptian nationalism.

Nowhere have I seen in a European language such a completely convincing account of the intellectual ferment preceding the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Mr. Ahmād's selections from the writings of the time are extremely well chosen and provocative. Although the depth of national feeling in Egypt at the time of the 'Urābī revolt cannot be accurately gauged by reference to these writers alone, yet it is clear from Mr. Ahmād's study that they cannot be ignored either, if a correct appraisal is to be made of the 'Urābī movement and its role in the evolution of Egyptian nationalism.

In his analysis of Islamic liberalism, Mr. Ahmād does not present a new picture of Muḥammad 'Abduh, but he does focus attention on the essential elements which have made 'Abduh the great influence he has been. Most significantly, Mr. Ahmād stresses 'Abduh's emphasis on the need for religious concepts "to impel men to work and live virtuously," and, for the balance of his work, the author develops the theme that the stimulation of civic virtue became the principal objective of Muḥammad 'Abduh's successors. Rather than relying on religion to serve as the binding force within Egyptian society, this new generation of reformers looked to nationalism as the creative impulse for arousing Egypt to action without, however, "shaking the pillars of Islām and for that reason," says Mr. Ahmād, "they were more effective than the pure secularists and the religious conservatives."

Mr. Ahmād examines the ideas of the most important of Muḥammad 'Abduh's disciples and traces their influence upon the generation of the period before the First World War both in the sphere of literature and of politics. Although the author's discussion of the emerging political parties is extremely well balanced, he misses the opportunity to examine more closely

the motivations of a man like Sir Eldon Gorst. It is true that Gorst alienated the *Umma* party by pursuing a friendly policy towards the Khedive, but Mr. Ahmād fails to point out that this was an impressive reversal of policy intended by Great Britain to give the Egyptians more power in running their own affairs than had been possible under the paternalistic rule of Lord Cromer. The author leaves the unfortunate impression that Gorst favored absolute government over constitutional government when, in fact, it seems quite clear that he was taking the first cautious step towards satisfying the legitimate demands of the Egyptian nationalists. That he did not go far enough is to ignore the state of mind of many people in Great Britain and the political realities of Egyptian life, not to mention the fact that he did not live long enough to pursue his policy to its logical conclusion. One would have hoped that the dilemma of governments in our own time with regard to the problem of which elements within a country should receive outside support would have made the author more understanding of the difficulties confronting Gorst and more appreciative of the efforts he made to give Egypt back to the Egyptians.

The detailed description of the thoughts of Ahmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid "the teacher of the generation" is a most welcome addition to the literature on Egyptian nationalism. That the more moderate views of Ahmad Luṭfī did not prevail and that the Egyptian nationalists felt compelled to follow a more extremist path add to the poignancy of the historical drama which unfolded in the frustrating years between the wars. Mr. Ahmād, however, sees in the thinking of Nāṣir and his friends a link with, if not a return to, the sweet reasonableness of the *al-Jaridah* group of Ahmad Luṭfī. It would be pleasant to suppose that this optimistic view is warranted and that the present leaders of Egypt are, indeed, taking their cue from this more idyllic brand of nationalism rather than from the strident form which developed during the period of the nineteen thirties and forties.

Mr. Ahmād brings to his study good taste, good judgment and a critical approach, three elements which make this book particularly

valuable to the European reader. It is an admirable synthesis certain to interest scholars and laymen alike.

◇ HELEN ANNE B. RIVLIN is assistant professor of history at the University of Maryland and teaches courses in Islamic Civilization and the Middle East. She is also the author of the forthcoming book, *The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt* (Harvard Middle East Studies, No. 4), Harvard University Press.

SONNE ÜBER ARABIEN. BILDER AUS DEM JEMEN, by Richard Gerlach. Leipzig: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft. Editions Leipzig, 1960. 144 pages. 10 color photographs, 140 black and white. £1.16.0.

Reviewed by Eric Macro

The earliest "picture" by European hands which has survived of any place within the confines of the present Yemen borders is probably the little sketch of Mocha on the MS chart of the entrance to the Red Sea (Collection d'Anville) used and inscribed by Dom Joam de Castro in January 1541. At least three pictures of Aden of dates 1512-77 are well enough known.

Who took the first photograph in Yemen? It was probably Renzo Manzoni (c. 1878). Primitive reproductions from some photographs were published with his book in 1884. Other pre-1900 photographs were taken by Gian Rossi and the Caprotti brothers. Italians before 1940 did well in this field; Massimo Rava with his unique and historic snapshots (1927), Ansaldi (1933), Ettore Rossi (*passim*), Salvador Aponte (1936) and Sandro Volta (1941). In the Yemen there will continue to be scope for first timers for many years; Nazih Mu'ayad al-Azm published the first photographs of Marib and Sirwah in 1936 and in recent years Professor F. Geukens has taken some unique photographs in Sa'ada, previously unvisited by Europeans. There have been many photographers but few of them artists. The exceptions are Everard Britton and Hugh Scott (1938)—their nos. 63 and 104 are still in the top class—Dick Sanger (Kodachrome), Bob Kuntz (Ansco), Chester Stevens and some eminent West Ger-

mans, Drs. Rathjens, Karrenberg, Fricke and Schott.

The present author, who seems to know nothing of his predecessors, joins François Balsan as first producer of a glossy book on S.W. Arabia. Balsan's *Arabie du Sud*, which dealt with the Aden Protectorates only, is now vastly overshadowed by Herr Gerlach's monster quarto volume. Without knowing the author's background it is difficult to assess the extent to which he was concerned of his own free will in the preparation of the text. Much of this is an eulogy on the work in Yemen of the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of China and the United Arab Republic. However, those who are interested enough to buy a photograph album of the Yemen will scarcely be concerned with reading a very generalized text by way of preamble. The book is obviously marketed as colossal, breathtaking and stupendous. Be this as it may, it is certainly the best collection of photographs of the country yet published.

Gerlach cannot have seen many published photographs of Yemen, otherwise he would not have fallen into the trap of uttering so many photographic platitudes. Silhouetted archways, stacked dung fuel cakes, San'a interiors, *nargibilas*, alabaster windows, *jambiyas*, *kalpaks*, *askaris* at the advance arms, jalousies, sunset between palm trees, primitive engineering of draw-wells, scene through barred window, dhow-building and the two-man saw in action. It is a pity that he bothered about color. He has only four good ones including one on the cover; the others are close-ups overposed and over-colored or uninteresting artistically. Some would have been more effective in black and white. He has certainly demonstrated that color can often be only a gimmick and that it is mostly unnecessary in these circumstances. However, all these are minor criticisms.

Clouds, angles and a sense of composition have served to produce his best pictures. Perhaps a little gimmickry also—the geometrical repetition of terraces and a full open-air mosque at prayer time—has helped to endear him to us. But his best is something which he could have ruined by thoughtlessness: al-Bakiliya complete

with clouds, trees, minaret, cupolas and all, a masterpiece of composition, a sultry San'a afternoon without that vivid light and shade contrast which we so often demand of our photographers. There are a lot of San'a minarets in the book. Who can ever grow tired of their unique architecture? The palace at Wadi Dahr continues to be as photogenic as ever and it is good to see it from yet another angle and to notice that some repairs have been carried out in the vicinity. It is not often that we see photographs of the great Hajja fortress or of the vineyards in the San'a district (probably Ra'udha). We would expect to see *euphoria* and terraces in Yemen and identical sights in the eastern Sudan and the Philippines, respectively, but such photographs in this book are truly striking.

Finally, the patchwork quilt of the plain of Jerim was a natural choice. Gerlach has produced his second best here, a better photograph than Dr. Scott was able to take. This would have been a suitable subject for color. Gerlach and his publishers are to be congratulated on this nostalgic volume: it will start more than one person wishing to return to that impossible task of obtaining a visa.

◊ WING COMMANDER ERIC MACRO, Royal Air Force, a specialist on the bibliography and history of exploration of Southern Arabia and the Yemen, is currently at the Air Ministry, London.

TRIBES OF THE SAHARA, by Lloyd Cabot Briggs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. xx + 295 pages. Maps, drawings, photographs, glossary and bibliography. \$6.00.

Reviewed by F. S. Vidal

Dr. Briggs could not have put it more accurately when he begins the Preface to this book by saying: "There has been more pure balderdash written and repeated about the tribes of the Sahara than about almost any other peoples in the world." He then proceeds to give us the first general description ever to be published of the Saharan peoples as a whole. The undertaking is certainly an ambitious one, and Dr. Briggs comes through with flying colors. In

this, his third major piece of research on the Sahara, the author presents the results of over a decade of work, both personal fieldwork in the desert and the painstaking analysis and evaluation of the literature ("a sorry mess at best").

Dr. Briggs starts out by setting the ecological scene. A second chapter gives a concise summary of Saharan history, from the earliest fossil remains to the booming oil business of today. This chapter, by the way, contains an excellent account of Saharan exploration. There follows a couple of chapters in which the author, taking his examples from a large number of tribes and localities, discusses in broad terms the settlement patterns, means of livelihood, basic economy, crafts, social systems and, in general, all the main features of the culture of the Saharan peoples. He then analyzes in specific detail four population groups, the Touareg, Teda, Chaamba and Moors, considered by him to be representative of the largest and more important elements of the Saharan population. The narrative section of the book closes with a chapter on "Health and Disease" (including such items as diet, food-taboos and contraception) and a "Retrospect and Prophecy" chapter in which the author, concerning himself with present developments, wonders what the future might hold for the peoples of the Sahara. The book ends with an indifferent glossary and an excellent bibliography.

The service performed by Dr. Briggs with his most recent work, destroying myths, exposing fantasies and correcting exaggerations, and the standards of the author's research are of such high quality that any unfavorable or dissenting comments must be concerned with extremely small matters indeed.

Dr. Briggs encounters the usual difficulties with Arabic transliteration, and is on occasion inconsistent: e.g., "Khaima" and "Jaibar." His statement that "under Moslem law, only land that is adequately watered can be privately owned" is incorrect, and probably stems from a misunderstanding of the complex Shar'i'ah laws governing revival of "dead lands." The mistaken belief that in Arabic the "ship" of

the desert is called just that, is perpetuated by the author. This is not so; the word "markoob" means "mount," something that is ridden on. There is also a probability that the term "Mehadjeria" which Dr. Briggs derives from a root meaning "to quarantine" or "to ostracize" is actually derived (the transliteration problem again) from the root meaning "to emigrate;" it definitely follows this derivation in other points of the Middle East.

This reviewer also believes that to call milk a "*fairly important by-product* of camel breeding" (emphasis added) is an understatement. Among camel breeders milk is more than just food. Besides his usual functions, one can consider the camel also as a self-propelled water purifying plant. Over considerable distances, where water is available but not fit for human consumption, the camels can drink it and convert the briny water into potable milk thus making those routes travelable. In Southern Arabia there exists the custom of adding milk to briny water in order to cut back the salinity. The importance of milk in this respect is often overlooked.

While Dr. Briggs' exposition of the interplay of oasis and desert is one of the best this reviewer has ever seen, some of the author's historical reconstructions (early migrations and the like) are certainly speculative and open to question, based as they must be on the scanty evidence which the author is first to deplore. One might wonder, for instance, whether cultural influences from the South were not larger than Dr. Briggs appears to believe. In any case, his attempt to give us a coordinated story that would account for most of the important cultural features present in the area not only is praiseworthy but also results in a narrative that makes sense.

Dr. Briggs has produced an extremely readable account, well illustrated and published with care, which will interest even those who are only vaguely familiar with or moderately interested in North Africa. Certainly no serious student of the area can afford to miss it.

◇ F. S. VIDAL, now employed by ARAMCO in Dhahran, previously worked and did anthropological fieldwork in North Africa.

YEMEN ON THE THRESHOLD, by Erich W. Bethmann. (Kohinur Series Number Three) Washington, D.C.: American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1960. 78 pages. Cloth-bound, \$2.00; Paper, \$1.00.

Reviewed by Hermann Frederick Eilts

Dr. Bethmann's small volume recounts his visit to Yemen in March-April, 1959. While there, he motored from Ta'izz to San'a via Ibb, Yarim, and Dhamar and from Ta'izz to Mokha; he also paid a flying visit to Marib. The Ibb-Yarim lap of his journey took him over towering Jabal Sumārah along what was until a few years ago a narrow, precipitous, withal spectacular, donkey trail. First opened as a motor road of sorts in 1953 by the late Sayf al-Islām al-Qāsim, brother of Imām Ahmad, this stretch along with the rest of the Mokha-Ta'izz-San'a road travelled by the author, is today being widened and surfaced as part of the United States economic aid program for Yemen.

Dr. Bethmann writes vividly and sensibly of the grandeur of Yemen's rugged scenery, the picturesqueness of its fortress-like cities, the lively but friendly curiosity of its hardy people. Perceptive, though tantalizingly brief, glimpses are provided into aspects of Yemeni religio-philosophical thinking such as predestination (p. 34), Zaydism (p. 42) and the impact of technology upon faith (pp. 26-27). The word portrait of the late Qādi Muḥammad al-'Amri (p. 8), who was killed last year in a Soviet aircraft accident near Moscow, will evoke warm memories from those befriended by that wise Yemeni statesman. The account of Soviet and Chinese Communist technicians encountered is sobering. Dr. Bethmann estimated some 200 Russians (p. 24) and 4,500 Chinese Communists (p. 37) were in Yemen in 1959; this number is known to have increased since that time. Yemen is today the focus of Sino-Soviet activity in the Arabian Peninsula, though the Imām remains unwavering in his fierce determination to maintain his country's independence and neutrality. "Communism is a reversal of all we stand for," said one prominent Yemeni

leader to Dr. Bethmann (p. 25). Friends of Yemen, Arab and Western alike, have been concerned at the extent of Communist penetration of Yemen and gratified at the recent development of a balancing Western interest which can be of service to the Imām in his desire to improve the welfare of his people.

A few minor corrections and supplementary observations are offered. When driving from Ta'izz past al-Janad—whose partially sunken mosque, local legend asserts, was pushed into the earth by the hand of the archangel Gabriel—one is on the road to Qa'taba in Yemen rather than Qatabān in the Aden Protectorate (p. 18). The ancient kingdom of Qatabān centered in Timna, in the Wadi Bayhan, over 100 difficult miles to the northeast. *Qasr Sala* was more than a summer palace of the Imām (p. 13); it was his year round residence until he moved some three years ago to Sukhna, near Hudaydah. The palace in upper Ta'izz (p. 6) is the *maqāam*, or seat of government. Thither the Imām would proceed from his palace to hold court, sometimes by car, sometimes astride a large white donkey, always escorted by his close-ranked, shuffling, eerily chanting body-guard—an extraordinary scene. The distance from Ta'izz to Mokha is closer to 60 than 90 miles (p. 61). The Saudi Arabian diplomatic mission in Yemen, like all others, is a legation rather than an embassy; unlike all but the UAR mission, it is in San'a, not Ta'izz (p. 11). A West German legation joined the Ta'izz diplomatic community in 1960.

Equating the term *qādī* with the south Arabian, or Qahtanic, stock of Yemen (p. 44) assigns a misleading value to the term, though the title is in fact used most widely among members of that group. In Yemen it represents a degree rather than an office and traditionally requires the granting of a diploma, usually by a recognized savant, sometimes by a religious institution. Of late, however, it has often been assumed somewhat lightly as a status symbol. Its debasement on this account has exercised the Yemeni learned community in much the same fashion as has a similar phenomenon in the Western academic world. In northern Yemen, the title *fāqīh* enjoys wider currency

for prestige purposes, and strangers of visible distinction will often be greeted inquiringly, "*sayyid au fāqīh?*" The term *sayyid* applied alike in Yemen to Ḥasani and Husayni descendants of 'Ali and Fatima, is less limited than suggested (p. 44). Its arrogation by a few families of "Hanafiyah" descent from 'Ali is grudgingly tolerated. The title *sābirīf* is indeed used in eastern Yemen (p. 44), but elsewhere has acquired a provincial flavor. When moving to San'a or some other urban center, a *sābirīf* will usually quietly doff that appellation and don instead that of *sayyid*, the mark of greater sophistication.

Though but a sampling of contemporary Yemen, Dr. Bethmann's account is well worth the hour or so required to read it. Its title rightly suggests that Yemen is entering a new era; its pages afford a threshold from which to survey Yemen in transition.

◇ HERMANN FREDERICK EILTS is a Foreign Service Officer who has had long association with Yemen and has spent considerable time there.

IRAN

GERMAN-PERSIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
1873-1912, by Bradford G. Martin. 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton and Company, 1959. 237 pages. No price indicated.

Reviewed by J. C. Hurewitz

Germany concluded its first treaty with Persia in 1873. A dozen years elapsed before formal relations were exchanged. Thirteen more rolled by before the Wilhelmsstrasse, encouraged by the Kaiser and pressured by German industrialists, discovered Persia's potential and launched a forward economic policy. Pursued with more vigor than imagination, this policy lasted until the summer of 1911 when, under a Russo-German convention, it was contingently suspended. World War I broke out before it could be reactivated.

German-Persian relations did not occur in a vacuum. Ever since France had been squeezed out during the Napoleonic Wars, Russia and Anglo-India won the field to themselves and engaged in bilateral competition at Persia's expense until Germany came along. The Shah naturally welcomed the mounting German interest so long as it served to check the expansion of Russian and British influence. But the moment that the German presence began to annoy the entrenched European powers, Russia and Anglo-India took defensive measures—including joint ones—to ward off the new rival.

With these outlines students of Persia's external politics have long been familiar. For the most part, however, knowledge of the subject came from British and Russian sources and were suspected of undue bias. There was thus room for an inquiry that would take German and Persian sources into account as well. The book under review tries to fill this gap.

The international political problem that the author investigates is four-sided, not two-sided. He brought to his research a knowledge of Farsi and German and was assisted in handling germane Russian materials. In Tehran he gained access to the Foreign Ministry archives, where he found the files in a state of utter confusion under the custodianship of an aged archivist who showed little sympathy for and no appreciation of the needs of scholarship. In Germany and England, by contrast, Martin discovered substantial pertinent sources, far more plentiful than those in Tehran and far more carefully organized. He went far beyond *Die Grosse Politik*, which furnished a hard core of documents on his chosen topic, in search of those supplementary records that, for whatever reasons, never found their way into the published collection. These data he enriched by culling information from the German, Persian and British press of the day.

Yet the results are disappointing. A major trouble springs from the fact that this is a doctoral thesis which appeared as a book without having first been transformed into one. It is, in addition, a thesis without a thesis. Without an analytical framework, the study remains amorphous. The intensifying Russian and

Anglo-Indian contest, which lay at the heart of the Persian problem throughout the period of the expanding German interest, receives no more than incidental treatment. Neither is there any systematic analysis of the German interest itself—erroneously labeled imperialistic even though it was manifestly pre-imperialist—nor of the Persian response to the welter of European pressures.

Martin makes virtually no use of Gooch and Temperley's *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, not even to corroborate testimony from elsewhere, and there is no trace of his having used any materials from the Public Record Office, except for the German Foreign Office archives temporarily on deposit in London. It is welcome to see references to press opinion of the day. But here again, the author does not handle his materials analytically nor does he sufficiently integrate the information derived from the press with that derived from the official records.

These are two lessons to draw from this book. No matter how engaging and valuable the theme of a study may be, an author ought not to rush into print until he has acquired control over his subject and his evidence. How much superior this work would have been had the author brought to his task not linguistic skills alone but also a mastery of the discipline of international politics.

◇ J. C. HUREWITZ is professor of government at the Near and Middle East Institute, Columbia University.

IRANISCHE LITERATURGESCHICHTE, by Jan Rypka. Leipzig: VEB Otto Harrassowitz, 1959. xxii + 672 pages. No price indicated.

Reviewed by Martin B. Dickson

Professor J. Rypka's *Iranian Literary History*, originally written in Czech and published in Prague in 1956, has been translated in East Germany with a foreword by the author and notice of new monographs in the field to 1959. It is one of several recent literary histories (by R. Shafiq, A. J. Arberry, E. E. Bertel's, A. Bausani) which seek to integrate the large body

of new material and research available since the days of E. G. Browne (now seriously outdated in certain aspects) and to reevaluate the entire field.

It is a composite work with Professor Rypka acting as editor and chief contributor. He has written the major section dealing with the Islamic period up to the 20th century (269 pages) and the 12-page section on Tajik literature up to the Russian Revolution. The other contributors are as follows: O. Klíma for the pre-Islamic period (65 pages); V. Kubíčková for the 20th century (58 pages); J. Bečka for Soviet-Tajik literature (48 pages); and J. Cejpek for folk literature (88 pages). An appended 77-page bibliography is a major contribution to the entire field, for it features references to frequently ignored basic monographs and editions produced in the past and present in East Europe and the Middle East. (However, the sometimes overfine and overlapping classification into 17 rubrics renders the use of this bibliography unnecessarily trying both for following the documentation and for general reference.)

The ten pages devoted to Hafiz may serve to exemplify Professor Rypka's approach. It consists of a summation of the most solid studies on the poet by the entire international gamut of specialists. We are presented with the differing opinions on various problems in the field (*e.g.* the authenticity and chronology of individual *ghazals*). The treatment is encyclopedic and highly authoritative. However, Professor Rypka himself does not intrude, and to be blunt, neither does Hafiz, for not a single verse is cited. This is not to underestimate the great service rendered of the field of Hafiz studies; it is meant to point up a very basic question in the field of literary history: Is it the "literary" or the "history" aspect which is to be stressed? Professor Rypka's solution is to present a general "literary" introduction of 55 pages covering language, genres, themes, style development and periodization, which is then followed by a chronological presentation of 212 pages.

O. Klíma's valuable survey of the rapidly changing field of pre-Islamic Iranology suffers from an apparently forced overcompression of

his material. While this sometimes leads to deplorable results in his style of presentation, it is surely compensated for by such sub-sections as the present status of the Central Asian linguistic finds.

V. Kubíčková's contribution on 20th century Persian literature is more original and fresh. She approaches her subject with the authority acquired from a sound knowledge of her authors and with decided gusto. (On Šādiq Chūbak: "In his more recent short stories he tends to favor a coarse naturalism—a decided disservice to his literary development.") One must however note the absence of any discussion on Ahmad Kasravi, surely one of modern Iran's leading literary and intellectual figures.

One may question the validity of extremist Tajik claims monopolizing traditional Iranian literature (Professor Rypka rejects this view). One may also decry the Toynbeeian thesis of a Šafavid-Shi'a provoked break in the continuity of the "Iranian" cultural world (Professor Rypka is equivocal on this point). But no one will deny the great interest of J. Bečka's contribution on the Soviet period of Tajik literature. For while this is quite properly described as a "branch of Soviet literature," it is nonetheless impossible for students of Iranian literature to ignore the works of Lāhūti (of both Kirmanshāh in Iran and Stalinabad in Tajikstan) or of Sadreddin Ayni. Both these writers and others have made important scholarly contributions and produced new creative works frequently derived from the common inheritance of both modern Iranians and modern Tajiks.

J. Cejpek's study on folk literature is a distinct contribution to a new field. Particularly felicitous are the 29 pages on the "folk epic" in which the constant give and take between literary and folk themes and genres is stressed. The author, however, is frequently disturbed by the fact that folk literature is not always ideologically correct and that "unprogressive" themes do occur. As an explanation, he suggests a dark plot by the ruling classes to produce "trash" (*Schundliteratur*) in an effort to subvert the proper class consciousness of the masses. "Bourgeois" critics have their own

clichés in this matter, such as "escape-literature" and "wish-fulfillment."

The work as a whole is essentially an authoritative summa of the contemporary state of research in the entire field of Iranian literature. Since it is meant to be a reference work, it is legitimate to complain of the frequent lapse of the paragraphing concept and of the important asides which can only be tracked down after the entire work has been read. But whatever its stylistic shortcomings, the book must be consulted prior to any research in almost any facet of Iranian literature.

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SHORTER NOTICES

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1956, edited by Noble Frankland, assisted by Vera King. London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959. xxv + 768 pages. 84s.

International politics in the Middle East occupied the center of the world stage from the start of 1956 to its finish and only toward the year's end shared the spotlight with events in Eastern Europe. Little wonder then that documents on the Middle East displace virtually half of this substantial volume. The selections for the most part related to the Suez crisis and the Sinai war with some attention to antecedent developments that flowed from the Arab-Israel dispute and the controversy over the Baghdad Pact. Brief essays introduce each of the four parts into which the Middle East materials are divided. The value of the essays would have been enhanced had the editor not limited himself to comments on the substantive issues but also explored the implications of the collapse at Suez of British power in the Middle East. The melting away of British influence removed from the region's international politics the principal stabilizing factor, one that had been there for over a century. Into this vacuum the

United States and the Soviet Union did not immediately move. Because the superpowers kept each other at bay, the newly independent states in the area—particularly in the Arab-Israel zone—which had not yet learned to live peacefully with one another found freer scope for action. This is the primary story that emerges from the documents, and those who seek to understand it will find this judicious collection an indispensable source.

◇ J. C. HUREWITZ, Columbia University.

THE LITERARY REVIEW: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY WRITING: TURKISH NUMBER, Winter 1960/1961. Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 2. Teaneck, N. J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1961. 159 pages. \$1.00.

According to the editors of *The Literary Review*, theirs is the first anthology of Turkish writing to be published in the United States. In their opinion such a venture is long overdue; judging by the quality of the work presented in these pages, they are right.

Most of these Turkish writers are young. Almost exactly half are in their twenties and thirties. Of the forty-three writers and artists—the work of eleven painters is shown—only three were born before 1910. Here is a dramatic illustration of the decisive break with tradition and the past that was brought about by the downfall of the Sultanate and the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Nowhere was this break sharper than in the field of writing. The Ottomans had clung to the French school in prose and to the Persian tradition in poetry—elegance, mysticism and obscurity.

In this collection of ten short stories, headed by a section from a book by Turkey's leading young novelist, Yaşar Kemal, there is not one example of the elegant, the obscure or the mystical. Among the thirty-two poets represented, elegance and mysticism are not primary targets, although as regards obscurity, such poets as İlhan Berk and Cemal Süreya do not consider clarity of expression essential.

In an anthology of this kind, a great deal depends upon the quality of the translations. Here in most cases, the translators have been more than adequate, they have been inspired. This is particularly true of the sensitive and intuitive work of Nermín Menemencioğlu.

I feel, however, that the graphic artists have been done an injustice, for the works reproduced here have lost much of their force and immediacy through the mechanical process.

In all other respects, the collection is stimulating, even exciting. The flavor of the writing will be as strange to most Americans as that of Turgenev and Chekov. The work is indeed unmistakably Turkish, which is one reason for its tremendous impact. Some of the stories may even appear shocking to the American reader, since they deal with that brutalized poverty that Erskine Caldwell, in this country, has chosen for his special province. American readers will feel a deeper identification with Turkish fiction when these gifted writers move on to the perhaps greater technical challenge of using less earthy backgrounds for the setting of their stories. As for the poetry, its appeal is more universal and in this collection every reader will find poems that speak directly to his heart.

◆ REBECCA H. LATIMER is the wife of a foreign service officer retired. They lived nine years in Turkey.

NORTHWEST ETHIOPIA, PEOPLES AND ECONOMY, by Frederick J. Simoons. Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. 250 pages. \$5.00.

In this work the author disclaims concern with acculturation, comparative sociology, ethos and personality and culture (p. ix). Instead, he concentrates on topography, climate, botany, soil chemistry, agriculture, animal husbandry and the uncomplicated crafts found in rural Ethiopia.

A disciple of the geographer Carl O. Sauer, the author rises above geographical determinism and seeks a sort of cultural determinism. His main thesis is that religious and status prejudices of the Coptic Ethiopians have sharply

limited the rational use of their geographical environment. In his view, a major example is the rejection of camel flesh for food "simply as a negative reaction to Moslem habit" (p 117, 214). But elsewhere he reports that camel flesh is not available, that camels don't survive on the Ethiopian plateau due to unfamiliar herbs, steepness, thin air, cold, rain, etc., and that the attempt by British troops to introduce 15,000 camels in January 1943 ended in total demise by May (p. 133). Moreover, he regards the inability of camels to survive a blessing, for otherwise the land would have suffered invasions by camel-mounted raiders like Egypt (p. 136). It seems the Ethiopians were not so irrational after all!

Footnotes are conscientiously supplied, but sometimes it is difficult to spot which data are the result of the author's own field work in 1953. Some of the contradictions in the chapter on social life are due to conflicting reports of the 19th century travellers, frequently referred to in this book. Thus, the Wayt'o (Woyto) are described as "Moslem fishermen" (p. 23), but admittedly, "other Moslems refuse to consider them Moslems" (p. 46). The latter statement is more correct. Elsewhere the author reports a strange custom in northern Ethiopia of cutting away living flesh of a cow for food, but admits that he never personally observed the practice (p. 148).

This is a most valuable collection of geographical information, useful to agricultural extension workers, economists and natural scientists. The social problems of this emergent feudal culture remain to be analyzed.

◆ SIMON D. MESSING, University of South Florida.

POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY, by Adda B. Bozeman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. xiv + 560 pages. Maps. \$10.00.

Mrs. Bozeman's book deals with the history of cultures and governments from antique Mesopotamia and Egypt to the present time. In the discussion of the modern era, the author observes that the basis of the unifying pattern

of human society is Western culture, which has been diffused as a result of scientific advance. The unifying pattern, however, does not exclude the numerous factors that tend to preserve variety and versatility in the present world scene. In fact the ideological cleavage and the rivalry of the major world powers are rendered less acute by the presence of many nations and cultures, each of which is likely to evolve its own syncretic system for the management of its affairs. To quote the author (p. 6), "the realities of world affairs today are not adequately rendered when conveyed in the simple myth of a bipolar world; for between the poles of the contemporary cultural and political map of the world there are numerous well-defined civilizations as well as many others that are just beginning to define themselves."

Modern society evolved from the medieval Western realm, the Byzantine realm and the Muslim realm, and the study of the interplay of these realms forms a substantial part of the book (Part III). The importance of the Byzantine Empire is duly recognized. The Byzantines carried on the Roman political tradition, under the banner of Christ, but they also perpetuated the culture of the Hellenistic period and the faith that the pursuit of knowledge was the noblest human enterprise. Islām was more successful than its Christian rivals in winning the allegiance of men, especially in non-literate regions. But the universality of Islām did not translate itself into a lasting imperial organization. At best Islām was an empire-in-motion, the Dār al-Islām that was in perpetual state of war against the non-Muslims. In modern times Muslim nations endeavor to follow the political legacy of the West rather than their medieval antecedents, which bear the stamp of Islamic theocracy. Nationalism is of necessity associated with secularism. Hence the idea of Muslim unity is confined to the realm of religion.

The book is remarkable for its broad scope and penetrating analysis of historical and cultural phenomena. A few slips (the date of Solon's reforms on p. 62, the date of the codification of Roman law by Justinian on p. 190, the date of the death of Theodosius II on p. 226) do not make the book any less valuable.

It is a thought-provoking work which cuts across many disciplines in a smooth and coherent manner. While much of the historical survey follows the traditional lines of presentation, a brilliant re-examination of the old processes of history and a re-evaluation of philosophical theories on history and law give the book a rare tone of originality.

◇ GEORGE G. ARNAKIS, University of Texas.

TURKEY, by Geoffrey Lewis. Second revised edition. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 226 pages. \$6.00.

Fundamentally this account of modern Turkey is as it first appeared in 1955 (reviewed in this *Journal* in the Spring 1956 issue). The historical portions remain the same except for the rectification of a number of errors and the addition of a few explanatory footnotes. In the descriptive sections Dr. Lewis has updated a good many statistics to 1957 or 1958, either by textual alterations or additional footnotes. He has, in addition, tried to take account of events into the early months of 1959, though at one point he speculates about the election of 1958 as if it were yet to come, while later he correctly notes that it was advanced to October 1957 and gives the results.

It is unfortunate that events have so rapidly overtaken this revision. Though the sections on the Cyprus question are rewritten, they do not foreshadow the independence now attained. The coup of May 1959 and subsequent alterations of the Turkish government are, of course, not mentioned at all, and it is a little startling to read that Menderes "is probably the most intelligent man in Turkish politics today." The value of the book is not, however, destroyed thereby. It remains the best introduction to modern Turkey.

◇ RODERIC H. DAVISON, Washington, D. C.

A WALK IN THE MOUNTAINS, A Family's Trip Through the High Lebanon, by Ralph and Molly Izzard. New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1960. 253 pages. \$4.95.

This is a pleasant and unaffected narrative of an English family's random impressions on a 300-mile pack-trip vacation through the mountains of Lebanon. Three adults, four children and three donkeys spent a delightful summer in 1957 in a most fascinating region. The authors have a sure and sympathetic touch in describing their contacts with the hospitable and appealing mountain people of Lebanon.

Though the travellers provide full details about their equipment, health habits and donkeys, the book is somewhat limited in furnishing reasoned information on the character, problems and divisions of the people in the areas through which they travelled. For example, a passing reference (p. 49) is made to the Hāshim family of Akoura as being trouble-making impoverishers of the area. Having camped myself for days on Hāshim family land in Akoura and knowing well their hospitality, this is a superficially obtained and misleading comment. "Gendarmes" are shown as being generally despised, while actually they enjoy a great deal of prestige and respect in the villages. Though the book makes no pretense of being other than a casual and friendly narrative the authors tend to over-exaggerate the risks and perils in this "wild mountain region." I assure you that villages such as Fnaidig, Akoura and the Cedars are not as wild and inaccessible as the authors imply.

The Izzards' route began at Faraya and proceeded north to the very mountainous region of Afka, Laklouk, the Kadish Valley, the historic Cedars, the plains of Akkar, to the city of Tripoli. Beginning again at the Col des Cedres the family descended to the grandeur of Baalbeck and travelled down the Bekaa Valley. They crossed over the Jebel Niha to Jezzine, Mouktara and the Druze country, the Maaser Chouf, Barouk and finally back to Beirut.

To sum up: Though a casual account, this is an engaging family travel narrative. It provides pleasant reading particularly for those

who have had the good fortune to know and love the mountains of Lebanon.

◆ CHARLES W. HOSTLER is US Air Attaché for Lebanon and Jordan, has a Masters degree from the AUB and is completing his fourth tour of duty in the Middle East.

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General

The Acculturation of Middle Eastern Arab Students in Selected American Colleges and Universities, by Khalil Ismail Gezi. Washington, D. C.: American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1959. (Ph. D. Thesis) 102 pages.

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The Agricultural Policy of Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt, by Helen Anne B. Rivlin. (Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, No. 4) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 390 pages. \$8.00. An analysis of Muhammad 'Ali's domestic policies, with materials from British, French, American and Arabic sources. This study examines the techniques he employed to implement his economic policy and the results produced.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer

With contributions from: Ernest Dawn, Sidney Glazer, John A. Lazo, Louis A. Leopold, Bernard Lewis, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, W. Sands.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islâm. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

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12846 LINEHAN, EDWARD J. "Old-new Iran, next door to Russia." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 119, no. 1 (Ja'61) 44-85. Well illustrated account of an 8,000 mile trip through Iran in 1960.
(See also 12882)

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12860 "The Kazakhs and Pugachev's revolt." *C. A. Rev.* 8, no. 3 (1960) 256-63. Contradictory interpretations by Soviet historians of the role of the Kazakhs in this late 18th century uprising.

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12863 'AZZĀM, 'ABD AL-RAHMĀN. "The Arab nation." *Islamic Rev.* 48 (D '60) 15-8. Random thoughts on the history of Arab nationalism and a projection of the future.

12864 BALDRIDGE, ELWARD F. "Lebanon and Quemoy—the Navy's role." *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 87, no. 2 (F'61) 94-100. Detailed account of the U. S. Navy's part in responding to President Camille Sham'un's request for troops on July 14, 1958.

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12868 DE DIANOUS, HUGUES-JEAN. "Note sur la presse afghane." *Orient*, no. 3 (1960) 177-84. The press is of relatively recent origin, the first

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12869 GAFUROV, V. G. "Socialist victory in the Soviet East." (in Russian). *Problemy Vostok.* no. 3 (1960) 7-19. A panoramic survey of progress in the Central Asian Soviet republics.

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12871 GAULMIER, JEAN. "Le Comité de Salut public et la première grammaire arabe en France." *Orient*, no. 3 (1960) 11-20. Despite the turmoil in late 18th century revolutionary France the authorities found time to concern themselves with the Orient. Their efforts led to the creation of the famous *École nationale des langues orientales* and the first Arabic grammar in France.

12872 HADDAD, GEORGE M. "Modern Arab historians and world history." *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 37-43. The author estimates that some 250 works were written or translated on world history in general or on the history of western and Afro-Asian countries from 1860-1958.

12873 HEYWORTH-DUNNE, J. "Parties politiques et gouvernement dans l'Irak d'aujourd'hui." *Orient*, no. 3 (1960) 69-94. Traces the history of the various parties, their relations with one another and with the army, and their role in the revolution of July, 1958.

12874 KERIMOV, M. "Situation of the Turkish peasantry." *Sov. Vostok.* no. 12 (1960) 29-30. Offers an explanation of why the Turkish farmers hailed the overthrow of the Menderes régime.

12875 KRAELING, CARL H. "Now and then in Libya." *J. A. O. S.* 80 (Ap-Je'60) 104-11. The author fears excessive urbanization that might lead to social cleavage and ultimately economic catastrophe.

12876 LAMBTON, A. K. S. "Persia today." *World Today* 17 (F'61) 76-87. Accelerated economic development has intensified old social and political problems while creating new ones. Growth of the cities continues even though there has been some improvement in rural conditions.

12877 MILLER, A. F. "Diplomatic preparations for the Treaty of Sèvres." (in Russian) *Problemy Vostok.* no. 5 (1960) 34-53. Describes the role of the Soviet revolution in preventing prolonged enforcement of the treaty.

12878 RALEIGH, J. S. "The Middle East in 1960—

a political survey." *M. E. Aff.* 12 (F'61) 34-55. 1960 was comparatively quiet and uneventful, as this country-by-country review shows. None of the problems was much closer to solution, nor was there any particular crisis, Algeria excepted.

12879 RECOULES, JEAN. "Les frontières de l'état marocain." *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, no. 4 (1960) 44-52. Challenges Moroccan claims to Mauretania.

12880 RONDOT, PIERRE. "L'opinion musulmane et l'incident irano-arabe au sujet d'Israël." *Orient*, no. 3 (1960) 95-101. President Nāṣir was not wholly successful in rousing Islamic opinion against the Shāh of Iran, showing once again that it is not easy to mobilize Islām for the political objectives of a single government.

12881 SALIBI, KAMAL S. "Lebanon since the crisis of 1958." *World Today* 17 (Ja'61) 32-42. Current Lebanese policy is aimed at giving the least possible offense to Nāṣir while maintaining the country's basic character.

12882 SEYRANYAN, B. "A new port on the Red Sea." *Sov. Vostok*, no. 11 (1960) 42-3. Account of a visit to Hodeida and summary of Soviet aid to Yemen.

(See also 12886, 12920, 12921)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

12883 "A brief survey of economic and cultural developments in Iran." *Islamic Rev.* 46 (O'60) 33-7. A miscellany of statistics and unrelated news items.

12884 "The economy of Afghanistan." *C. A. Rev.* 8, no. 3 (1960) 316-31. A survey of recent Soviet sources on the country's water, foreign trade (1900-45), and "guided economy."

12885 "The Iraq grain board." *Arab World* 45 (O'60) 6-11. The Grain Board is playing an important role in organizing the country's grain trade on scientific lines and in raising its standards.

12886 "Labor and living conditions in Kazakhstan." *C. A. Rev.* 8, no. 3, (1960) 273-9. The Kazakh SSR has been in serious difficulties for several years. Although mainly economic in nature, they illuminate some political and social problems still awaiting solution.

(See also 12892)

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

12887 D'ENCAUSSE, H. CARRÈRE. "Organisation officielle de l'Islam en U. R. S. S." *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, no. 4 (1960) 4-28. Some 30 million Muslims are included within the frontiers of the Soviet Union, making it the fourth largest Islamic power in the world. An examination of the official apparatus, including a population breakdown by religious denomination and area.

12888 DES VILLETES, JACQUELINE. "La vie des femmes dans un village maronite libanais." *I. B. L. A.* 23, no. 3 (1960) 271-9. Married women still confine themselves to productive tasks in the home and field, whereas most of the younger and unmarried women have salaried jobs elsewhere.

12889 GARDNER, GEORGE H. "The Arab Middle East: Some background interpretations." *J. Soc. Issues* (Ann Arbor), no. 3 (1959) 20-7. The central fact about the Arabs today is that their centuries-old values and mode of life are being "severely battered by forces generated through cross-cultural contact and through the pressures growing out of the need to establish a place in the society of the modern world."

12890 AL-HUSAYNI, ISHĀQ MŪSA. "Christ in the Qur'ān and in modern Arabic literature." *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 297-302. Quotations from the Qur'ān and summaries of five books published between 1894 and 1958. Modern Muslim writers are most favorably disposed toward Christ. The bone of contention between Islām and Christianity lies in the "interpretation of the 'Symbolism' which occurred in the prophet's utterances, rather than in the essence of the faith."

12891 MACLEOD, ROBERT B. "The Arab Middle East: some social psychological problems." *J. Soc. Issues* (Ann Arbor), no. 3 (1959) 69-75. Suggests ways in which modern "cross-cultural methods" can be applied to a few of the more accessible aspects of Middle Eastern and Western cultures.

12892 MELAMID, ALEXANDER. "Economic development and urban geography." *Geog. Rev.* 51, no. 1 (Ja'61) 137-9. Review article examining the relationship between economic development and urban growth as explored by recent research on Egypt, Lebanon, and West Africa.

12893 MELIKIAN, LEVON H. "Authoritarianism and its correlates in the Egyptian culture and in the United States." *J. Soc. Issues* (Ann Arbor), no. 3 (1959) 56-68. The relationship between positive attributes of personality and authoritarianism tends to be opposite in Egypt and the United States. They suggest that in Egypt the authoritarian Muslim may be more healthy psychologically, perhaps because he is conforming to the general culture pattern.

12894 MUHYI, IBRAHIM ABDULLA. "Women in the Arab Middle East." *J. Soc. Issues* (Ann Arbor), no. 3 (1959) 45-57. While women are making progress, no evidence of a militant crusade for greater rights is at hand. There is a genuine desire for freedom from some of the ancient restrictions along with retention in modified form of the traditional conception of woman's role as wife and mother.

12895 NAJARIAN, PERGROUCHI. "Adjustment in the family and patterns of family living." *J. Soc. Issues* (Ann Arbor), no. 3 (1959) 28-44. The family in the Middle East, as perceived by young high school and college students, is a happy unit. Parental discord and complaints against

parents do, of course, exist, but do not constitute a troublesome problem.

12896 SUZUKI, PETER. "Village solidarity among Turkish peasants undergoing urbanization." *Science* (Washington) 132 (S'60) 891-2. A study of a group of Anatolian peasants who are making a smooth adjustment to Istanbul life. The author attributes this to the feeling of village solidarity still actively felt. The phenomenon is helpful in promoting socio-economic development in underdeveloped countries.

(See also 12886)

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, QUR'ĀN, AND THEOLOGY

12897 'ABD AL-KADER, 'ALI, "Rasā'il al-junayd." *Islamic Quart.* 5 (Ja'60) 83-98. Text and translation.

12898 BERCHER, L. "La censure des moeurs selon al-Ghazali." *I. B. L. A.* 23, no. 3 (1960) 299-326. Translation from the *Iḥyā 'ulām al-dīn*.

12899 AL-FĀRŪQI, ISMĀ'IL RĀGİ. "On the ethics of the Brethren of Purity." *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 18-24.

12900 HEER, NICOLAS. "A Ḥūfi psychological treatise." *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 24-36. A translation of al-Tirmidhi's *Bayān al-Faqīh*.

12901 HOURANI, GEORGE F. "Two theories of value in medieval Islam." *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 269-78. "Objectivism" (values such as goodness and justice have a real existence independent of anyone's will) versus "theistic subjectivism" (all values are determined by God). The author examines the reasons why the latter or Ash'arite theory prevailed in Islām.

12902 KHADDURI, MAJID. "The Islamic system: its competition and co-existence with western systems." *Proceed. Amer. S. of Internat. Law.* (1959) 49-52. Some basic assumptions of the classical Islamic conception of world organization.

12903 KISTER, M. J. "The social and political implications of three traditions in the *Kitāb al-Kharāj* of Yahyā b. Adam." *J. Econ. and Soc. Hist. of the O.* 3 (O'60) 326-34. Interprets several obscure *hadīth*s permitting certain fiscal and legal issues in Islām to be viewed in a broader context.

12904 KRYMSKY, A. E. "A sketch of the development of sufism up to the end of the third century of the hijra." *Islamic Quart.* 5 (Ja'60) 109-25. Krymsky (1871-1941) was an outstanding orientalist and Ukrainian poet. This translation from the Russian reveals penetrating insight into the subject.

12905 MACDONALD, JOHN. "Islamic doctrines in Samaritan theology." *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 279-90. Contends that Samaritan thought has been inspired primarily by Christian and Islamic sources,

that there is no evidence of borrowing from orthodox, normative Judaism.

12906 AL-MA'SŪMI, ŞAGHIR HĀSAN. "Ibn al-Imām, the disciple of Ibn Bājjah." *Islamic Quart.* 5 (Ja'60) 102-8.

12907 RAHMAN, FAZLUR. "Sirat al-Nabi of Allāmā Shibli." *J. Pak. Hist. S.* 8 (Jl'60) 167-83.

LANGUAGE

12908 DZHAIKYAN, G. B. "The origin of consonantism in Armenian dialects." (in Russian) *Vop. Yaz.*, no. 6 (1960) 39-49.

12909 ESENKOVA, ENVER. "Influences lexicales françaises dans la langage turque." *I. B. L. A.* 23, no. 3 (1960) 291-7. The long-standing influence of French vocabulary on Turkish has become intensified in modern times with penetration into virtually every aspect of culture.

(See also 12871)

LITERATURE

12910 "The literature of Azerbaijan." *C. A. Rev.* 8, no. 3 (1960) 235-55. A standout feature of the Soviet treatment is the appropriation as Azerbaijani of writers generally regarded as belonging to other countries.

12911 BECKA, J. "New papers on Rudaki by Tadzhik and other Soviet scholars." *Arch. O.* 28, no. 3 (1960) 494-501. Tajik scholars owing to their familiarity with modern research techniques and mastery of the sources are making a valuable contribution to Iranian studies, as this biobibliographical article shows.

12912 FADIL, 'ABD AL-HAQQ. "The fame of Omar Khayyām." *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 259-68. A general appraisal of the personality, scientific achievements and literary talent of the poet

12913 KHALAFALLAH, MOUHAMMAD. "L'évolution de la langue et de la littérature arabis au XX^e siècle." *Jour. World Hist.*, 6, no. 1 (1960). 12914 KHULUSI, S. A. "The influence of Ibn al-Muqaffa on the *Arabian Nights*." *Islamic Rev.* 48 (D'60) 29-31. Cites evidence pointing to the celebrated eighth century writer's influence on the framework, early tales, and style of the classic.

12915 LESCOT, ROGER. "Jeunes écrivains iraniens d'expression française." *Orient*, no. 3 (1960) 117-31. Translation of a fairy tale by Karim Mojtahedy.

12916 PETRACEK, K. "Syntaktisches aus den Diwan des al-Aḥwās al-Anṣārī." *Arch. O.* 28, no. 2 (1960) 174-180.

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12917 "Three Leningrad orientalists." *C. A. Rev.* 8, no. 3 (1960) 280-6. Bartold, Yakubovskiy, and P. P. Ivanov were outstanding Russian scholars specializing on Central Asia.

12918 BERSON, ALAN. "The Muslim republics of the U. S. S. R." *R. C. A. J.* 48 (Ja'61) 56-66. A description of Soviet publications appearing between April and July 1960.

BIOGRAPHY

12919 DE SOMOGYI, JOSEPH. "My reminiscences of Ignace Goldziher." *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 5-17. A favorite student writes in eloquent detail of his distinguished teacher.

MISCELLANEOUS

12920 "The Twenty-fifth International Congress of Orientalists." *Problemy Vost.* no. 5 (1960) 206-220. A listing of the papers presented plus general comments on the Moscow meeting.

12921 WHEELER, G. E. "Russia and Asia in 1960." *R. C. A. J.* 48 (Ja'61) 17-28. An exceptionally interesting account of the Moscow Congress of Orientalists and a subsequent visit to Central Asia.

BOOK REVIEWS

12922 *Modern Afghanistan*. (in Russian) *Problemy Vostok*, no. 6 (1960) 174-7. (Aziz Niallo). A guide book written by a group of authors.

12923 ALDERSON, A. D. and IZ, FAHIR. *The concise Oxford Turkish dictionary*. *Islamic Quart.* 5 (Ja'61) 130-2. (J. R. Walsh). "Has made the whole body of contemporary creative literature accessible to the foreigner." Includes fifty suggested entries.

12924 ARBERRY, A. J. MINOVI, and WILKINSON, J. V. S. *The Chester Beatty Library*. B.S.O.A.S. 23, no. 2 (1960) 401-2. A catalogue of the Persian manuscripts and miniatures. (M. J. Dresden).

12925 BAER, GABRIEL. *The Arabs of the Middle East*. (in Hebrew). *R. C. A. J.* 48 (Ja'61) 91. (Emile Marmorstein). Recommended for the serious student.

12926 BERGER, MORROE. *Military élite and social change*. *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 56. Egypt since Napoleon.

12927 BRIGGS, LLOYD CABOT. *Tribes of the Sahara*. *Arab World* 45 (O'60) 30. "A scholarly and intensely interesting account."

12928 BIRDWOOD, LORD, *Nuri as-Said*. M. E. Aff. 12 (F'61) 57. (Majid Khadduri). "Neither full nor authoritative . . . at times not even accurate."

12929 BOUMAN, JOHAN. *Le conflit autour du Coran et la solution d'al-Baqillani*. *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 62-3. (David W. Butler).

12930 BUTLER, GRANT C. *Kings and camels*. *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 320. (Eleanor T. Calverley). Experiences with Aramco, the main emphasis being on the Arabs.

12931 CHILDERS, ERSKINE B. *Common sense*

about the Arab World. Internat. Aff. 37 (Ja'61) 107. (S. H. Longrigg). "Interesting, sensible, valuable, well-informed within its limits."

12932 CLARK, MICHEL K. *Algeria in turmoil*. *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 320-1. (Vernon L. Ferwerda). The author "strains so hard to put the French in the most attractive position . . . that the end product can hardly be considered an objective appraisal of the situation."

12933 COWAN, DAVID. *An introduction to modern literary Arabic*. *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 68-9. (Ernest N. McCarus).

12934 CRAGG, KENNETH. *Sandals at the mosque*. *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 316-8. (Claude L. Pickens, Jr.). "A cumulative expression of the (author's) thinking in relation to the Christian communication with Muslims."

12935 DARKE, HUBERT, tr. *The book of government* (of Nizām al-Mulk). J. Econ. and Soc. Hist. of the O., no. 3 (O'60) 335. (C. Cahen). First English translation of this celebrated work.

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12937 FAKHRY, MAJID. *Islamic occasionalism*. *Islamic Quart.* 5 (Ja'60) 126-7. (A. L. Tibawi). Occasionalism, as used by the author, means "the belief in the exclusive efficacy of God."

12938 GAITSKELL, ARTHUR. *Gezira: a story of the development in the Sudan*. Geog. Rev. 51, no. 1 (Ja'61) 157-8. (William A. Hance). "Students . . . of all undeveloped areas will find that this volume makes important contributions toward the solution of an extremely difficult problem."

12939 GHODS-NAKHAI, M. *Rubaiyat*. *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 315-6. (J. Christy Wilson). "A modern Rubaiyat in English by an author of our day. It is much the same philosophical tone as Omar Khayyam but lacks the brilliance of the former."

12940 GRUNWALD, KURT AND RONALL, JOACHIM O. *Industrialization in the Middle East*. Internat. Aff. 37 (Ja'61) 107-8. (Doreen Warriner). "An industrious compilation, mainly from U. N. and other official reports."

12941 GUILLAUME, A. *New light on the life of Muhammed*. *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 55. The new material comes from a Moroccan MS containing a report of Ibn Ishāq's lectures on the Prophet.

12942 HARRELL, RICHARD. *The phonology of colloquial Arabic*. *Muslim World* 50 (O'60) 312-4. (Harvey Sobelman). The author "has only succeeded in adding more chaos to the original chaos of his field data. . . . Yet the work will be esteemed for its near-encyclopedic detail."

12943 HAY, RUPERT. *The Persian Gulf states*. *Muslim World* 51 (Ja'61) 62. (E. E. Calverley).

"An excellent geographical and political account of Eastern Arabia."

12944 HEER, NICHOLAS, ed. *Al-Tirmidhi's Bayān al-farg*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 68. (Elmer H. Douglas).

12945 JABRE, FARID. *La notion de certitude selon Ghazali*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 63-5. (Elmer H. Douglas).

12946 JEFFERY, ARTHUR. *Islam: Muhammad and his religion*. J. A. O. S. 80 (Ap-Je '60) 146-7. (Wilfred Cantwell Smith). "An anthology for students, presenting in small extracts . . . translations of Muslim texts on many facets of the faith."

12947 KARAPETYAN, E. T. *The Armenian family commune*. (in Russian). Sov. Etnografiya, no. 5 (1960) 159-61. (V. Kobychev).

12948 KHADDURI, MAJID. *Independent Iraq*, 2nd ed. R.C.A.J. 48 (Ja'61) 95-6. "Professor Khadduri's chief interest seems to be in the formal aspects of politics—constitutions, electoral systems, the programmes of political parties, etc.; Internat. Aff. 37 (Ja'61) 110. (S. H. Longrigg). "A meticulous and readable record and . . . a source-book helpful to later writers."

12949 KHALFIN, N. A. *Failure of British aggression in Afghanistan* (in Russian.) Problemy Vostok, no. 3 (1960) 174-6. (Gordon-Polonskaya and N. I. Semenova). "The first work to deal with all three Anglo-Afghan wars while throwing light on some obscurities in Afghan history."

12950 KHALIFÉ, IGNACE-ABDO, ed. *Sifāt-us-Sā'il* (of Ibn Khaldūn). Muslim World 50 (O'60) 309-11. "A more developed presentation of (Ibn Khaldūn's) ideas on sufism than is to be found in his famous work, the *Muqaddima*."

12951 KIMCHE, JON AND DAVID. *Both sides of the hill: Britain and the Palestine war*. Internat. Aff. 37 (Ja'61) 108-9. (Elizabeth Monroe). "The bulk of it is a description of the battles in Palestine that began directly when the United Nations had voted in 1947. . . . Its account of these constitutes a great justification for the writing of contemporary history."

12952 KRAEMER, JÖRG. *Das problem des islamischen Kulturgeschichte*. Arch. O. 28, no. 2 (1960) 344-6. (O. Klíma); Muslim World 50 (O'60) 322. (Gerhard Schreck).

12953 LANDAU, ROM. *Islam and the Arabs*. Mid. East Aff. 12 (F'61) 55-6. (Kenneth Cragg). The reviewer criticizes the excess of generalizations.

12954 LAQUEUR, WALTER. *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. Islamic Quart. 5 (Ja'61) 133-6. (Edward Atiyah). "Contains a vast amount of information thoroughly documented, lucidly presented, and objectively, if not always, correctly interpreted;" Muslim World 50 (O'60) 327-8. (Matthew Spinka). An "authoritative study."

12955 LEGENDRE, MARCEL. *Survivances des mesures traditionnelles en Tunisie*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 59. A concise compendium of traditional measures of measurement. Of great practical value.

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12961 MILES, GEORGE. *Excavation coins from the Persepolis region*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 60-1. (Harold W. Glidden). Principally Islamic coins of 'Abbasid origin.

12962 MONTEIL, V. *Les Musulmans soviétiques. L'Afrique et l'Asie*, no. 4 (1960) 59-61.

12963 NAJĀ, A. S. *Al-Kumit bin Zaid al-Assadi*. Muslim World 50 (O'60) 312. (Fu'ad Bahman). Al-Kumit was a political poet of the Umayyad period.

12964 O'BALLANCE, EDGAR. *The Sinai campaign*. R. C. A. J. 48 (Ja'61) 91-2. Although most of the author's information is derived from Israeli sources, "the performance of the Egyptian army emerges as rather more creditable than it has been represented previously."

12965 PARET, RUDI. *Mohammad und der Koran*. Muslim World 50 (O'60) 312. (Gerhard Schreck). A good presentation for the non-specialist.

12966 PARET, RUDI. *Symbolik des Islam*. J. A. O. S. 70 (Ap-Je'60) 147. (Franz Rosenthal). "An excellent brief introduction to the vast subject of Islam in general."

12967 PARTNER, PETER. *A short political guide to the Arab World*. Internat. Aff. 37 (Ja'61) 106. (S. H. Longrigg). "The essay is of far higher quality than the ordinary summary . . . of Arab affairs; it shows study, comprehension, and sympathy."

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12969 PEARSON, J. D., ed. *Index Islamicus* 1906-1955. J. A. O. S. 80 (Ap-Je'60) 148-9. (Franz Rosenthal). "A full overall picture of the aims and interests of Islamic research in the West during the first half of the twentieth century."

12970 PELLAT, CH., ed. *Recueil de textes tirés de la presse arabe*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 59-61. "For students of Arabic who possess a good knowledge of grammar and a fair modern vocabulary."

12971 RAHMAN, F., ed. *Avicennas de Anima*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 67. (Elmer H. Douglass).

12972 REUSCHEL, W. *Al-Halil ibn Ahmad, der Lehrer Sibawaihis, als Grammatiker*. Problemy Vostok, no. 5 (1960) 197-8. (G. H. Gabuchan).

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12974 SALIBI, KAMAL S. *Maronite historians of medieval Lebanon*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 65-7. (Kenneth L. Crose). Furnishes considerable detail on the period of the Crusades and Mamluks.

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12977 SCIPIO, LYNN A. *My thirty years in Turkey*.

Muslim World 50 (O'60) 328-9. (Edwin E. Calverley). The biography of an American engineer who organized the department of engineering in Robert College.

12978 SHWADRAN, BENJAMIN. *The power struggle in Iraq*. Muslim World 51 (Ja'61) 55-6. An interpretation of the aftermath of the July 1958 revolution that does "justice to standards and patterns that are distinctly Middle-Eastern," R. C. A. J. 48 (Ja'61) 95.

12979 TREVASKIS, G. K. N. *Eritrea: a colony in transition: 1941-52*. Internat. Aff. 37 (Ja'61) 117. (S. H. Longrigg). The author spent ten years in the territory and he possesses "qualities of observation, synthesis, and scholarship."

12980 TRITTON, A. S. *Materials on Muslim education in the Middle Ages*. Islamic Quart. 5 (Ja'61) 127-9. A highly critical review.

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12982 WILBER, DONALD, N. *Iran: past and present*. R. C. A. J. 48 (Ja'61) 96-7.

12983 ZIADEH, FARHAT J. AND WINDER, R. BAYLY. *An introduction to modern Arabic*. Arch. O., 28 no. 3 (1960) 514-5. (K. Petrácek). The reviewer strongly recommends the book as a pedagogical tool.

LIST OF PERIODICALS UNDER SURVEY

al-Abhath. Lebanon and Syria, £1; foreign, £1; single issue £1. 250, 6s. *q* American Univ. of Beirut; agent: Dar al-Kitab, POB 1284, Beirut, Lebanon.

Acta Orientalia. 60 forint. *irreg* Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Orientalistikai Köleményei, 2 V. Alkotmány-utca 21, Budapest, Hungary.

al-Adib. Single issue £1. *m* al-Adib, B.P. 878, Beirut, Lebanon.

African Affairs. £1 4s; single issue 5s. *q* Royal African Society, 18 Northumberland Ave., London, W.C.2.

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L'Afrique et l'Asie. 800 fr. *q* I.A.C. 8, rue de Furstenberg, Paris 6e.

American Historical Review. \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Historical Association, Study Room 274, Library of Congress Annex, Washington 25, D. C.; single issues available from The Macmillan Co., 60 Fifth Ave., New York 11, N. Y.

American Journal of Archaeology. \$10.00; no extra charge for foreign subscription. *q* Archaeological Institute of America, 5 Washington Square N, New York 3, N. Y.

al-Andalus. 60 ptas.; single issue 30 ptas. *semi-ann* Secretaria, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Cambio Internacional Serrano 117, Madrid, Spain.

Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Kakultesinin Dergisi. 4 parts per ann Univ. of Ankara, Turkey.

Annales Archéologiques de Syrie. Syria, £S 20; foreign, £2 10s or equiv.; single issues £S 10, £1 5s. *semi-ann* Direction Générale des Antiquités de Syrie, Damascus, Syria.

Annales de l'Institut d'Etudes Orientales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger. No fixed price. Institut d'Etudes Orientales, Faculté des Lettres, Algiers, Algeria.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Membership, U.S., \$5; Can., \$4.50; elsewhere, \$4; subscription, libraries and other institutions, \$6; single issue, mbrs. \$1.25, non-mbrs. \$2. *bi-m* American Academy of Political and Social Science, 3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia 4, Pa.

Arab World. Town mbrs. £1 1s; country & overseas mbrs. 10s 6d. *q* Anglo-Arab Assn., 27 Eaton Place, London, S.W.1.

Arabica. Fl. 26; fr. 2400. *3 issues per ann* E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; Librairie Orientale et Americaine G.P. Maisonneuve, 198, Blvd. St.-Germain, Paris 7e.

Archiv Orientální. Kčs.100; single issue Kčs.25, *p* Československá akademie ved Orientální ústav, Lásenská 4, Praha III, Czechoslovakia.

Armenian Review. \$6; single issue \$1.75. *q* Hairenik Association, Inc., 212 Stuart St., Boston 16, Mass.

Asiatische Studien. Sw. fr. 18 *q* A. Francke, A. G. Verlag, Bern, Switzerland.

Belloten. *q* Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, Turkey.

Biblioteca Orientalis. \$9.50; single issue \$2. *bi-m* Dr. A. A. Kampman, ed., Noordeindeplein 4a, Leiden, The Netherlands.

British Museum Quarterly. £1; single issue 5s 3d. *q* Trustees of the British Museum, Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.

Bulletin of the Cleveland Museum of Art. \$3; single issue 35¢. *m* (10 issues per ann) Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland 6, Ohio.

Bulletin of the Detroit Institute of Arts. 80¢; single issue 25¢. *q* Detroit Institute of Arts, 5200 Woodward Ave., Detroit, Mich.

Bulletin des Etudes Arabes. *bi-m* 175 Chemin du Telemly, Algiers, Algeria.

Bulletin de l'Institut du Desert Egyptien. By exchange or request. *semi-ann* M. Mitwally, Sec. Gen. de l'Institut du Desert Egyptien, Blvd. Sultan Hussein, Heliopolis, Egypt.

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library. £1 11s; single issue 15s 6d. *semi-ann* University Press, 316-324 Oxford Road, Manchester 13, England.

Bulletin of the Museum of Fine Arts. \$1; single issue 25¢. *q* Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 15, Mass.

Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. £1 10s. *3 issues per year* School of Oriental & African Studies, Univ. of London, London, W.C.1; agent: Luzac & Co., 46 Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.

Burlington Magazine. UK, £3; foreign, \$10; single issue 5s, \$1. *m* Burlington Magazine, Lt., 12 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.

Cahiers de Tunisie (formerly *Revue Tunisienne*). 1000 fr; foreign; 1200 fr; single issue 400 fr. *q* L'Institut des Hautes Études de Tunisie, 2 rue de Souk-Ahras, Tunis, Tunisia.

The Caucasian Review. Institute for the Study of the USSR. Mannhardtstrasse, 6, Munich 22, Germany.

Central Asia Review. 30s; single issue 7s 6d. *q* Geoffrey Wheeler and David Footman, eds. 66 King's Road, London, S.W. 3.

Commentary. U.S., \$5; foreign, \$6; single issue 50¢. *m* American Jewish Committee, 34 W. 33rd St., New York 1, N.Y.

Current History. U.S., \$6; Can., \$6.25; elsewhere, \$6.50; single issue 50¢. *m* Events Publ. Co., 108-10 Walnut St., Philadelphia 6, Pa.

L'Egypte Contemporaine. Egypt, £E 1.50; foreign, £1 14s; single issue £E .40, 9s. *q* Boite Postale 732, Cairo.

L'Egypte Industrielle. Egypt, £E 1; foreign, £1 10s; single issue £E .15s, 15s. *m* La Fédération Egyptienne de l'Industrie, Mahmoud Bayram, ed., 26a rue Cherif Pacha, Cairo.

Ethnos. Swed. cr. 15; single issue Swed. cr. 4. *q* Statens Ethnografiska Museum, Stockholm Ö, Sweden.

Faenza. Italy, lire 1000; foreign, lire 1500; single issue lire 200, lire 300. *semi-ann* Direzione del Museo Internazionale delle Ceramiche, Faenza, Italy.

Foreign Affairs. \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Council on Foreign Relations, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21, N.Y.

Geographical Journal. £1 16s; single issue 8s 6d. *q* Royal Geographical Society, 1 Kensington Gore, London, S.W.7; agent: John Murray (Publ.), Ltd., 50 Albemarle St., London, W.1.

Geographical Review. \$9.50; single issue \$2.50. *q* American Geographical Society, Broadway at 156th St., New York 32, N.Y.

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Héspérien. 2600 fr; single issue 1300 fr. *semi-ann* Secrétariat des Publications, Institut des Hautes-Études Marocaines, Rabat, Morocco; agent: Librairie Larose, 11 rue Victor-Cousin, Paris 5e.

IBLA. Tunisia and France, 850 fr; foreign, 1000 fr; single issue 215 fr, 250 fr. *q* Institut des Belles-Lettres, 12 rue Jamaa el Haoua, Tunis, Tunisia.

İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi. Faculty of Divinity, Ankara Univ., Cebeci, Ankara, Turkey.

Illustrated London News. UK, £5 18s 6d; U.S., (British Edition) \$18, (American Edition) \$16.50; single issue 3s, 35¢. *w* 1 New Oxford St., London, W.C.1; agent: International News Company, 131 Varick St., New York 13, N.Y.

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International Social Science Bulletin. \$3.50; single issue \$1. *q* UNESCO, 19 avenue Kleber, Paris 16e; U.S. agent: Columbia Univ. Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27.

Iraq. £1 11s; single issue 18s. *semi-ann* British School of Archaeology in Iraq, 20 Wilton St., London, S.W.1.

Isis. \$7.50; single issue \$1.90. *q* History of Science Society, I. Bernard Cohen, ed., Widener Library 189, Cambridge 38, Mass.

Der Islam. DMW 28; single issue DMW 10. *3 issues per year* Schriftleitung des Islams, Prof. Dr. R. Strothman & Prof. Dr. B. Spuler, ed., Bornplatz 2, Hamburg 13, Germany; agent: Walter de Gruyter & Co., Genthiner Str. 13, Berlin W5 (U.S. Sector).

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Islamic Review. UK, £1 5s; U.S., \$3.75; single issue 2s 6d, 37¢. *m* Working Muslim Mission & Literary Trust, Shah Jehan Mosque, Woking, Surrey, England; Moslem Society of USA, 870 Castro St., San Francisco, Calif.; The International Muslim Society, Inc., POB 37, Manhattanville, Station J, New York 27, N. Y.

Izvestiya Akademii Nauk—Otdeleniye Literatury i Yazyka.* \$4.50 or £1 10s; single issue 90¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.

Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen. DMW 24. *ann* Publ.: Dr. Ernst Hauswedell & Co. Verlag, Fontenay 4, Hamburg 36, Germany.

Jewish Quarterly Review. \$6. *q* The Dropsie College, Broad & York Sts., Philadelphia 32, Pa.

Journal of the American Oriental Society. \$8; libraries, \$7; single issue \$2. *q* American Oriental Society, 329 Sterling Memorial Library, New Haven, Conn.

Journal Asiatique. *q* Société Asiatique, 1 rue de Seine, Paris 6e.

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Le Muséon. 300 Belg. fr. 2 double vols. per year Le Muséon, 9 Ave. des Hêtres, Héverlé-Louvain, Belgium.

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New Times.* \$3.50 or 14s; single issue 10¢, 4d plus postage. *w* Moscow, USSR.

Oriens. TL 15; \$5. *semi-ann* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, % E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; agent for U.S. & Can.: Prof. Dr. Eberhard, 604 Panoramic Way, Berkeley, Calif.

Orient. *q* ed. Marcel Colombe, 114 Champs Elysées, Paris VIII.

* Agents in the U.S. for Russian publications: Four Continent Book Corporation, 38 W. 38th St., New York 19, N. Y.; Universal Distributors, 52-54 W. 13th St., New York 11, N. Y.

Orientalische Literatur Zeitung. q J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, Scherlstr. 2, (10B) Leipzig, C1, Germany. **Oriente Moderno.** \$8. m Instituto per l'Oriente, Viale Davide Lubin 2, Rome.

Palestine Exploration Quarterly. £1 1s. semi-ann Palestine Exploration Fund, 2 Hinde St., Manchester Square, London, W.1.

Politique Etrangère. 1800 fr; foreign, 2250 fr; single issue 330 fr. bi-m Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, 54 rue de Varenne, Paris 7e.

Proceedings, Royal Society of Historical Studies. irreg 18 Ave. du Baron Empain, Heliopolis, Egypt. **Revue du Caire.** Egypt, £E 2.25; foreign, 2000 fr; single issue £E .20, 200 fr. m 3 rue Dr. Ahmed Hamid Said, Cairo; Les Editions des Cahiers du Sud, 28 rue du Four, Paris 6e.

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Rocznik Orientalni. Warsaw, Poland.

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Studia Islamica. Single issue, 650 fr. semi-ann Editions Larose, 11 rue Victor-Cousin, Paris 5e.

Sudan Notes & Records (incorporating Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of the Sudan). Sudan and Egypt, £E .75; foreign, 18s; single issue £E .40, 9s. semi-ann G. N. Sanderson, ed., POB 555, Khartoum, Sudan; agent: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 46 Gr. Russel St., London, W.C.1.

Sumer (Journal of Archaeology in Iraq). Iraq, £1 1; foreign, £1 10s; single issue 10s, 15s. semi-ann Directorate General of Antiquities, Baghdad, Iraq.

Tamuda. Spain & Span. Morocco, 100 ptas.; foreign, \$4; single issue 60 ptas., \$2.50. semi-ann Delegación de Educación y Cultura, Tetuan, Spanish Morocco.

Tarbiz. \$5. q Magnes Press, Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel.

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Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher. DMW 40; single issue DMW 20. semi-ann Prof. Julius von Farkas, ed., Hospitalstr. 10, Göttingen; Publ.: Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, Germany.

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Die Welt des Islams. Gld. 25; \$6.60. q Prof. G. Jäschke, ed., (21a) Munster (Westf.), Hüfferstr. 69, Germany; Publ.: E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. irreg Orientalisches Institut der Universität Wien, Hanuschgasse 3/II, Vienna I, Austria.

World Today. UK, £1 5s; U.S., \$5; single issue 2s, 45¢. m Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St. James' Square, London, S.W.1; 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N. Y.

Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. semi-ann Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GMBH, Weisbaden, Germany.

ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique	Mid., Middle	<i>Arabic</i>
Acad., Academy	Mod., Modern, moderno, etc.	
Afr., African, Afrique, etc.	Mus., Museum, musée	
fr., fricain, Afrique, etc.	Natl., National	
Amer., American	Nr., Near	
Archeol., Archaeological, Archéologique	Numis., Numismatic, numismatique	
B., Bulletin	O., Oriental, oriente, etc.	<i>Russian, Polish, etc.</i>
C., Central	Pal., Palestine	
Cent., Century	Phil., Philosophical	
Contemp., Contemporary, etc.	Philol., Philological, Philologique	
Cult., Culture	Polit., Political, Politique	
D., Deutsch	Proceed., Proceedings	
Dept., Department	Quart., Quarterly	
East., Eastern	R., Royal	
Econ., Economic, économique	Res., Research	
For., Foreign	Rev., Review, revue	
G., Gesellschaft	Riv., Rivista	
Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc.	S., School	
Gt. Brit., Great Britain	Soc., Society, société	
Hist., Historical, historique, etc.	Stud., Studies	
Illust., Illustrated	Trans., Transactions	
Inst., Institute	U.S., United States	
Internat., International	USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	
J., Journal	Univ., University, université	
L., Literature, etc.	Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung	
M., Morgenländisch, etc.		<i>Turkish</i>
Mag., Magazine		
	Fak., Fakülte	
	Univ., Universite	

Communications

The JOURNAL welcomes comments from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in these columns. In addition to letters of comment on previous articles, communications on other information of interest will be printed as space is available.

Dear Sir:

Miss Gendzier in her paper on "James Sanua and Egyptian Nationalism" [Winter 1961 MEJ] describes the present age as having "learned to accept the hostility of Arab and Jew as a fact of political life."

This statement implies an identification of Jews, Israelis, and Zionists, to which the majority of Jews will object as emphatically as many Arabs.

The statement is neither correct nor justified—with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia where discrimination against "Jews" in general is practiced by the Arabian American Oil Company and the United States Government upon insistence of the Saudi Arabian Government.

The identification as implied by Miss Gendzier may be useful to the political objectives of Israel and Zionism, but will be rejected by most Jews and Arabs alike.

WILLIAM B. BROWNE
New York, N. Y.

"INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY KURDISTAN" FORMED

An "International Society Kurdistan" was founded in Amsterdam, Netherlands, on July 1st, 1960, and is now active in about a dozen countries. Its aims are threefold:

- 1) To collect and distribute information on Kurds and Kurdistan;
- 2) To help the Kurds in their struggle for democratic emancipation; and
- 3) To help improve relations between the

Kurds and their neighbor nations in Western Asia, thus contributing to peace.

Within the framework of ISK there are a "Scientific Council," a "Central Kurdish Library in Europe," a "Kurdish Sound Archive" and a "Kurdish Picture Archive."

In November 1960 the ISK started an information service in German, extended last January to a monthly called *Betrift: Kurden* (= "Concerning: Kurds") which developed into an information magazine "Kurdish Facts," published in English in March 1961. The ISK is a private, politically and ideologically independent, international agency. Its leaders are: Mr. Silvio van Rooy (Chairman), Mr. Lou Simonse (Vice Chairman), Drs. Jan Kemp (Secretary), Mr. Jouthe Roodbergen (Second Secretary) and Mr. Eelco Broeksma (Treasurer.)

ISK is preparing several scientific publications, among them a small (Kurmanji) Kurdish dictionary (English and German), an English-language anthology of contemporary Kurdish poetry and a history of the Kurdish Mehabad Republic (1945/46). It also intends to organize yearly congresses of Kurdologists. "Kurdish Facts" reports on Kurdish, West-Asian and Afro-Asian affairs and on their impact on Orientalistics. It contains a digest of the Kurdish press and of the international press on Kurdish affairs and is going to publish documents, a cumulative chronology, maps, biographies and a Kurdish words list in installments. It can be ordered at £1.-/- or equivalent (payments to "International Society Kurdistan," Twentsche Bank n.v., Amsterdam) annually. The ISK's address is Amsterdam-W., Da Costastraat 25/I.

Dear Sir:

I note J. B. Kelly's remarks [*MEJ*, XV, p. 122] on my review of George Lenczowski's *Oil and State in the Middle East*, [*MEJ*, XIV, pp. 338-340]. I have also noted the statement he mentions in *The London Times* on the subject of the Buraimi arbitration, together with the statement of Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on October 25, 1955. It has been and still is my view that the tribunal was competent to review the facts in the case. The charge that attempts were made to corrupt the tribunal is by no means equivalent to the charge that this body itself was corrupt, and I think it is significant that, as I have been told, the learned arbiter, Dr. De Visscher, Chairman of the tribunal, requested Sir Reader Bullard to withhold his resignation until such time as the first ruling of the tribunal could be read.

Had it not been for the position taken arbitrarily by the British member of the tribunal at that moment, the arbitration would have proceeded. Thus, the British decision took this affair out of the realm of law into the realm of force and no excuses can change the record.

Since the failure of the arbitration fighting has been continuous in the Oman mountains, between local groups and the forces of the Sultan of Muscat, and in the meantime the good offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations have been enlisted. As this process is still in progress, it may be just as well not to discuss the details of the matter further.

JAMES TERRY DUCE
New York, N. Y.

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
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